Sam Houston
THE NEW MEXICO VOLUNTEERS
It’s possible that history students and Civil War buffs will not understand the American Civil War in New Mexico if they are not familiar New Mexico itself - it’s history and cultural heritage, in short – what kind of people lived here. If one reads only the popular histories available on the Civil War period one gets the impression that the New Mexicans had never volunteered for military duty before… that they were untrustworthy, untried, and their very enlistment was a great experiment of sorts, almost amounting to the controversial use of black troops in the eastern states. This is not quite how it was.
One cannot look at the situation in the southwest with the same political, religious and cultural points of view that existed in the ‘mainstream’ United States. People here did not have any real experience with the issues of Negro slavery, states rights, and economics as they existed east of the Mississippi. This was truly a foreign land – a world apart, so to speak. This failure to take into account a population’s unique demographics is not a new phenomenon. Most Americans, who entered New Mexico in the period after its conquest, did not understand the native New Mexicans, and early historians who recorded and recounted those American experiences followed through with many of the same biases. Therefore, this historical stereotype has passed down to today when modern historians take the Territory itself almost completely out of historical context. Part of the reason for this is that we have very few accounts that were written from a native point of view, Hispanic or Native American. But if we discount their point of view we are ignoring the vast majority of the people who lived here at the time. We’ll try to examine the opening of the Civil War from a slightly broader perspective. The first aspect we’ll look at is the many difficulties that New Mexicans had with Texans long before the Civil War began.
The problems between New Mexico and Texas did not begin during the American Civil War, they began during the Texas revolution for independence. When Sam Houston’s troops captured Santa Anna himself, Sam judiciously tried to cinch his success and avoid further bloodshed by making a deal with him. In return for sparing his life, the Mexican leader agreed to pull his troops out of Texas. It was a good move because Santa Anna had 4,000 fresh troops not twenty miles away. The Texan army followed the retreating Mexicans to the banks of the Rio Grande. Once there, Sam Houston and his officers inspected their newly won Territory and tried to decide where the western boundaries of their new country lay.
Sam Houston
When the Texan revolutionary army, after their many victories under the command of General Sam Houston, halted on the banks of the Rio Grande, a council of officers was called, to determine what should be the boundary of the new republic. All the officers present, with the single exception of Houston, advised that the chain of mountains, lying about one hundred miles west of the Rio Grande, should be adopted as the western boundary line: thus embracing the rich and thickly settled valley of the river; but Houston overruled their decision, and insisted that the river itself should be the line, from its mouth on the Gulf of Mexico, as far north as the 39 degree of latitude, from thence eastwardly, taking the old boundary of the state of New Mexico as far as the Arkansas River, which it was to follow to the 100 degree of longitude, thence directly southward to Red River, and, after following the windings of which for some distance, to turn along the western boundary of Louisiana to the Gulf. (Edwards 3)
Thus began the troubles between New Mexico and Texas as they claimed the land east of the Rio Grande. To the Texans, their revolution was a ‘done deal,’ the Mexican army was gone and they were free. But to the Mexicans, it was a defeat that many could not accept. To them, it had not won anyone’s independence yet.
In the meantime, Texas and Mexico found themselves locked in a frustrating pattern of vicious border clashes. Whenever Mexico’s resolve for revenge began to sag, the Texans would bolster it with some arrogant act. In September 1836, the Texans brazenly voted to seek annexation to the United States. Three months, later, the Texas Congress decreed that the Rio Grande River marked the Texas-Mexico border, thereby claiming parts of four Mexican states. Next, the Texas government began encouraging sea captains to commit piracy on Mexican shipping. And the Texans constantly added insult to injury, making ethnic slurs of the most infuriating sort. Typically, a Texas official referred to Mexico as that “imbecile nation,” and a Texas newspaper called Mexicans “the abject race, whom, like the mosquito, it is easier to kill than to tolerate its annoying buzzing.” (Southwest 114)
Although the United States delayed the Texan request to annex Texas as a state, they did recognize it as an independent republic early in 1837. The Texans, however, were not content to rule their own domain. They quickly set about taking steps to exploit the weaknesses of Mexico. They began to interfere in several of the revolutions that were going on in different parts of Mexico.
In 1840, Texas made an alliance with rebels in the southern state of Yucatán, sending its small but aggressive navy to blockade Mexican ports. Far more serious, however, was the Texans’ meddling in the revolts of northern federalists against the centralist government in Mexico City. By the fall of 1841, Texan-abetted bloodshed was so widespread in the north that General Mariano Arista, in charge of the region’s defenses, implored all Mexicans there to join ranks against the real enemy. “In Texas,” he declared, “you can find a field in which to display your warlike ardor without the pain and mortification of knowing that the blood you shed and the tears you occasion are from your brethren.” (Southwest 114)
If the Texans had simply been satisfied with their freedom and the lands they were unquestionably in control of at the time, the Mexicans might have just let things be. As it was, even Americans were having trouble reconciling some of the actions of Texas, and to Mexicans it was seditious assault. The Texan revolt was not an isolated event as American history usually makes it out to be. There were revolts in ten provinces including New Mexico and California. IF Mexico had been more stable the Texans would have had much bigger problems. But as it was, Santa Anna and the government that took over after him had a lot of fires to put out. All of the revolts were caused by similar causes – Santa Anna’s dissolution of the constitution and the creation of a republican central government in Mexico. The Rio Arriba (“upriver”) Rebellion in New Mexico came on the heels of the Texan revolt, breaking out in late 1836 and extending into 1837. More than three thousand rebels from northern New Mexico rose up and gained control of the entire upper portion of the province including the capitol, Santa Fé. They killed the governor and set up a new government. In response, the region called Rio Abajo (“downriver”) gathered its militia forces, who elected a somewhat dubious Manuel Armijo as their leader, and marched to relieve the Capitol. Aided and led by a company of dragoons from Veracruz, the rebels were dispersed without any guidance from Armijo, an unlikely hero, yet, through good self-promotion to the authorities in Mexico, he was appointed to the rank of General and made governor of the province. He was very pleased with himself. It is quoted that he once said, “God rules the heavens; Armijo rules the earth.” This was how he began his somewhat checkered political career which lasted until the American forces invaded nine years later in 1846. Thus Texas and New Mexico became locked in incongruous perceptions of each other. The New Mexicans feared the belligerent Texan revolt – that they would try to extend it to New Mexico; and at the same time, the Texans thought that New Mexico would welcome them as comrades because of the Rio Arriba revolt. So in any case, by 1841, people in New Mexico had heard plenty enough about Texan belligerence, and when they discovered that Texas’ attentions would now be turned on them it caused them much concern.
After the Rio Arriba rebellion ended, New Mexicans settled back down to Mexican rule (more accurately, Armijo rule), but there were still murmurings of the sentiments of the revolt in several locations of upper province. This encouraged Texans who were visiting New Mexico and word got back to those in Texas. Even as early as 1839, the Mexican authorities in Santa Fé believed that an American party under the leadership of a Julian Werkeman (probably William Workman), was endeavoring to ‘fan the flames of the previous revolution in favor of receiving a like revolution from Texas.’ Werkeman was stirring up the old feelings that had inspired the revolt in the first place (Twitchell II 74, footnote 52). Meanwhile back in Texas, preparations were made to take control of their new land in New Mexico. They formed an expedition to go to Santa Fé.
The time had now arrived, so thought the rulers of Texas, when the republic should exercise its authority over the length and breadth of her domain, when the citizens of her farthest borders should be brought into the common fold, and as the Texans believed, as is claimed by the historian of the Texas-Santa Fe expedition, with the full belief in the readiness and willingness of the inhabitants of New Mexico, the destined point, should the inhabitants really manifest a disposition to declare their full allegiance to Texas, the flag of the single-star republic was to be raised over the old palace; but if not, the Texan commissioners were merely to make such arrangements with the authorities as would best tend to the opening of trade, and then retire. This approximately covers the Texan side of the story as related by the historian, Kendall, an American citizen, who accompanied the expedition… (Twitchell II 69)
Mirabeau
B. Lamar
Even though it was billed as a trade expedition, just for back-up the Texans brought along a six-pounder cannon, which was described by one beholder as beautiful: “It bears upon it the lone star of Texas, and the name of her ex-governor, ‘M.B. Lamar,’ and upon the sight is engraved ‘Santa Fé’” (Edwards 25). No doubt, the Texans had brought along this little beauty merely to bestow it as a gift to the people of Santa Fé – after all, they had engraved the name of the city on it! However, the New Mexicans did not at all appreciate the approach of the Texans. “General Lamar seems to have been very poorly informed as to the sentiments of the people of New Mexico. The reception accorded these so-called Texan pioneers was of an entirely different sort” (Twitchell II 70).
The expedition left Austin in the month of June, 1841. There were six companies, under the command of Hugh McLeod, brevet brigadier-general of the Texan army. Accompanying them came three commissioners, Colonel William G. Cooke, Jose Antonio Navarro, and D. Richard F. Brenham. The commissioners carried with them proclamations, printed in English and Spanish, explaining the advantages of the freedom which the Texans offered. “In the minds of the Texans,” says Kendall, “not a doubt existed that the liberal terms offered would be at once acceded to by a population living within the limits of Texas, and who had long been groaning under a misrule most tyrannical” (Twitchell II 74).
When the Governor Armijo learned of their approach, it is said that he lamented, “Poor New Mexico! So far from heaven, so close to Texas!” He took measures to arouse his people and place his military forces, both regular and militia, in full battle readiness. He had anticipated such a threat for some time and had long since alerted the government of neighboring Chihuahua to be prepared to lend aid. Scouts were posted along the eastern frontier to spy on the Texan advance, and tight restrictions were placed on the travel of Americans living in the province to forestall any possible communications with the enemy (Simmons 70).
But the Texans lost their way and after three months of arduous travel the men were reduced to desperate straits. They were orphans of the wilderness now, begging for assistance.
The expedition was planned and put into execution with almost inconceivable incompetence. Although the distance from Austin to Santa Fe was about 700 miles, the Texans actually traveled a circuitous 1,300 miles. To make matters worse, they started out at a time when the Plains were almost waterless. And, as if incompetence were not enough, they had hard luck on the way. Kiowa and Comanche war parties harassed them and ran off their horses. A fire in camp destroyed tents and ammunition. Men sickened, starved, grew wild with thirst; some discarded their weapons as too heavy a burden. (Southwest 147)
Texan
Commissioners L-R: Colonel William G. Cooke, Jose Antonio Navarro
Armijo sent Captain Damasio Salazar to scout the eastern plains for signs of the invaders. On the 4th day of September Salazar captured three men. They escaped and were recaptured. One was killed resisting and the other two were executed for trying to escape. This was not a good beginning. Later, on the 16th of September, Salazar captured five more men near Cuesta on the Pecos River. He immediately planned to execute all five, but was dissuaded by a New Mexican. “The man thus saving the lives of the captives was Don Gregorio Vigil. He was a man of great prominence in that locality and possessed considerable wealth. He was of good heart and correct principles and had great influence in that portion of New Mexico” (Twitchell II 78). Hearing of the destitute condition of the invasion force and sensing that success was imminent, and to make sure he was in on it, Governor Armijo made his move.
Deciding the moment had arrived for New Mexico’s napoleon to take the trail, Governor Armijo, astride his mule and arrayed in a brilliant blue uniform, mustered his troops and marched grandly out of Santa Fe. Along the roadside some thirty miles east of the capital, he encountered a party of his men bringing five other prisoners. Among them was Captain William P. Lewis, a young artillery officer, who, fearing for his life, claimed he was a merchant from the United States. At that unlikely declaration, Armijo grasped Lewis by the collar of his dragoon jacket, dragged him up alongside his mule, and pointing to a button on which were a star and the word “Texas,” he thundered, “I can read ‘Texas’ and no merchant from the United States travels in a Texan military jacket.” (Simmons 72)
The next day, on the 17 of September ninety-four more men under the command of Colonel Cooke were found at Anton Chico by Captain Salazar, who immediately demanded their surrender. While Cooke deliberated on whether to fight or surrender, Mexican militia arrived under the command of Don Manuel Chaves, nephew of ‘his Excellency.’ Chaves, who could speak English and the unfortunate Captain Lewis negotiated the surrender. Lewis informed the dismayed Texans, correctly, that Armijo was not far away with 1,500 more men. They surrendered. Manuel Chaves supplied them with such food and blankets as he could and marched them to Santa Fé.
Manuel
Antonio Chaves
Manuel Antonio Chaves was not new to militia work. At the age of sixteen years, in 1835, he was with a trading party when they were attacked by Navajos. His companions were killed and he was wounded seven times, but somehow he made it back to New Mexico. His endurance was remarkable and his bravery was legendary. He became known as “El Leoncito” (the little lion) for his aggressive spirit and short stature. He was the son of Don Julián Chaves, originally a native of Tomé, and Doña María Luz Garcia de Noriega. He was described as soft-spoken, with brown hair, grey eyes and fair skin. He later married M. Vicenta Labadie, a descendant of French fur trappers.
Now, if Manuel had a fault it was horseracing. All New Mexicans and most natives were obsessed with gambling but Manuel’s particular love was horseracing. Years earlier, he had owned the finest racing horse in Santa Fé. Governor Armijo was extremely jealous and had it poisoned. Chavez found out what had happened and tried to assassinate ‘his excellency’ with a bow and arrow, but he missed. That’s how he ended up in St. Louis as an exile for a couple of years. That’s how he came to learn English. Eventually, Armijo needed him enough to ask him to return, reassuring him that all was forgiven (Simmons). Now, he was in charge of the column that brough the prisoners to Santa Fé.
Manuel
Armijo
Once the column arrived at Santa Fé, Armijo ordered them bound and placed in a dirty sheep corral next to the Governor’s Palace. Through the walls they could hear a heated debate going on all night as to their fate. It was apparent to them that the Governor was not going to abide by the terms of the surrender. But, luckily for them, Armijo lacked the courage to order the execution of the prisoners by himself so he had asked for a vote by a council of officials. The vote finally taken at dawn was in favor to send the prisoners to Mexico City (by one vote). In contrast to Armijo’s hostility, Manuel Chaves befriended Commissioner-Colonel Cooke and housed him in his own home. And for his part in the negotiations, the unfortunate Captain Lewis became the eternal scapegoat for the Texans because they believed that he had lied to them. The six-pound gun was placed as a monument in the central plaza.
Armijo then sent out Colonel Juan Andres Archuleta who rounded up the remaining Texans on the 5th of October, at Laguna, Colorado (boy, were they lost!). “On the day following [their arrival in Santa Fé], the last of the prisoners were sent on their tedious march to the City of Mexico, where they arrived in several divisions at the beginning of 1842” (Twitchell II 78). On the way down, the salacious Captain Salazar had the opportunity to execute three more prisoners, and two others died from other causes. Salazar cut off their ears as a grisly record of their passing.
The unfortunate Texans suffered a great deal on the road to Mexico on account of the inhumanity with which they were treated by the soldiers who conducted them; and they might have fared worse had not Captain Albino Chacón gone with them, who though being a military, was a man of noble and humane sentiments, took pity on them and did all he could to mitigate their suffering till they reached El Paso del Norte (now Juarez, Mexico) where they were received by General Gonzales and the Curé, Don Ramon Ortiz, who at once took interest in treating the prisoners with charity. (Read 405)
Presidio Captain Albino Chacón was the father of future US Civil War Captain Raphael Chacón of the First New Mexico Volunteers. While in El Paso, the prisoners were treated surprisingly well and the Texan officers dined as guests of General Gonzales. In fact, they were sipping brandy and smoking cigars with the General when he arrested Salazar for his brutal conduct. Except for Armijo’s apparent treachery, most of the viciousness of New Mexico’s treatment of the prisoners was a direct result of the actions of Salazar; and to be fair to him, he was only following direct orders from Armijo. “If any pretends to be sick or claims he cannot march, shoot him and bring me his ears” (Southwest 147). Compared to other New Mexicans, Salazar had a definite cruel streak. He appeared to be one of the few people in the Province to take Armijo seriously - a willing henchman to a cowardly despot. He gave Armijo five pairs of ears which he nailed to a wall in the palace where the Americans found them in 1846. Armijo knew how his people thought of him; and, in all likelihood, the ears were meant to be badges of courage. Most New Mexicans and American merchants went about their business, ignoring him as much as possible. Eventually, the group of Texan prisoners reached Mexico City, where some of them were released early on. The remainder were set free by Santa Anna on June 13th, 1842, except for one man who was condemned to death but bought his way out of it.
Albino
Chacon
Kendall, the expedition’s historian, defended the idea of an invasion by stating that, “the attempt to conquer a province, numbering some one hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants within its borders, was a shade too Quixotical to find favour in the eyes of the three hundred and twenty pioneers” (Twitchell II 70, footnote 50). New Mexico did not have that many people at that time, probably about 40,000-45,000, but considering that the populace mainly lived in small, far-flung, pastoral villages consisting of mostly peons; and the standing army in the whole area was a company of one hundred troops who were spread out in garrisons or employed guarding the Santa Fé Trail, was the idea really so quixotic? Perhaps not. It was well known to traders on the Santa Fé Trail that the Mexican Presidio troops were only armed with lances, swords, and very antique firearms. Three hundred well-armed Texans with good rifles could easily defeat this contingent, and the Texans knew it. But what about the many militia groups? Of these, The Texans heard rumors of great dissatisfaction in the ranks, and it was possible that a large militant faction, such as the previous 3,000-plus rebels of the Rio Arriba Rebellion might step in and put things altogether in the Texan balance. With that in mind, it was just possible and the Texans knew it.
Much has been written of the suffering of the Texan prisoners, but most of it is only impressive if you believe that the suffering of Texan criminals is much more important than that of Mexican criminals. The Mexican officials were represented in these reports as being most inhumane in conduct. These were bold complaints from a failed invasion/coercion force. The Texan response to the capture of its army was as incredibly out of context as their boundary claims were in the first place. After the incident, Sam Houston wrote a long letter outlining the Texan stand on this issue (the only stand the Texans ever made during this invasion).
General Houston outlines very well what probably was the belief of a great majority of the people of the single-star republic, but the facts and circumstances, taken as an entirety, fail to uphold his contention, for in reality they were an armed, invading force, entering a country claimed by Mexico, whether justly or unjustly it makes no difference, for the purpose of hoisting the Texan flag by connivance with traitors and outsiders. To be sure, it was not proposed to undertake the conquest of New Mexico with a force of three hundred Texans against the will of the inhabitants; but, if the people were willing, the Texans were on hand ready to make that sort of a conquest. It cannot be said that such an enterprise was not hostile to Mexico, and while no apology can be offered for the barbarous manner in which the Texans were treated by the infamous Salazar, still the Texans were in the wrong and they received what sometimes has come through the “fortunes of war.” They were nothing more or less than armed invaders, who might be expected to meet with opposition, and if defeated to be treated as rebels, or at best, as Texas belligerence and independence had been recognized by several nations, as prisoners of war. (Twitchell II 72-73)
Considering that memories of the Texan retaliatory massacres of hundreds of Mexican soldiers at San Jacinto, as well as Santa Anna’s humiliating defeat were not yet very far in the distant past, as well as the fact that they really were armed invaders, the Texans were actually treated surprisingly well, especially by Santa Anna himself. Yet, the Texans protested most vociferously. Ironically, to the utter chagrin of Texan patriots, a large number of Americans did not buy the Texan story at all, causing them to complain even louder.
The Mexicans and Armijo have been the subjects of great abuse for their conduct and treatment of the Texans, but generally speaking, all fair-minded people must admit that the invaders were simply out of luck and received the same sort of treatment that would have been accorded by their own people had Texas territory been invaded by a hostile force or one acting and moving under pretenses acknowledged and proven to be false. (Twitchell II 82)
Because of this debacle, implicated Texan sympathizers hastily left New Mexico for California.
B.D.Wilson, in his Observations, Ms., says that two men, Rowland and Workman, and about twenty others left for California on account of Texans complications, as they did not think it safe to remain in New Mexico. Workman and Rowland were under suspicion of having been instrumental in sending information to the Texans prior to the Texas-Santa Fe expedition. (Twitchell II footnotes 83)
William
Workman
One would think that would have been the end of it, however, the pusillanimous Texans just couldn’t ‘let it go.’
Infuriated by the savage treatment of the expedition’s members, the Texas Congress passed a resolution demanding that Texas’s borders be extended to encompass eight of Mexico’s northern states and territories including the two Californias. This insolent action, together with Lamar’s effrontery in having sent the expedition to Santa Fé, convinced the Mexicans that the time had come to reconquer Texas. Their campaign against the republic set off a wave of panic among Texans, but after a few sharp engagements and a series of plundering raids against San Antonio. Goliad, and Refugio, the attempt at reconquest ended abruptly.
As the Mexicans withdrew, Sam Houston, now President again, sent a force toward the Rio Grande to hasten their departure. Obeying Houston’s order not to expand hostilities into Mexico, the Texan commander soon gave up the pursuit and headed for home. But most of his men, fired up against the Mexicans, crossed the Rio Grande on their own and tried to seize the town of Mier. There they were overcome by a larger body of Mexicans and forced to surrender. Like the members of the Santa Fé expedition, they were marched south in chains toward Mexico City. (Josephy 15)
¡Otra Vez!
But humiliation brought even more patriotic fervor deep in the heart of Texas and another army was quickly mobilized to accomplish what the former had not and to punish the Mexican miscreants who had done their jobs in service of their country. Someone was going to pay this time.
The people of Texas were loud in their threats of vengeance for what they called the treachery and barbarous conduct of Armijo. No sooner had the captive Texans returned from Mexico than retaliatory enterprises were openly discussed. The newspapers teemed with editorials denouncing the Mexicans and calling upon the people of the single-star republic to rise for the purposes of invasion and revenge. Not content with invading New Mexico they proposed to plant their banners in the city of Chihuahua; all of northern Mexico must be revolutionized… There was great popular enthusiasm. (Twitchell II 82)
To carry out this plan the Texans began raising “…a force of eight hundred men, under the command of Colonel Jacob Snively, and such enthusiasm prevailed that it was with difficulty that the number was kept down, so many applications were made for joining the enterprise” (Twitchell II 82). But for some reason, due to an apparent lack of purpose and direction, the invasion idea and the army as well, pretty much died of neglect and mismanagement. Enthusiasms drained in the inactivity and the ranks dwindled drastically. The ‘invasion’ plan was shelved and instead, someone got the bright idea of attacking the trade caravans on the Santa Fé Trail, an idea which shows in a true light the actual intentions of the Texans, which was the control of the Santa Fé Trail commerce. “The grand army of invasion and vengeance, the revolutionizing and capture of all of northern Mexico, finally resolved itself into nothing but the attempted plundering of caravans supplying the Santa Fe-Chihuahua trade…” (Twitchell II 82).
The Texan authorities also organized at least two companies to go on ahead of the main group, presumably as advanced scouts. These companies were headed by John McDaniel and Charles A. Warfield. McDaniel and his small group were the first to leave. Warfield would soon follow with Snively behind him. Of course Mexico and New Mexico soon knew about the proposed Texan enterprises and were very worried about it. And not least of the worries was that the United States would come in on the side of Texas against them. What was left of the Spanish borderlands was almost completely undefended in terms of military strength. “The Mexican government took immediate steps to meet the pending invasion and sent a large force into New Mexico, under General Jose M. Monterde, to support General Armijo…” (Twitchell II 82).
Unable to invade anyone, the remainder of the Texan army aborted the direct invasion plan and prepared to move north to attack the trade caravans on the Santa Fé Trail. Since part of the trade route was through Texas-claimed territory all the goods were to be considered contraband. The idea was to only plunder Mexican goods and leave the Americans in the caravans unmolested. But how would Americans feel about having their business counterparts from south of the border plundered at will? Not very good at all. They had had a very good commerce going on for twenty years now and they didn’t want anything to spoil it. The US Army wasn’t too fond of the idea either and did their duty to protect their own country from foreign invaders. As usual, the Mexicans knew all about it before it even happened. “It was currently reported in New Mexico, as early as November, 1842, that a party of Texans was out upon the plains, prepared to attack any Mexican traders who should attempt to cross the Missouri river the succeeding spring” (Twitchell II 83). The Mexican ambassador in Washington DC asked the United States to provide protection for the caravans, which they did (Reeve 49). The commander of the US troops in the area, Captain Philip St. George Cooke, a native of Virginia and a West Point Graduate, was alerted to watch for Texan banditos.
But in New Mexico, except for a paranoid Armijo who saw Texans behind every bush and tree as well as behind every American merchant in Santa Fé, most New Mexicans seemed to be unconcerned. “So little apprehension, says [Josiah] Gregg, seemed to exist, however, that in February, 1843, Don Antonio Jose Chavez, of New Mexico, left Santa Fé for Independence, with but five servants, two wagons, and fifty-five mules” (Twitchell II 83). March was unseasonably cold and the ill-fated party suffered from frostbite, losing most of their animals. At the Little Arkansas River, Chavez was captured by John McDaniel and his small command of fifteen ruffians. After plundering his goods, seven of the men left. The other eight drew straws and shot Chavez. Ironically, it turned out that Chavez’ family was one of the few in New Mexico who had assisted the original Texan prisoners with food and blankets!
The unfortunate Chavez, whose murder, I suppose, was perpetrated under pretext of the cruelties suffered by the Texans, in the name of whom the party of McDaniel was organized, was of the most wealthy and influential family of New Mexico, and one that was anything but friendly to the ruling governor, Armijo. Don Mariano Chavez, a brother of the deceased, is a gentleman of very amiable character, such as is rarely met in that unfortunate land. It is asserted that he furnished a considerable quantity of provisions, blankets etc., to Col. Cooke’s division of Texan prisoners. Señora Chavez, the wife of Don Mariano, as is told, crossed the river from the village of Padillas, the place of their residence, and administered comforts to the unfortunate band of Texans. Though the murder of young Chavez was evidently not sanctioned by the Texans generally, it will notwithstanding, have greatly embittered this powerful family against them – a family whose liberal principles could not otherwise have been very unfavorable to Texas. (Gregg 170-172)
Antonio Jose’s brother, Don Mariano, was possibly the only man in New Mexico that Governor Armijo feared and therefore he could do pretty much what he wanted – even in giving aid to the Texan prisoners. While McDaniel was busy with Chavez, the Captain Cooke’s US Dragoons had been following his trail. He and his men were arrested and sent to St. Louis where they were tried for murder and robbery. “In due course, the sentence of the court which found them guilty was carried out and John McDaniel and his brother David were both hanged” (Twitchell II 84). And they had complained about how the Mexicans had treated them! Neither Houston nor Mirabeau wrote any letters of protest this time. But it wasn’t over yet. Colonel Warfield’s company was already on the move. Warfield had lived in New Mexico and was familiar with much of the territory. He enlisted twenty-four men and set out for the Point of Rocks where the company would rendezvous. In April 1843 they advanced toward Mora and arrived there undetected (Reeve 49/Twitchell II 85).
[Warfield] was able to reach as far as the town of Mora without being noticed, and attack the defenseless people of that village at midnight, killing five men, and leaving an equal number wounded, and steal all the horses he could meet with (Read 406). [A Texan account states that they captured 72 horses and 18 ‘soldiers,’ whom they soon let go.]
They were afterward followed by a strong party of Mexicans, who succeeded in regaining not only their own livestock but all that belonged to the Texans as well. (Twitchell II 85)
They overtook him and captured five of his companions, Wordfield [Warfield] and the others succeeding in escaping. The five prisoners were sent to Santa Fé, where they were punished with imprisonment (Read 406).
In consequence, the [remaining] Texans burned their saddles and walked to Bent’s Fort on the Arkansas where the party was disbanded, Warfield and a few faithful followers passing over to Snively and his band. (Twitchell II 85)
Mora was not a good town to pick on. It had been carved out of the mountain wilderness in the early 1800s in spite of the many Ute, Comanche, and Apache raiding parties that ranged through the area. Mora was built with defense in mind with the houses joined together in a rectangle and even had a small two-story fort laced with loopholes on the NW side for a refuge. On the SW corner was built a wood blockhouse. The villanos were hardy frontiersmen and they maintained a very aggressive militia. Even a company of US Dragoons couldn’t take the town four years later in 1847 until they returned with cannon. Furthermore, New Mexicans had been fighting this hit-and-run style of warfare for a long time with the hostile natives and they easily overtook Warfield’s company. It is interesting to note that they captured the same number of Texans as men that had been killed by them. Perhaps it was a coincidence, perhaps not. I don’t think so. And it was amazing they didn’t kill them all – but then again, leaving the Texans dismounted on the open prairie would have been the highest form of insult. They had what they wanted – the horses and the prisoners.
Colonel Snively’s force was now ready to follow Warfield. On April 25th they left Georgetown near Austin for the international boundary, the Arkansas River. “Colonel Jacob Snively and his ‘gallant’ band of Texan ‘avengers,’ to the number, not of eight hundred, but about one hundred and eighty, now appear upon the scene” (Twitchell II 84), luckily bypassing the patrolling US dragoons. When they reached the Arkansas they were joined by Warfield and the few men he had left. Warfield had recently been at Bent’s Fort and heard about the progress of the trade caravans there. He was able to inform Snively that sixty wagons were on their way to Bent’s Fort from Missouri and another caravan would soon be coming up from Santa Fé. Kit Carson, Charles Bent, and Ceran St. Vrain now arrived in the area with their own wagon train. Kit describes his meeting with Captain Cooke (Carson’s notations were corroborated by Cooke’s own journal of the expedition).
L-R:
Charles Bent, Ceran St. Vrain, Christopher Kit Carson
At Walnut Creek we found four companies of dragoons encamped, commanded by Captain P. St. G. Cooke. He informed us that the [westbound] train of Armijo and several traders was a short distance in his rear. They had about one hundred men, Mexicans and Americans, in the party and a large number of wagons. Captain Cooke had received intelligence that a large party of Texans was at the crossing of the Arkansas, waiting to overpower the train and kill or capture the Mexicans, in revenge for the treatment Armijo had given the Texans when in his power.
The Mexicans concluded to remain where they were and send word to General Armijo of their predicament. The dragoons were to guard them only as far as the Arkansas, and they wished Armijo to send soldiers for their protection after the departure of the American troops. They offered me $300 to carry the letter to Armijo in Santa Fé, and I accepted the offer. I set out for Taos, accompanied by Dick Owens. At Bent’s Fort I was informed that the Utah Indians were on my route. Owens remained at the fort and Bent furnished me with a fine horse to lead with me, so that if I should fall in with any Indians I could mount him and make my escape. I discovered the Indian village without being seen by the inmates, passed them by during the night, and arrived safely at Taos, where I gave the letter to the Alcalde to forward to Santa Fé. (Carson 69-70)
Upon receiving the news, Governor Armijo gathered several militia units and Presidio soldiers totaling 700 men to guard the eastbound caravan and they left Santa Fé, bound for the international crossing. Meanwhile, Snively’s force, still eluding Cooke’s scouts, advanced down the Santa Fé Trail and on June 19th ambushed the advance guard - a group of one hundred Taos militia under the command of Captain Ventura Lobato.
Snively then set out meeting with Captain Bentura Lovato already very near Bent’s Fort. Lovato who was going on the vanguard took Snively and his troop as the pickets of Cook’s army; Snively taking in the mistake made by Lovato, fell suddenly upon him and his soldiers killing him and fifteen men and making prisoners almost all the rest. (Read 407)
The man who escaped had been lucky enough to catch one of the Texan’s horses, on which he rode away to the report to his general. He encountered Armijo on the march with his six hundred men, but when the General learned of the defeat of his brave soldiers his heart failed him and he returned in all haste to Santa Fé. (Carson 71-72)
One of those who were able to escape made a report of the occurrence to the caravan and Cooke’s spies were informed of the encounter and these immediately advised Cooke of what had occurred. Cooke, next, set out hurriedly with 200 soldiers capturing Snively before he could hear of the arrival of the American army. (Read 407).
Phillip
St. George Cooke
When Snively’s Texans were discovered by Captain Cooke, they thought the Americans would hail them as comrades-in-arms. But they were very disappointed to find that Cooke was quite sensitive about finding a camp of armed foreigners on the US/Mexican border. By this time, Snively’s force had been drastically reduced by desertions and loss of mounts to native raids.
Snively with about a hundred men was at the time encamped on the right bank of the Arkansas, some ten or fifteen miles below the point called Caches. He crossed the river and met Captain Cooke who soon made known his intention of disarming the Texans, which he forthwith proceeded to do. A portion of the Texans, however, deceived Cooke by delivering over the worthless guns which had been captured from the Mexicans under Lobato, keeping their valuable Colt’s repeating rifles. (Twitchell II 88)
The Texans told Captain Cooke they had killed eighteen Mexicans, wounded eighteen more, and captured the rest. Cooke sent forty of the Texans to Fort Leavenworth, presumably including Snively, and set the rest free. After release by the Americans, most of the remaining Texans, now about 60-70 men commanded by Warfield, went into Mexican territory after the southbound caravan on its way to Santa Fé. They soon gave up, however, and headed for Texas. Ironically, the Taos militia they had defeated was the very same people that Workman and Rowland had hoped to incite to assist the Texans in their first invasion.
Had the Texans proceeded differently – had they induced the Mexicans to surrender without battle, which they might no doubt easily have accomplished, they could have secured their services, without question, as guides to General Armijo’s camp, and that unmitigated tyrant might himself have fallen into their hands. The difficulty of maintaining order among the Texans was perhaps the cause of many of their unfortunate proceedings. (Gregg 173)
These were not friends of Armijo. Not only were most of them Pueblo Indians and Hispanics from Taos, they had apparently been forced to take this forward position by armed coercion (some even had to be tied to their saddles), so Gregg’s assessment that they would not only surrender but also lead the Texans to the governor, may well have been an accurate one. And once again, Armijo, the ‘ruthless tyrant’ showed his true mettle by immediately turning the caravan around and heading in a panicked ‘pell-mell’ retreat back to Santa Fé. Armijo was always more of a merchant than a governor – and never a general. Understandably, the American freighters were also very disturbed by the Texan proceedings.
They [the Texans] could not have been ignorant that but a portion of the traders were Mexicans – that many American citizens were connected in the same caravans. The Texans assert, it is true, that the lives and property of Americans were to be respected, provided they abandoned the Mexicans. But did they reflect upon the baseness of the terms they were imposing? What American worthy of his name, to save his own interests, or even his life could deliver up his trading companions to be sacrificed? Then after having abandoned the Mexicans, or betrayed them to their enemy – for such an act would have been accounted treachery – where would they have gone? They could not then have continued on to Mexico; and to have returned to the United States with their merchandise, would have been the ruin of most of them. (Gregg 170-172)
By this time, the Mexicans sponsored fully fifty percent of the trail’s commerce and an attack on them would have severely curtailed the enterprise. So in the end, loyalty and trade relations won out. The as-yet uninvolved Texans still residing in New Mexico became the victims of their compatriot’s deeds. “When the news of the defeat of Lobato’s command reached Taos, the friends and relatives of the slain, the whole population, indeed, were incensed beyond measure; and two or three naturalized foreigners, who were supposed to favor the Texan cause, and who hitherto had been in good standing, were now compelled to flee for their lives…” (Twitchell II 87).
As a result of the Texan depredations, General Santa Anna (back in office again) closed all the ports of entry of northern Mexico to all commerce from August 7, 1843 to March 31, 1844 - and trade completely ceased on the Santa Fé Trail. It was not until the lifting of the ban that the caravans began to roll again when ninety wagons and 200 Americans once more hit the trail to the southwest. The pugnacious Texans had influenced the commerce on the Santa Fé Trail all right, but not in the way they had intended.
Texas was admitted into the Union in 1845 and five years later, the US Congress passed the Organic Act of September 9, 1850, by which New Mexico was changed from a military protectorate to an official U.S. Territory with a non-military governor, a Territorial Council, and a representative in Congress. This attempt to ‘territorialize’ New Mexico brought the old boundary claims of Texas once more to the surface – never mind that New Mexico had only been ceded to the US from Mexico in 1848 and therefore it could never have been Texan. But at least now, the Texans had to deal with the United States about it.
Texas, the “Lone Star State,” had been a member of the Union for five years and apparently had won strong backing in Congress in support of her claim, for Texas had just created four new counties, three of which included New Mexico territory: El Paso County, containing a small portion of the extreme south of what is presently New Mexico; Worth County, comprising land north along the Rio Grande from El Paso to Belen and east to the Pecos River, and Santa Fe County including all remaining territory east of the Rio Grande plus segments of Colorado and Wyoming. (Ream 60)
What many of the New Mexicans didn’t know is that they were now brought into the heart of the nation’s most serious conflict – the slavery issue – and that made it critical. The opposition to the Organic Act was spearheaded by the representatives of Texas, who brought to Congress the old Texan boundary claims. At this time many southerners actually hoped that the Texas/New Mexico conflict would bring the country into open war in order to solve the slavery question once and for all. Therefore, with southern backing, the Texans felt that they had enough clout to at least legislate the take-over of eastern New Mexico if not precipitate a national war and take it. The debates for the Organic Act were very one-sided.
New Mexico had at least one friend in Congress in 1850. “New Mexico stands alone with no one to speak for her,” said New York’s Senator William H. Seward, “put New Mexico on equal footing with Texas. Only the voice of Texas is heard.” Seward then proposed immediate statehood for New Mexico. Seward’s proposal failed without a single favorable vote. (Ream 59)
J.
M. Washington
And going beyond mere proclamations, the emboldened Texans took steps to administrate their fantasized new counties.
Texas Governor George T. Wood appointed Spruce M. Baird of Nacogdoches, Louisiana as “Judge of Santa Fe County,” and dispatched him to Santa Fe to take over. “Judge” Baird arrived in Santa Fe in November 1848 after a 1500-mile, 6-month, frightful journey, and presented his commission to the governor. When Colonel John Washington, Military Governor of New Mexico read the commission, he exploded: “Who in hell is Governor Wood; and where in hell is Texas?” (Ream 46)
That was serious cussing in those days (at least in a public office). Although many southerners believed the Texan claim was actually ridiculous, as long as slavery was involved they were going to back it; and, of course, the North would oppose it. It appears that from early on, the South had set its sights on acquiring new land for the slave o’crats in New Mexico.
It is said that when Texas was admitted to the Union in 1845, a secret plan was being considered to precipitate confrontation between north and south to confirm Texas’ claim to all of New Mexico east of the Rio Grande. Furthermore, Jefferson Davis in 1851 – later U. S. Secretary of War – who was running for governor of Mississippi, is said to have considered a similar maneuver backed by southern states and a prominent New Mexico official. But Jefferson Davis lost the election and the idea was discarded. (Ream 62)
Unaware of these political machinations and uninfluenced by robust arguments, New Mexicans still considered themselves to be an independent territory and this continued to irritate the Texans.
The defiance of the New Mexicans angered the Texans, some of whom proposed sending troops “to suppress the existing rebellion in Santa Fe.” [Actually, there was more ignoring than defying going on in Santa Fe at this time.]
…Threatening to fight United States troops, as well as New Mexicans, Texas’ belligerent new governor, Peter H. Bell, offered to lead an army to Santa Fe and asked for support from the Southern states. (Josephy 16)
This was the point when war could have begun, but the United States ‘bought’ not only New Mexico, but at least ten more years of peace, before the Civil War would break out in earnest.
In the end, the Federal government settled the conflict peaceably. Under the compromise of 1850, Texas was induced by payment of $10,000,000 to abandon its claims and accept its present boundaries and the establishment of the New Mexico Territory, with Santa Fe as its capital. (Josephy 16)
Thus, the Texans were paid-off handsomely by the Federals for what was never theirs and one would think that would have been the end of it. However, paying for the land only legitimized the claims in the minds of some belligerent Texans, and of those, many complained it had not been a proper price for the acreage. Nevertheless, the deal was done and the Organic Act passed. Incidentally, during the settlement of the border dispute the survey party made a mistake and put the southern border of New Mexico too far to the north. Thus, El Paso that had belonged to the Province of New Mexico since its inception in 1680 now became Texan. However, neither the purchase nor the survey was successful in stopping Texan incursions into New Mexico. Regardless of what the United States had paid for, Texans who had been given land grants by the State of Texas were moving into New Mexico and forcibly taking land from New Mexicans.
“With these land certificates, or ‘head-rights,’ many Americans [Texans] flocked to the valley of the Rio Grande, and in repeated instances, located them on property which for a century had been in the quiet possession of the old Spanish colonists and their descendants. The latter, to avoid litigation, and, sometimes in fear of their lives, abandoned their homes, and sought refuge on the Mexican side of the river. Dona Ana, a modern town on the eastern bank of the Rio Grande, being a desirable place, and moreover selected by the United States for one of its military posts became an attractive point for speculators, and was in consequence pounced upon by them, and covered by the Texan land-warrants. Whether the Mexican occupants of the town and lands adjacent were the lawful owners or not it is needless to investigate; it is sufficient to say they were the first settlers, and had long been in undisturbed possession. They now became alarmed. Litigations commenced; some applying to the authorities of New Mexico, Texas, or the United States, for protection. Failing to obtain it, several hundred abandoned their property and homes in despair, and sought an asylum in Mexican territory, preferring the very uncertain protection they could obtain there to remaining as citizens of the United States.”
“With this resolution, a spot was selected on the opposite or western side of the river, six or eight miles below Doña Ana, which, it was believed, would be within the limits of Mexico. On the 1st of March, 1850, sixty Mexicans with Don Rafael Buelas at their head, most of whom had been domiciled at Doña Ana, abandoned their homes on account of their many grievances, and moved to the lands known as the Mesilla, where they established themselves… More than half the population of Doña Ana removed to Mesilla within a year. When the boundary line was established in April, 1851, and it became certain that La Mesilla was south of the boundary line, according to the treaty map, their fears were removed, and a day was set apart for the public rejoicing. For the whole population had determined to abandon the place if the boundary line had run south of the village, and thus placed them under the jurisdiction of New Mexico.” (Twitchell II 294-295, footnote 219)
Another village called Chamberino was also founded by New Mexicans who did not want to remain in the United States (Fugate 17). Doña Ana was not an ancient villa. It had been inhabited during the first occupation of New Mexico and Governor Otermin had stopped there during his retreat to El Paso in 1680 due to the Pueblo Rebellion. But after the reconquest it was never re-settled until a grant was approved in July 1840, and even then, settlers did not arrive until 1843 (Fugate 43). Nevertheless, it was a Mexican town and never had belonged to Texas except in imagination. As a note of interest, Colonel Doniphan stopped there in December 1846, bought supplies and rested for two days. It was a welcome respite after traveling through the desert. The Colonel donated a canon to the town for use in defense against Apaches (Fugate 44). So it appears that the town was well-disposed towards the United States in 1846 while maintaining its aversion to Texas in 1850. On the other side of the Rio Grande, Mesilla still belonged to Mexico and the inhabitants celebrated that fact. People from Northern New Mexico also moved there to avoid becoming US citizens. No doubt, however, the celebrations were very muted when it was sold to the United States in the Gadsen Purchase of 1853. As for Doña Ana:
Today, the majority of the Anglos are gone and Doña Ana is once more a small Hispanic-American farming community. The old church, Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria (Our Lady of Purification), is about the only visual reminder of the past, but the names of some of the original fourteen families live on in the roster of residents (Fugate 44)
Also occurring during the 1850’s, there were more Texan schemes to take over northern Mexico through attempts to influence local revolutions as well as taking advantage of the attempted filibusters in Arizona and California but these are not part of New Mexico’s story.
The advent of the Civil War, eight years later, again brought to mind the old grievances as well as the expansionist fever, and besides, to Texans, the United States was the enemy now. So it seemed that it was as good a time as any, to finally take-over what had always been rightfully theirs, so they thought. Incredibly, the Fifth Texan invasion was as ill-conceived as the others had been. Although better executed, it was still very badly planned. General Sibley had convinced the Texans that:
(1) An army could live off the land. In truth, the inhabitants of New Mexico themselves could hardly live off the land. There had been a drought for several years. Crops were small and stores were low (what hadn’t been carried off by the Indians yet). In addition, the villages along the Rio Grande were being ravaged by smallpox.
(2) That the citizens of New Mexico would rise and join them. The New Mexicans hated the Texans – the Texans themselves had made sure of that.
(3) That the South could open a gateway to the California and Colorado gold fields and the California seaports. Nevermind that Sibley’s understrength command of 2,600 men would have to fight 4,500 Federal and New Mexican troops, and another 2,300 were on the way from California, 1,000 from Colorado, and 5,000 more were on their way down the Santa Fé Trail… You do the math.
He [Sibley] should have known how difficult it would be for a large army to live off the land in the arid, sparsely populated country between Fort Bliss and Albuquerque, where the local people could scarcely raise enough to support themselves; that while most of the Hispanic population of New Mexico was apathetic about the war, they hated and feared Texans and were not likely to flock to his army; and that the officials and many of the prominent citizens in the northern part of the territory were strongly pro-Union. (Josephy 53)
Henry
Hopkins Sibley
There was no excuse, Sibley had lived in New Mexico and should have known better; but in his defense, he probably wasn’t sober at the time. Conquering New Mexico in those days was kind of like conquering Russia. The fifteen years of American occupation had improved almost nothing. There was no infrastructure, just a sea of peasants and sheep in a harsh landscape. Conquer a village and what do you have? …some scared peasants, some sheep, and a few beans. Conquer the Capital, Santa Fé, and it still wouldn’t amount to anything. The only two strategic points of any value were Forts Craig and Union, and Sibley didn’t have enough men to take over either one of them.
So….into the valley of pestilence, famine, drought, poverty, Indian depredations, fortified Union strongholds, and hostility to anything Texan, rode the unsuspecting Rebels…
Sources:
Source 1: (Edwards) Frank S. Edwards, A Campaign in New Mexico with Colonel Doniphan, University of New Mexico Press, 1996.
Source 2: (Twitchell): Ralph Emerson Twitchell, Esq., Leading facts of New Mexican History, Volumes 1 & 2, The Torch Press, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1912.
Source 3: (Josephy): Alvin M. Josephy Jr., The Civil War in the American West, Vintage Books, 1991.
Source 4: (Gregg): Josiah Gregg, Commerce of the Prairies, edited by Max L. Moorhead, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954.
Source 5: (Southwest): Time Life Books, The Old West Series, The Spanish West, Time Inc., 1976.
Source 6: (Ream) Glen O. Ream, Out of New Mexico’s Past, Sundial Books, Santa Fe, New Mexico, 1980.
Source 7: (Simmons) Marc Simmons, The Little Lion of the Southwest, First Swallow Press/Ohio University Press, 1996.
Source 8: (Carson) Edited by Milo Milton Quaife, Kit Carson’s Autobiography, University of Nebraska Press, 1966.
Source 9: (Fugate) Francis L. and Roberta B. Fugate, Roadside History of New Mexico, Mountain Press Publishing Company, Missoula, 1989.
Source 10: (Read) Benjamin M. Read, Illustrated History of New Mexico, The New Mexican Printing Company, 1912.
Source 11: (Reeve) Frank D. Reeve, History of New Mexico Volume II, Lewis Historical Publishing Co., Inc., NY, 1961.