Abraham Lincoln
President of the United States
When the Confederates opened fire on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, on April 12th, 1861, they caused a rippling shock and surge of patriotic emotions (both north and south) throughout the entire United States and all her territories. Even in far-flung New Mexico the reverberations were just as profound and people found themselves suddenly faced with a critical choice: North, or South. People everywhere had known for a long time that the choice would be eventually in the making, but after Sumter, they knew for sure that the time for confirmation was now here at last – and it was finally time to ‘ante up.’ Perhaps no one felt the urgency to choose more than the professional army officers currently in service. Three days later, on the 15th, President Lincoln called to service 75,000 volunteers for the Union. The entire nation began to think of mobilization, and the US Government, or what was left of it, with a hostile rebel army assembling only miles away from the nation’s capital, was preoccupied, to say the least, with events nearby (‘panicked’ might actually be a more appropriate description).
Abraham
Lincoln
President of the United States
“It was understandable that the Federal government was less concerned with the sparsely populated Trans-Mississippi West than with the eastern theaters, where the great armies were being assembled, where the great battles would be fought, and, indeed, where the war would be won or lost. But especially during the first year of the war, the western territories, and particularly New Mexico, were treated at times as if they were a nuisance. Few officials in Washington seemed to know where New Mexico was, much less care what happened to its people, most of whom were dismissed as troublesome Mexicans who contributed nothing to the country and whose constant need for protection from the Indians was a costly bother and burden. A typical attitude about the Territory was expressed by Secretary of War Simon Cameron on May 11, 1861. In replying to a warning from Secretary of the Interior Caleb Smith that the southern counties of New Mexico were in “imminent danger” of invasion from Texas….Cameron answered casually that, ‘measures have been or will be taken commensurate with its [New Mexico’s] importance.’ Six days later, the measures were taken: many of the Regulars [US Army troops] in New Mexico were ordered withdrawn to the east. So much for the Territory’s importance, a perception in sharp contrast to that of the Confederacy.” (Josephy 390, footnote 20)
Miguel
Otero
The Confederacy’s perceptions of New Mexico were largely due to the exhortations of the New Mexico delegate to Congress, Miguel A. Otero, who contributed to pro-slavery rhetoric. One observer noted, “…Otero has let it be known that if New Mexico expects any favors from Washington, a slave code would be a wise move” (Horn 86). To the delight of Southerners everywhere, in 1857 and in 1859, New Mexico passed legislation legalizing and protecting slavery, the latter entitled “An Act Providing for Protection of Slave Property in this Territory.” Miguel Otero was born in 1829 in Valencia to parents Don Vicente Otero and Doña Gertrudis Aragón de Otero who were both natives of Spain. Miguel attended local schools and went to St. Louis University in 1841 and then studied law at Pingree College in Fishkill NY. He finished law school back in Missouri and returned to New Mexico where he worked as a secretary to Governor Lane, then as state attorney general, and later, as a representative to the Territorial Council. In 1856 he became a delegate to the US House of Representatives (as a Democrat) where he served until 1860.
The governor of New Mexico, Governor Abraham Rencher, a North Carolinian by birth, approved of these actions. Abraham Rencher attended a local school including home schooling and graduated from North Carolina University in 1822. He studied law and became a practicing lawyer in 1825 in North Carolina. He served five terms in Congress and he became the US minister to Portugal from 1843 until 1847. Then he was appointed Governor of New Mexico by President Buchanan in 1858.
No doubt, the main thrust of the pro-slavery argument in the Territory, spearheaded by the Otero and Armijo families, was fueled by the fear that the ‘Dons’ would lose all their peones if they did not join with the South. In addition, due to commercial trade relations with southern Americans, and the number of army officers and public officials from the South, the Ricos (Spanish for the rich) were actually more familiar with southern Americans than they were with northerners.
Her Mexican population, ignorant, timid, and superstitious, had been attached to the Union by conquest, scarcely fifteen years before, and had, meantime, been mainly under the training of Democratic officials of strong pro-slavery sympathies, who had induced her territorial legislature, some two years before, to pass an act recognizing slavery as legally existing among them, and providing stringent safeguards for its protection and security – an act that was still unrepealed. (Twitchell II 358, foonote 281, a quote from Horace Greeley, American Conflict 20)
The slavery law passed in 1857 provided that no free person of African or mulatto descent could stay in New Mexico for more than 30 days, or they could be fined 50-100 dollars and sentenced to hard labor for one to two years. The law enacted in January, 1859 protected slaves as property and provided fugitive laws similar to those in effect in other southern states. It furthermore attempted to distinguish between slavery and peonage, by clarifying that ‘slavery’ only pertained to those of the African race, while ‘contracted service’ [peonage] related to those of other races. Many people who were familiar with the custom, considered peonage to be a form of slavery (some even going so far as to say it was worse than slavery), and slavery of captive Indians did not even enter into the discussion.
The peonage system had long been in force in New Mexico. Peonage consisted in the acceptance by an individual voluntarily of servitude for the payment of debt; it involved no loss of civil rights, no sale or transfer of service and no legal obligation on the part of the children of peons. There was also a system of enslavement of Indian captives, which was, of course, based upon no law. These captives were bought and sold, in some families many being held in this sort of bondage. There were few military or civil officials who did not possess these Indian captives. The peonage system was not affected by the emancipation proclamation, inasmuch as it was not regarded as involuntary servitude, but was finally abolished by act of congress in 1867. (Twitchell II 325)
The peonage system had developed out of the Encomienda system, the name derived from the Spanish word ‘encomendar,’ meaning to entrust. This system was transferred from the conquered Moors in Spain to the Native Americans in the New World. It was nothing more than a grant to hold slaves for plantations and mines. The missions had a similar system but the reason for the ‘slavery’ was salvation and civilization, neither of which the natives appreciated very much. In New Mexico the Encomiendas were mostly farming and ranching plantations and along with the missions they were pretty much the biggest reason for the Pueblo Revolt of 1680. When the Spaniards returned to New Mexico in 1693, except for slavery of Indian captives, the system had softened into peonage which was more acceptable than outright slavery. The first peons were probably Genisaros, natives who had become culturally Spanish. Many free men became peons through purchases made in a Rico’s store, and then were snared for life. Nevertheless, peonage flourished where slavery had not.
Americans who feel superior to and more progressive than the “cruel Spaniards” are not really paying attention. Yes, we did not enslave ‘our’ Native Americans. We took their lands through genocide and expulsion and then brought over black slaves from Africa to work on our own encomiendas. And here we were, on the eve of a bloody Civil War in 1861 to fight over what the Spaniards had already given up freely. Furthermore, when the war would be over, the New Mexicans would free their peones, while the system spread into America as a replacement for the loss of slavery, especially in the South. It would take many forms such as sharecropping, tenant farming, and outright indebted servitude but it would become a staple of the American economy. One hundred years later, as late as 1960 some states would still legally allow forms of peonage in the United States. But the North should not feel superior over the South either, because northerners had their own forms of peonage created by the big industrialists. “Sixteen tons and what do you get? Another day older and a deeper in debt. Saint Peter don’t you call me ‘cause I can’t come. I owe my soul to the company store” (Tennessee Ernie Ford).
Meanwhile, back in 1861, though most New Mexicans were actually apathetic to the American issues, once the fact of these slave laws was published in the eastern states, most Americans believed that New Mexico would throw her lot in with the South. In fact, to the Confederacy, it appeared that the entire Southwest could and would become pro-southern… and New Mexico seemed to be the least problematic portion of that equation. Many Southerners believed that this fantastic dream was simply theirs for the taking.
“It was hoped that California, or at least southern California, would be brought by inclination and intrigue into the confederacy. It was thought that the strong southern element would be able to control Colorado. Some reliance was probably placed in the hostility of the Mormons to the government, so far as Utah was concerned. Arizona was known to be controlled by secessionists. The native New Mexicans were confidently expected to espouse the southern cause as soon as there might be a show of success. And the Apaches and Navajos were looked upon, not exactly as partisans of the south, but as a potent factor in the defeat of the union forces. Troops in the territory were barely sufficient for defensive warfare against the Indians, and New Mexico was a long way from Washington, even if there had not been a need of all available forces nearer the national capital. Moreover, there were military stores in the New Mexican forts worth capturing, to say nothing of the opportunity for a display of exuberant Texan patriotism, even if the Californians and Coloradoans, by failing to perform their part of the contract, should render it impossible to carry out the scheme in its grander phases and extend the confederacy to the Pacific shores. The project was a grand, and from a southern point of view, a legitimate one, with good apparent prospects of success. (Bancroft, H. H., Ibid, pp. 685-686, Twitchell II 358, footnote 283)
The situation in New Mexico was further dramatized when the two US Army commanding officers of the Territory were revealed as pro-southern. Even before the activation of Abraham Lincoln’s presidency, the Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, had contrived to position Confederate sympathizers Colonel W.W. Loring, of North Carolina and George B. Crittenden as commanders of the forces in New Mexico in order to facilitate manipulation of the forces in that state.
L-R:
William W. Loring and George B. Crittenden
It was the business of these men to attempt the corruption of the patriotism of the officers under them and to induce them to lead their men into Texas and give them to the service of the rebellion. One of these officers, Lieutenant-Colonel B. S. Roberts of Vermont, who had joined Crittenden at Fort Stanton, perceiving the intentions of his commander, refused to obey any orders that savored of a treasonable purpose, and, procuring a furlough, he hastened to Santa Fe, and denounced Crittenden to Colonel Loring. He was astonished when, instead of thanks for his patriotic service, he received reproof for meddling in other people’s business, and discovered that Loring was also a traitor. Roberts was ordered back to Fort Stanton, but found an opportunity to warn Captain Hatch, the commander at Albuquerque, and Captain Morris, who held Fort Craig, both on the Rio Grande, as well as other loyal officers, of the treachery of their superiors. The iniquity of Loring and Crittenden soon became known to the army in New Mexico and they found it necessary to leave suddenly and unattended. Of the 1200 regular troops [the enlisted men] in New Mexico, only a very few proved treacherous to their country. (Twitchell 360)
In truth, Loring himself had been left ‘holding the bag’ while he submitted his resignation. In May Colonel Fauntleroy, commander of the Department, had resigned because he was also of Confederate sympathies, making Loring the new commander. William Wing “Old Blizzards” Loring was born in North Carolina in 1818 to Reuben and Hanna (Kenan) Loring. He had been soldiering since he was fourteen years old in the Seminole Wars in Florida. He went to college later studying law and graduating from Georgetown College. He volunteered for service during the Mexican War at the age of twenty-seven and was promoted from Captain to brevet Lt. Colonel for valorous conduct. After the war he stayed on in the Army and became the Department commander of Oregon before being assigned to New Mexico under Colonel Fauntleroy. At thirty-eight years old he was the youngest line colonel of the US Army. In addition to Loring, one third of the US Army officers in service resigned from their commands and moved to join the Confederacy, an act which most of the remaining loyal troops considered to be desertion and betrayal. The effect of this on the morale of the remaining troops was nearly devastating.
From the latter Territory alone [New Mexico], along with Loring went his chief of staff, Colonel George B. Crittenden, and Major Henry Hopkins Sibley, leader of the 2nd Dragoons, as well as Major James Longstreet, Captains Richard S. Ewell, Cadmus M. Wilcox, and Carter L. Stevenson, and Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler. All of them rose to become general officers in the Confederate armies. “We were being deserted by our officers,” complained one man who remained loyal. “We were practically an army without officers.” (Josephy 34)
The Resignations of so many officers demoralized the troops remaining at the different posts. Although some of the departing Southerners took easterly routes across the plains toward Texas, most of them went south to El Paso, streaming past Forts Craig and Fillmore on the Rio Grande and spreading the virus of confusion and defeatism among their garrisons. At Fort Fillmore, some forty miles north of El Paso in New Mexico, one soldier recalled being startled when the commander of the dragoons at Taos, the ebullient forty-five-year old Major Henry H. Sibley, leaned from a wagon full of other defectors and called out to the watching troops, “Boys, if you only knew it, I am the worst enemy you have.” (Josephy 37)
The exodus of so many union officers caused a vacuum within the leadership of the Union Army in the Southwest. Those who were still loyal had no idea what they should do. They had not been prepared for this. Therefore, much of the normal business of the Federal Army had been neglected for some time. Although Loring had submitted his resignation and was getting ready to leave, the War Department was too busy to select his successor. Major Edward Richard Sprigg Canby and Major Benjamin Stone Roberts were the ranking officers left in the Territory to literally ‘hold the fort.’ Canby was senior to Roberts but being a professional soldier he waited for confirmation of his appointment to command of the department. None came.
L-R:
Edward R. S. Canby and Benjamin Roberts
Both Canby and Roberts were graduates of West Point and talented career officers that had considerable experience in the West. Canby was born at Piatt’s Landing, Maryland, in 1817 and graduated from West Point in 1839. Like all his peers he served in the Mexican War, the crucible of training for the Civil War, and was twice praised for commendable actions. After the war he remained in the Army, serving all over the west, including a campaign with Sibley against the Mormons in 1857-58. He also had served with Sibley in the recent New Mexico Navajo campaign of 1860-61 (Taylor 13-14). Benjamin Roberts came from Vermont from a notable military family. He graduated from West Point in 1835. He was a lawyer as well as an engineer and the formidable fortification of Fort Craig would be due to his credit. He had worked in the past as an engineer for the railroad and assisted on the construction of the Moscow to St. Petersburg railroad in Russia. He was brevetted in rank twice for bravery during the Mexican War and had been serving in the army in the west when he was not on special assignment elsewhere (Taylor 37-38). They were both staunch and resolute unionists and, to their credit, they would hold New Mexico as long as they could. Finally, on the 17th of May, 1861, Canby made his move.
He then mustered courage enough to announce that it was necessary, in order “to protect the fort or interests of the Government,” for him to assume the department command, “otherwise it might be in the highest degree disastrous.” Thereafter, signing himself “Lieutenant Colonel Commanding the Department of New Mexico,” he gave impetus to the enlistment of volunteers. (Union 237/Canby 5/17/61 WOR)
Raphael Chacon noted that as early as May, New Mexicans, especially the younger men, began to talk enthusiastically about enlisting in the army (Legacy 118). But the army in New Mexico wasn’t ready yet and Canby would not set the wheels of recruitment in motion for another whole month as we shall see. First he promoted himself to a brevet Lt. Col. (which was confirmed later) and then also promoted Major Roberts to a brevet Lt. Col. and sent him to command Fort Stanton in the southeast part of the Territory, near the present day town of Lincoln. Canby also handed out brevet promotions to several other officers, including William Chapman at Fort Union and Allen L. Anderson, whom he selected to be his adjutant, working out of Fort Marcy in Santa Fé. Then he began to consolidate his regular army troops. There was a great deal of uncertainty reigning in the Federal ranks in both the officers and men. But if officers and troops in New Mexico were not in very good shape, they were no worse than Union troops anywhere else. It is a strange fact of the Civil War that in the first two years most of the Union officers throughout the North lacked confidence and clarity. This phenomenon had never existed to such an extent in the US army before. And if that wasn’t enough, most of the Union Regulars, especially Canby and Roberts, also lacked any confidence in the nearest available source of additional manpower, the New Mexicans.
“Colonel Canby, like every other commander of the regular army who had preceded him since the American occupation and the revolution of 1847, had a very erroneous idea of the Mexican character. He said that “the people of the Territory, with few exceptions, I believe are loyal, but they are apathetic in disposition, and will adopt any measures that may be necessary for the defense of the Territory with great tardiness, looking with greater concern to their private, and often petty interests, and delaying or defeating the objects of the Government by their personal or political quarrels. I question very much whether a sufficient force for the defense of the Territory can be raised within its limits, and I place no reliance upon any volunteer force that can be raised, unless strongly supported by regular troops.” (Twitchell II 369)
The New Mexicans were thought by the Americans to be undependable. In one correspondence a US officer commented with unusual candor, “The Mexicans are a peculiar people, and the sooner I get east of the Mississippi, the better I shall like it. I do not know exactly what to make of them. I do not doubt many of them feel brave enough now, but how it will be in case of actual invasion, time only can determine” (Wilson 118).
Although for generations the Hispanos had engaged in almost ceaseless warfare with Indians, Canby and most of the Anglos had low expectations of what they could do against an organized army of Confederates. Racial prejudice, cultural differences, and attitudes of ethnic superiority contributed to their lack of confidence in the New Mexicans’ fighting ability. …Although Canby faced an urgent need for their assistance, he, too, echoed somewhat the same feelings. (Josephy 41)
Is it really possible that the New Mexicans lacked fortitude and bravery? This myth may have stemmed from the days of the Mexican War, in which Americans easily won battles against the Mexican Army. However veterans who were paying attention realized that this was not exactly the case. W.W.H. Davis who was a 1st Lieutenant in the 1st Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry regiment during the war wrote:
I believe the Mexicans have been unjustly accused of cowardice as a race, and denied the attributes of personal courage that belong to every other people. In looking at the source from whence they spring, we see no reason why they should not possess all the physical virtues that belong to the human race (Davis 217-218).
In the late war between the United States and Mexico, the rank and file of the Mexican army, in many instances, exhibited a bravery that would have done honor to any troops in the world; and upon the frontiers of New Mexico, in their conflicts with the Indians, the peasantry have frequently behaved in the most gallant manner.
…With American officers to lead them, they will make excellent troops; and they possess a power of endurance under fatigue which excels most other people. (Davis 219)
General Ulysses S. Grant also made similar notations during that war. He said, “The Mexicans… stood up as well as any troops ever did,” and, “…I have seen as brave stands made by some of these men [Mexicans] as I have ever seen made by soldiers (Osprey 20-21). Earlier, American explorer Zebulon Pike had visited New Mexico in 1806 and wrote in his journal, “Being cut off from the more inhabited parts of the kingdom, together with their continual wars with some of the savage nations who surround them, render them the bravest and most hardy subjects of New Spain” (Southwest 141). Pike also noted that New Mexican soldiers were outstanding, except they were poorly trained and armed. But Pike’s, Davis’ and Grant’s views were unusual, shared mostly by Americans who had ‘gone native,’ and had immigrated into New Mexico society before it became American – men like Kit Carson, Governor Bent, Ceran St. Vrain, and Governor Connelly, etc. Even as late as 1866, the qualities of New Mexicans were still not recognized, and Carson felt compelled to explain to his superior, Brigadier General James Carleton, “I am convinced that the best troops that could be used in war with them [Indians] would be Mexicans as they are more energetic and untiring in pursuit, enduring a larger amount of physical fatigue and, when well-officered, their courage is unquestionable (Blanket 39). However, other than this brief note, these men did not leave us much in writing to go on. Most people who wrote things down felt differently and tended to describe the New Mexicans as ‘inferior.’ Even today, historians try to soften the accusations and implications by describing the New Mexicans as ‘untested,’ ‘untried,’ or ‘inexperienced;’ because they think, due to these early reports, that the New Mexicans were cowardly and undependable in battle. But these are modern misperceptions based on the prejudices and lies of the day.
Apparently there was another concern shared by those in authority. It was that the New Mexicans were still ‘imperfectly loyalized.’ On July 3rd, 1861, in a letter to Simon Cameron, the US Secretary of War, from Judge Perry E. Brocchus, it was advised that:
…if you would most effectually strengthen the government of the United States, physically and morally, in that recently conquered and imperfectly loyalized region of our country; if you would plant most deeply in the soil of New Mexico and in the hearts of her people the staff from which floats the ‘flag of the free.’ You must show the good faith of giving them ample protection, alike against the marauding savage and the rebellious domestic foe. (ORWR)
In other words, to make them good and loyal citizens, give them the military and civil support they needed. But, unfortunately, the US government wasn’t about to do that. They didn’t feel they could spare any troops and even wanted to take those that the Territory had. One thing that Judge Brocchus was right about – the best way to help the New Mexicans was to solve their most chronic problem – the Indian problem.
Throughout the 1850s, native New Mexicans did not feel they were getting the protection they had been promised and this was further aggravated by the refusal of the military to provide adequate arms and pay for the Territorial militias. With improved arms, they could protect themselves better than the army could. At one point, the Governor of New Mexico did receive 100 stand of arms, but they were all determined to be unserviceable. Only 100 weapons – and they didn’t even work! Much of this neglect was due to the fact that the United States Congress had long been exasperated with the expense of maintaining New Mexico.
“A waste of money,” said Charles Conrad, Secretary of War in Washington referring to government expenditures in behalf of New Mexico in 1852; “New Mexico, inaccessible, inferior inhabitants, it total real estate value $2,700,000 costs $1 million annually for defense, one half the total land value to protect 61,000 inferior people. It would save money to pay settlers to move out; troops could serve better elsewhere.” “Well,” Replied Santa Fe’s Weekly Gazette, “if Conrad’s going to sell us out, he better raise his estimate, because New Mexico’s cash value now is $5,171,471. (Ream 63)
And the US had paid Texas ten million dollars for one quarter of the Territory! To most Americans, New Mexico was considered more of a burden than an asset. They felt that the US had spent enormous sums with very little return. A list of Congressional budgetary approvals for New Mexico:
Acts of Congress in relation to New Mexico, appropriations, etc., during the decade 1850-1860 are the organic act and appropriation of $20,000 for public buildings and $5,000 for a library;
1851, appropriation of $34,700 for territorial government $18,000 for the Navajó Indians and $135,530 for payment of the volunteers of 1849;
1852, $31,122 for the government of the territory;
1853, appropriation of $32,555 for government expenses and $10,000 for Indian service; authorizing legislature to hold extra session of 90 days; authorizing employment of translator and clerks, sessions of 60 days instead of 40 days, payment of code commissioners;
1854, appropriation for government $31,620, for public buildings $50,000, roads $32,000, and Indian service $45,000; appointing surveyor general and donating lands to settlers; increasing salary of governor to $3,000, and judges to $2,500; attaching Gadsen Purchase to New Mexico; authorizing payment of civil salaries for 1846-1851 under the Kearny code; and establishing a collection district;
1855, appropriation for government $35,500 including $2,000 for archive vaults, Indian service $52,500, surveys $30,000, Texas boundary $10,000, raising governors salary to $3,000;
1858, appropriation for government $33,000, Indian service $85,000; road $150,000; creating a land district; confirming Pueblo land grants;
1859, appropriation for government, $17,000; Indian service $75,000;
1860, appropriation for government $23,500, Indians $50,000, capitol $50,000, confirming private and town land grants;
1861, appropriation for government $20,500, Indians $50,000, roads $50,000; act attaching all north of latitude 37° to Colorado. (Twitchell II 310, footnote 235)
Indeed, to many Americans, New Mexico was a veritable financial sinkhole. A wasteland of pastoral, non-industrial Mexicans, sedentary but sometimes hostile Pueblo Indians and nomadic and semi-nomadic marauding savages. It was difficult for Americans to see any value in it. Meanwhile, even the well-intentioned territorial governors were almost completely helpless.
…having been in office only six months, he [Governor Calhoun] wrote to his superiors at Washington –“without a dollar in our treasury, without munitions of war, without authority to call out our militia, without the cooperation of the military authorities of this territory, and with numberless complaints and calls for protection, do you not perceive I must be sadly embarrassed and disquieted?” (Twitchell II 284)
At the same time, the army was asking ‘What’s the problem? All is quiet.’ Of course it was; Indians didn’t attack forts (not yet anyway). No doubt, New Mexicans were amazed by the incredible show of complete incompetence by their new ‘Owners.’ At least when they were Mexicans, they knew they were on their own and the government didn’t even bother to make feeble promises. One begins to get the feeling that the Army was there, not to serve and protect, but rather to keep the inhabitants in their place – more like jailors in a vast desert prison. The United States’ real interest was not in New Mexico itself, but in the connection it made to California. It was a giant ‘dust bunny’ on the road to gold dust Utopia. Even the catastrophe of a pending Texan invasion did not prompt supporting action. Once again, New Mexico, along with the inadequate support of the remaining regulars, was on her own. And new Mexicans had more than Texans to fight, they had the Indians as well… Comanche, Apache, and Navajo. By 1860, the hostile native situation had become intolerable.
Believing that their resistance had forced the withdrawal of the Butterfield stage line and the departure of the Federal troops from their homelands, Chiricahua and Mimbreño Apaches struck all across the new Confederate territory with renewed determination to drive every white man out of their country. As early as May [1860], citizens of the Mesilla Valley, suffering casualties and loss of their livestock in the almost daily raids, organized a company of Arizona rangers to “chastise the Apaches.” (Josephy 50)
Elsewhere, Mescalero Apaches, Utes, Comanches, and Kiowas also threatened the New Mexican farms and ranches. Canby did what he could to provide protection with his small force, but refused to be diverted from the greater danger posed by the Confederates. (Josephy 51)
During the years 1859 and 1860, according to the report of the Indian agent for New Mexico, nearly three hundred citizens had been killed by the Indians; in one locality alone, on the Rio San Juan and the Rio Las Animas, the mines had been abandoned and forty Americans and fifteen Mexicans had been murdered. Colonel Canby did not accomplish much other than the destruction of large numbers of cattle and sheep belonging to the Indians, which caused the hostiles to sue for peace and an armistice of twelve months was agreed upon. (Twitchell II 319-320)
New Mexicans knew from experience the Navajo problem was not so easily solved. They had made many treaties in the past. Navajo renegades called ‘ladrones’ [‘thieves’ in Spanish], young men who were not under the leadership of any of the established chiefs and did not recognize their treaties had continued raiding at will; and if the Native Americans had trouble keeping treaty agreements, it goes without saying that so did the US government and its agents, and often the civilians themselves. And here in the Territory, some of the New Mexicans also aggravated the already complicated situation.
At the town of Cebolleta on the Navajo frontier during the years 1850 to 1860 there was a band or company of Mexicans known as “Cebolleteños,” whose principal occupation was stealing of Navajo girls and boys for the purposes of sale to the Mexicans. It was a custom, whenever a wealthy Mexican had arranged for the marriage of a son or daughter, to give these “Cebolleteños” an order for one or two Navajo boys or girls to be given to the newly wedded pair as a bridal gift. (Twitchell II 304, footnote 228)
However one looked at it during the 1850s, the Native American problem appeared to be insolvable. Either the raiding by hostile tribes would not end until all New Mexicans were destroyed or the belligerent tribes were decisively defeated once and for all – and no one could see any possibility of the latter occurring. At various times in their history, New Mexicans had solved Indian crisis on their own, through punitive raids as well as through gifts and trading. They could do it again, given the resources. But if the Americans lacked confidence in the New Mexicans, the New Mexicans must have felt even more so about them. One resolution of the New Mexico Council in December 1852 read:
…since the entrance of the American army under General Kearny this Territory has been a continual scene of outrage, robbery and violence carried on by the savage nations by which it is surrounded; that citizens daily are massacred, stock stolen, our wives and daughters violated and our children carried into captivity (Twitchell II 292)
Stephen
Wattts Kearny
The violence continued almost entirely unabated and by the latter part of the decade, the trust of the people of New Mexico in the US Army was at an all time low. Even though there were more army troops in New Mexico now than there had ever been in the Mexican or Spanish periods, the Indian problem had not improved. In fact, according to the locals, it was getting worse. The situation was so bad that when the Texan invaders finally overran Socorro, New Mexico in 1862, a leading Hispanic merchant and farmer named Pedro Baca, said, “the United States Government was a curse to this Territory, and if the Texans would take and keep possession of New Mexico the change could only be for the better” (Wesche 46). Little Baca knew that the Texans would have just as many problems with the marauding natives as the Federal troops did. Some people take this to indicate a marked disloyalty among the New Mexicans, but needing protection is not disloyalty. In actuality his words are an indication of the complete and utter frustration of New Mexicans with the United States and particularly with the US Army. A typical statement of the pre-Civil War period is as follows:
The American troops are at war with the Indians, and if they could only catch them (the Navajós), would give them fits, but Colonel Sumner is on his way back from their country without even seeing one of them. Since his expedition started, the Indians have come into this country within twenty miles of Santa Fé, and have robbed the citizens and run off their stock. (Twitchell II 284, footnote 206)
The American reluctance to arm the New Mexicans turned out to be a mistake, because in response to Indian raids, the locals usually reacted quicker and chased the raiders longer and harder than the US troops did. Traditionally, at the first sign of trouble, a drummer in a village plaza would sound the alarm. Grabbing their weapons and a few rations, all the available able-bodied men would quickly assemble in the plaza and ride off after the perpetrators. Immediately following, the villagers would begin packing a supply wagon with extended rations and when ready, the wagon and more men would follow the pursuers. Meanwhile, a message had to be sent to the nearest military installation, an army detail had to be assigned; they would draw a few days rations and then ride out, often hours after the crimes had been committed. When the rations ran out, the soldiers returned. By then, in most cases, the New Mexicans had already caught or lost the raiders and the event was closed. Consider this typical event written down by Samuel Woodworth Cozzens in his book The Marvelous Country and related by Marc Simmons.
It was probably in 1858 when the Cozzens party was outfitting at La Mesilla, located on the Rio Grande above El Paso, that the tragedy of the White family occurred. [Eager to reach their destination, Mr. E. J. White, his wife, an infant and two Mexican servants left La Mesilla for their destination of Fort Buchanan near Tucson].
On the following morning, Cozzens was aroused from his bed by the beating of a drum and a great commotion in the plaza. Hastily drawing on his clothes, he hurried out to find an excited throng of Mexicans listening to the tale of two ranchers who had just come in from the Rio Mimbres. [They had found the scalped bodies of two men, one American and one Mexican, but the women and infant were believed captured].
Heartsick over the news, Cozzens mounted his horse and rode with urgency to nearby Fort Fillmore, where he received assurance that a squad of dragoons would be dispatched in pursuit as soon as possible. On returning to La Mesilla, he discovered that about fifty Mexicans had assembled in the plaza with their horses and rifles, determined to start after the Indians at once. Cozzens and a half dozen other Americans present immediately volunteered to join the rescue company, and, as he tells us, the men were greatly encouraged because as scouts they had “two of the most celebrated guides in the country, Don Manuel Chaves and Don Jesus Armijo.” (Simmons 140-142)
Despite the best efforts of the volunteers, Mrs. White and the infant did not survive, and, even though a fort was nearby and the troops were alerted early on, the promised soldiers never arrived. Even after the Civil War, army practices were still no better and one New Mexican commented:
It is really a melancholy, if not shameful way in which the military go to work to protect the settlers on the frontier, especially so in time of actual danger. As soon as the news reaches a post that depredations by Indians have been, or are being committed, a troop of cavalry or even infantry, is called out, on the spur of the moment, who, reaching the scene of the disaster, either find the bird flown or if in the neighborhood, the supplies of rations which were taken along, will not justify the troops to follow on the trail, and home they go again. (Keleher 6, footnote)
The army was not always lethargic. There were instances when they took the field aggressively after an emergency, as in the case of another Mrs. White who unfortunately met the same fate. On that occasion, the US Cavalry was assisted by Kit Carson as well as by Captain Valdez’ mounted New Mexico Volunteers from Mora. But the lack of response happened all too often nonetheless. From the Army’s point of view they had been very active during the 1850’s. Here are the highlights of their engagements:
1849 October 24 near Las Vegas, detachment of 3rd Artillery [precipitated the Jicarilla/Ute War]
1849 Nov. 15, Co. I 1st Dragoons, destroyed a Jicarilla Camp on the Canadian River
1852 Feb. 2 fight on the Jornada del Muerto, detachment of Troop H, 1st Dragoons;
1852 Jan. 24-Feb. 19 near Laguna on the Jornada del Muerto, Troops D, E, and K, 2nd Dragoons;
1852 Feb. 6, near Ft. Webster, N.M., K Company, 3rd Infantry.
1854 March 30, Battle of Cienguilla versus Jicarilla Indians at Cienguilla NM, detachments Co. F & I, 1st Dragoons [the most decisive Indian battle of the decade, the dragoons were almost destroyed]
1855 Jan. 15 White Mountains, Troop H, 1st Dragoons;
1855 Jan. 19 Peñasco River, near White Mountains, Troop B, 1st Dragoons;
1855 March 19 Cochotope Pass, Chowatch Valley, N.M., Troops D and F, 1st Dragoons and D Company, 2nd Artillery;
1855 May 1-2, Chowatch valley N.M., Troop D, 1st Dragoons and D Company, 2nd Artillery;
1855 June 13, on Pecos River, Company I, 5th Infantry.
1856 March 20, Almagre Mountains, N.M., Companies B and I, 3rd Infantry;
1856 March 29, Mimbres Mountains, Companies B and I, 3rd Infantry;
1856 November 30, Sacramento Mountains, N.M., detachment of Company C Mounted Riflemen and G Company, 1st Dragoons.
1857 March 9, Mimbres Mountains, Detachment Company G, Mounted Riflemen;
1857 March 11, Ojo del Muerto, detachment Company B, Mounted Riflemen;
1857 May 24, Mogollon Mountains, Companies C, D, and I, Mounted Riflemen; Company B and detachment of Company E, 3rd Infantry.
1857 June 27, Gila River, Companies B and G, 1st Dragoons; B, G, and K, Mounted Riflemen; Company C and detachments F and K, 3rd Infantry; Companies B, H, and I, 8th Infantry;
1857 December 7, Ladrones Mountains, detachment Company F, Mounted Riflemen;
1857 December 13, Dragoon Springs, detachment Company F, Mounted Riflemen.
1858 March 11, Huachuca Mountains, detachment Company G, 1st Dragoons;
1858 May 30, near Fort Defiance, detachment Company I, Mounted Riflemen; Companies B and G, 3rd Infantry;
1858 August 29, Bear Springs, detachment Company I, Mounted Riflemen.
1858 September 9-15, Laguna Chusca and vicinity, Companies A, F, H, and I, Mounted Riflemen; Companies B and C, 3rd Infantry.
1858 November 9, Carrizozo, Company F, 3rd Infantry.
1859 January 25, Whetstone Springs, detachment Company D, 1st Dragoons;
1859 February 8, Dog Canyon, Sacramento Mountains, detachment Company D, Mounted Riflemen.
1859 April 27, near Ft. Fillmore, Company D, 1st Dragoons;
1859 November 12-26, various fights with the Pinal Apaches, Company D and detachment Company G, 1st Dragoons; Company A and detachments Companies C and H, Mounted Riflemen;
1859 November 14, Tunica, detachments Companies B, C, E, and G, 3rd Infantry;
1859 December 3, Santa Teresa, detachment Company A, Mounted Riflemen;
1859 December 18, detachment Company A, Mounted Riflemen, at Santa Teresa.
(Twitchell II 300, footnote 225)
Notice how the number of skirmishes escalates in the latter years – and the escalation would continue well into the Civil War when it would reach peak proportions. Throughout the 1850s most Americans felt that by conquering New Mexico the US had merely inherited its ‘Indian problem,’ but no one stopped to think how New Mexicans had received America’s problem – slavery and the Civil War.
Before 1846, Americans who traveled into this territory came as people who visit a foreign country. They came with a respect for the customs and language of the inhabitants. They had to treat the New Mexicans as equals, as business partners, neighbors, and sometimes as family. If they wanted to stay, they had to integrate and live with the people that were here. Once New Mexico became American, the majority of people who came did so as opportunists; as those taking advantage of ‘new ownership,’ where laws and enforcement were minimal. Some were just running from the law or some other misfortune. Others came to carve out personal financial and land-based empires; while others were soldiers who had been assigned to harsh duty on the frontier. Almost overnight, the native inhabitants found themselves to be second-class citizens. Only with difficulty did they begin to understand the laws, customs, and speech of the newcomers. Even before the American conquest, it was apparent to leading New Mexicans that the United States would eventually cause a profound influence on the Territory. This prompted more than a little concern among Hispanic New Mexicans who deliberated on how to deal with these problems. “Reportedly in 1841, when he [Jose Francisco Cháves, future Lt. Colonel of the 1st NM Volunteer Infantry] departed for St. Louis to enter college, his father, Mariano Chávez, said: ‘the heretics are going to overrun the country. Go, learn their language; come back to defend your people’” (Ream 42).
For many years after the American Occupation, New Mexico was faced with problems that were unique in America. No other state or territory had language or racial difficulties comparable to those with which New Mexico was obliged to contend. The sweep of Kearny’s army through New Mexico dislocated business and property affairs. Severance from Mexico thrust upon the inhabitants of the Territory an alien tongue, new laws and customs, and created conditions which called for prompt and vigorous assistance from the federal government in the national capital. The assistance, however, was not readily forthcoming. (Keleher 6)
The Americans did not easily understand the New Mexicans either and continued to keep many misperceptions. They needed to learn about the historical developments that had brought New Mexico into the Union in the first place. General Kearny had invaded the province in 1846, arriving in Santa Fe and raising the US flag in the plaza on August 18. Later that year, resistance against the American invasion broke out in several locations. It was suppressed by US Dragoons and Artillery with the assistance of a company of New Mexico volunteers, most of which were Americans living in New Mexico. But, surprisingly, at least two of the volunteers were Hispanic New Mexicans. Thus the volunteering of New Mexicans to fight alongside Americans began with at least two natives, not in 1861, but early in 1847.
In a brief period [Ceran] St. Vrain, who had received a commission as captain, rounded up sixty-five willing recruits, most of them trappers and traders. For reasons of his own, he approached several New Mexicans and extended them an invitation to join. Among those who responded were Nicholas Pino and Manuel Chaves. Apparently St. Vrain was already an admirer of Manuel and aware of the young man’s reputation as a scrappy fighter when he visited his home only a few days after the trial and proffered him an officer’s appointment in the new “Emergency Brigade.” Chaves agreed to enroll but declined to accept the commission, perhaps because, as one writer has stated, it might have irritated the Americans. Thus, after taking a formal oath of allegiance to the United States, Chaves entered service as a private, and his friend Nicholás Pino followed suit. (Simmons 102)
L-R
Manuel Cháves, Nicholás Pino
St. Vrain’s volunteers participated in the three main clashes of the 1847 rebellion. They guarded the supply wagons at the Battle of Santa Cruz de la Canñada, and successfully warded off a large party of resistants who attempted to capture them. A few days later at Embudo Station, they led the US Forces as skirmishers and drove the enemy from the valley on their front. At Taos, they helped invest the Pueblo and guarded against any attempted escapes by rebels. During one breakout attempt, Ceran St. Vrain was repaid in kind for his trust in Manual Chaves, when Manual saved his life from certain death. In the same year another company of New Mexican volunteers campaigned against Apaches under the command of Major Edmundson in May. Then in August a company organized by Captain Ramón Luna from Las Lunas went against the Navajos (Militia). After the Mexican War, the Territory of New Mexico was ceded to the United States and there was no longer any question to which country it belonged. Furthermore, New Mexicans were given a choice. “The treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo [in 1848] provided that residents could choose: leave New Mexico entirely, or remain by declaring their preference of citizenship – Mexico or the United States” (Ream 56). About 1,500-2,000 citizens chose to become Mexican and were relocated with aid from the Mexican Government to Chihuahua and southern New Mexico, which was part of Mexico at the time. The remainder had decided to become Americans, and after that, New Mexicans did not consider themselves to be anything but Americans. But Americans did not think of them the same way – to them, they were still ‘Mexicans.’
José
María Chaves
More Militia initiatives followed. In 1848 companies from Taos under Captains Marcial Tafoya and José María Valdéz went out after the Utes and Jicarrilla Apaches in June and July. After that, in the Spring of 1849 three more companies campaigned against the Navajos; guided by Captains John Chapman and Henry L. Dodge of Santa Fé, and Captain A. L. Papin of San Miguel. Two years later, two more battalions were organized against Apaches in 1851-52 and again in 1854. These battalions were commanded by Brigadier Generals José María Cháves and Manuel Herrera. But except for use as auxiliaries and guides, the army was more than reluctant to use them as equals. Eventually, by 1855, Ute and Comanche depredations forced the US Army to admit that it needed the New Mexico militia, not just in defense of their own communities, but rather to assist the regulars on campaign against the hostiles. They had done so before in smaller capacities, but this time they were considered additional troops. Governor David Meriwether authorized the organization of a battalion of mounted militia. The volunteers were not to be paid but they would be armed and supplied by the army. The battalion was to be commanded by Ceran St. Vrain. Ten companies were raised; two were posted on the frontier to protect vulnerable towns and four companies were sent on campaign in Colorado. The other four companies probably did garrison duty for the Army. The company captains were Charles Deus of Santa Fe, Miguel E. Pino also of Santa Fe, José María Valdéz from Mora, Antonio María Vigil of Abiquiu, Pedro León Luján also of Abiquiu, William S. Cunningham from Santa Fe, Charles Williams of Taos, Francisco Gonzáles also of Taos, and Manuel A. Cháves from Santa Fe (Militia). Manuel Cháves became the captain of Company D, and Raphael Chacón served as the first sergeant of Company B. It must be noted here that the volunteers were not all Hispanic. A few were Americans, but in addition, a sizable number of men were Pueblo Indians. The Puebloans had traditionally served as allies and auxiliaries to the Spanish and then to the Mexicans in defense of the province, and they continued this practice into the American period up to and including the Civil War.
Colonel Thomas T. Fauntleroy was commander of the campaign. The base of operations was Fort Massachusetts, a miserable excuse for a fort. It was a difficult time and the weather was bad. Both Chacon and Fauntleroy were taken sick at one point. After many fruitless days on the trail Manuel Chaves’ Company D was sent on ahead where they located a Ute camp which they destroyed. Raphael Chacon’s company was employed in a similar manner. After the campaign Fauntleroy commented, “the regular troops and the officers acted with the most admirable decision and promptitude, while the conduct of the volunteers excited my warm approbation” (Simmons 133). The campaign was a success and the New Mexicans’ abilities were finally recognized by their fellow soldiers in the field as wells as by other American observers. W. W. H. Davis wrote:
An evidence of their patriotism and courage came under my observation. In the month of January, 1855, the governor of the Territory called for a battalion of mounted volunteers to assist the regulars in chastising the Indian tribes who were in hostile array, and in a very few days more companies offered their services than could be accepted. They served for a period of six months; and it is the unanimous testimony of the United States officers who were on duty with them, that in all the conflicts with the enemy they exhibited a courage equal to, and power of endurance greater than, the troops of the line. They were ever among the foremost in the fight, and were noted for their good order and discipline; and I am justified in saying that a desire to serve the country sent them into the field, since the greater part of them had nothing to lose from Indian depredations. (Davis 219)
William
W. Loring
What is important here is that a pattern was established which would prevail for the duration of the Indian wars, i.e., the civil governor appealing for citizens’ aid and a few natural leaders, men such as Manuel Chaves, his friend Miguel E. Pino, and others, stepping forward to assume the burdens of command and undertaking to enroll volunteer companies. Acting in concert with regular army units of dragoons and artillery, these volunteers performed yeoman’s service in safe guarding the settlements and within time earned the grudging respect of American officers, who initially had looked with some disdain upon short-term native soldiers. (Simmons 127)
No one failed to notice that on extended campaign, the New Mexicans rode harder and longer, and engaged the natives ahead of the US troops. Colonel Loring found this out first-hand. In June 1857 “Old Blizzard” was on a campaign with 300 men against the Apaches in the Gila River area. He was guided by Captain Manuel Chaves’ company of spies and guides. At one point, Loring asked Manuel for his advice. Chaves replied,
“We must follow the trail day and night, making no fires, and eating cold rations. We’ll have to move rapidly, because once they know we’re on their trail, they’ll skip for the border and be in Mexico before we get in sight of them. But if you will allow me to go ahead with my company, I know I can overtake them” (Simmons
Loring recognized the soundness of his advice, and though realizing it would put his men to a severe strain, he gave his assent. Manuel and his companions were seen infrequently in the days that followed, as they ranged far ahead picking up sign and setting an exhausting pace. The scouts, indeed, appeared indestructible, bred as they were to the hardships of this savage land, but not so the troopers, who soon succumbed to fatigue and commenced falling asleep in their saddles. Loring finally called a halt and ordered a night’s rest, knowing his trail-weary soldiers would be useless even if they managed to come up with the enemy. (Simmons 136-137)
Chaves’ plan worked and the column caught up with and chastised the hostiles. Again, Loring was impressed. Meanwhile another campaign was simultaneously going on southern New Mexico in the area we now call Arizona. Colonel Bonneville at the head of a large force, including elements of the 3rd and 8th Infantries, some of Mounted Rifles, and Captain Ewell’s Company G of the 1st Dragoons. Paddy Graydon was in Ewell’s company. This group was assisted by a company of spies and guides under the command of Blas Lucero. His company was a mix of Pueblo Indians and Hispanos. This column was after Apache tribes, including Mogollon, Coyotero, and others (Tiger).
A few years later, the volunteers were needed again. A war caused by the military and the government Indian agents had been going off and on with the Navajos since September 1858 and over three hundred citizens had been killed since then. The military and the Indian agents were pushing the natives too hard in their demands, causing them to go on the warpath. New Mexicans tried to solve the problem on their own. In January 1860 Captain Jesús Velásquez of Conejos took a company out in January and another company of Pueblo Indians from Laguna took the field in June. Then Captain Francisco Leiva of Galisteo also campaigned in August, but it wasn’t enough (Militia). Eventually, in August of 1860 several people were murdered near Santa Fe and the citizens could stand it no longer.
The people of the territory held a convention in Santa Fe, August 29, 1860, to determine if they should take the Navajo War into their own hands. They voted to raise volunteers under citizen leadership for a Navajo Campaign. Governor Rencher was in sympathy with the citizens, but he noted that the Governor had no ammunition and no power to raise any. (Horn 81).
A battalion of 450 New Mexicans was quickly raised. Governor Abraham Rencher originally supported the formation of this battalion but the US Secretary of State, Lewis Cass, ordered him to oppose it. One factor that did not help New Mexico’s position in Washington DC was that Congressional Representative Miguel Otero had stated that New Mexicans could take care of themselves in regards to Indian depredations. Rencher asked Col. Fauntleroy for support. However, Fauntleroy also was against the battalion and refused to provide them with arms or ammunition. So they went out on their own anyway – an unprecedented event in NM history under American rule, which no doubt, alarmed some of the authorities to a great degree. Obviously New Mexicans were tired of American incompetence and apathy, and they had decided to act on their own. Miguel E. Pino was elected Colonel and Manuel Chávez became the second in command as the Lt. Colonel. Cháves directed the companies in the field while Pino administrated the unit. There were six companies in all under Captains Narciso Santisteban from Bernalillo, Andrés Tapia from Santa Fé, Juan N. Gutierres of San Miguel, J. Francisco Cháves from Peralta, Juan Gallegos of Cañada [Santa Cruz], and Ygnacio Baldéz of Santa Fé (Militia). The men supplied their own rations, clothing, arms, ammunition, and mounts (Simmons 159).
The march was very difficult in the winter weather and many mules and horses were lost to exhaustion and a lack of provender. The New Mexicans met the Navajo in a series of sharp engagements and returned in December when food and ammunition gave out. “Navajo hostilities were by no means ended with this foray, but it had been shown that the New Mexicans, acting under their own competent leader and campaigning in a country they knew intimately, could perform as well or better than regular army troops” (Simmons 161). Navajo raids continued that winter and due to another public outcry, Colonel Fauntleroy reluctantly ordered another campaign, this time with both regulars and volunteers commanded by Major Edward R. S. Canby. Sibley was on this campaign too. Unlike the previous volunteer campaign, Canby moved slowly and cautiously and it’s easy to imagine that the hardy volunteers chafed under his command. “Colonel Canby did not accomplish much other than the destruction of large numbers of cattle and sheep belonging to the Indians, which caused the hostiles to sue for peace and an armistice of twelve months was agreed upon” (Twitchell II 319-320).
At one point in the campaign, an officer of Volunteers captured a Navajo prisoner and Canby sent a lieutenant to collect him. The New Mexican officer, newly promoted Captain Román Baca (Manuel Chaves’ half-brother), informed the subaltern that Canby should get his own prisoner and he hanged him from a tree rather than turn him over to the commander. And when the lieutenant returned to arrest him, with hands on his weapon, Román stated that he was ready to shoot it out to settle the question. Chaves, who was standing nearby, said, “He means it.” Presumably, the rest of the volunteers appeared ready to back them up. The lieutenant and Canby backed down. Canby did not understand that the volunteers who fought in defense of their homes were not normally paid; their only pay was any plunder they could pick up and prisoners were plunder.
The provision that the volunteers keep all booty seized was an old practice long used by Spain to reward militiamen who served on the frontier. The governor [Rencher] had specifically stated in his call that the property which may be captured from any hostile tribe of Indians… shall be disposed of in accordance with the laws and customs heretofore existing in this Territory,” at least until such time as Congress ruled differently. (Simmons 126)
These were not the actions of timid or cowardly volunteers. These were hard men who had thrived on a harsh frontier, and the fact that they were able to intimidate the US Regulars is a significant one. Canby must have felt that the New Mexicans were not entirely controllable, and this incident may have been one that helped him form his opinion that the natives were not capable of looking to the common good. And more than likely, his professional pride had been damaged as well. Therefore it’s more accurate to say that Canby feared and mistrusted the volunteers, and was not worried about their willingness to fight. He knew they were brave and he knew that they would fight if they wanted to, but in his confused mind, he may have wondered who they would fight. He would not forget the unauthorized campaign and the prisoner incident, which would cloud his judgment in the months to come. He was not alone in his mistrust. Many US officials believed that the New Mexicans exaggerated the Indian problem and clamored for the organization of volunteers and extended campaigns merely to gain plunder and captives, perhaps some did, however, this would have been a completely moot point if the volunteers were armed and paid. Ironically, the refusal of the United States to organize, arm, train, and pay New Mexico volunteer companies completely backfired on them, because if they had been doing so, they would have had a ready territorial guard to call up when the Civil War began.
The important concept here is that by the time of the American Civil War, New Mexicans volunteering for military service alongside the regulars was nothing new, and the regulars knew that. In other parts of the Union, militia units dressed in parade uniforms and performed drills on Sunday afternoons; marched in civic parades, or appeared at patriotic holidays and community picnics. The majority of them were young men who had little or no military experience; and the same for the older men, unless they were veterans of the Mexican War. These militias may have had experience in modern drill, but not in campaigning and fighting. However, in New Mexico, not only were the volunteers anti-Texan to a man, they had been on at least one campaign, and many of them had been on several. Their officers were very experienced, Hispanics and Whites, mountain men, ciboleros (buffalo hunters), comancheros (Indian traders), rancheros, and freighters; men like Ceran St. Vrain, Kit Carson, Miguel Pino, Nicholas Pino, Manuel Chaves, Jose Francisco Chaves, Santiago Hubbell, William Mortimore, José María Valdez, Raphael Chacon, and many others. They knew their troops, and the lay of the land, and the habits of the hostile natives as well. They were formidable allies, who had often guided, aided, and out-performed the Federals. As W. W. H. Davis wrote, “…in all the conflicts with the enemy they exhibited a courage equal to, and power of endurance greater than, the troops of the line [the regulars].” If Canby and his officers had but realized it, they were receiving as experienced and campaign-hardened a militia as any other state in the Union. The New Mexican Volunteers entered the Civil War at a complete cultural disadvantage. Yet they proved themselves time and again.
As I stated before, most Civil War historians tend to ‘surgically’ remove the events of the Civil War in New Mexico from the bigger picture, namely, that the Civil War in the west was actually a war within a war – the Indian wars. This is a mistake, because using only Civil War sources leads to misperceptions; such as the one that New Mexicans were cowardly. Or that they were unpatriotic because they were slow to join the volunteer army and thus leave their families open to Indian attacks. Another example is that historians point out the “pronounced disloyalty” of the 200 New Mexicans who joined the Confederate army in the Mesilla area. But how pronounced was it? These traitors were mostly transplanted Texans and Mexican renegades, some of them outlaws. Even after what the Texans considered to be a benign occupation, the New Mexicans did not rally to the Southern ‘Cause.’ Colonel Baylor, Confederate commander of La Mesilla was completely unconvinced of their support.
Colonel Baylor, on October 25, 1861, writing to General Sibley, bears witness to the fact that the sentiment among the Mexican population was for the Union. He says: “The Mexican population are decidedly Northern in sentiment, and will avail themselves of the first opportunity to rob us or join the enemy. Nothing but a strong force will keep them quiet. I would again urge that re-enforcements cannot be too soon sent up.” (Twitchell II 359, footnote 284)
A few American officers like Colonels Fauntleroy and Loring did appreciate the abilities of the volunteers. Confederate sympathizer Loring appreciated them enough to offer Manuel Chaves a commission in the Confederate Army, but Chaves answered that he had sworn an oath to the United States and its flag….so had Loring.
General Loring rose to the rank of major-general in the service of the Confederacy. Prior to his departure he endeavored to induce Colonel Manuel Chaves and other prominent New Mexican Indian fighters to join him, offering them commissions in the Confederate service; not one accepted his offer. (Twitchell II 360, footnote 285)
It’s quite likely that the New Mexicans who were proud and aware of their abilities exhibited bravado that made many Americans uncomfortable. After all, their country had been stolen, their way of life was disappearing – what else did they have besides their personal pride? They were a ‘kept’ people and probably felt more like prisoners than Americans. Even the powerful Hispanic families were often made to feel like second class citizens. This is not difficult to imagine, especially since they were still referred to by the authorities as ‘Mexicans,’ not Americans. Ralph Twitchell, a leading New Mexico historian, laments that New Mexico should have become a state early on and the real character of the natives would have been revealed.
Had New Mexico been admitted into the Union in 1850, her constitution would have prohibited slavery. There were not a thousand residents in the territory at that time who had been born in the United States and the Mexican population was over sixty-five thousand, nearly all the latter being opposed to slavery, but the factious temper of the times was such that the slightest pretext for argument gave rise to angry conflict and in the light of events transpiring during that period and until the actual breaking out of hostilities in the war between the states, there was no chance for the admission of New Mexico into the Union.
The true sentiment of New Mexicans was reflected ten years later by their contribution in men for the Federal armies, in the great conflict for the preservation of the Union and the suppression and eradication of an institution which, at the first opportunity, in convention assembled the people had declared to be obnoxious to all liberty loving citizens. (Twitchell II 278)
Abraham
Rencher
To the utter surprise of Southerners everywhere, in 1861, Henry Connelly, newly appointed Governor of New Mexico, stated in his opening address before the legislature, “The [slavery] law is not congenial with our history, our feelings or our interests” (Ream 71), and the law was repealed. Too late, Southern politicians realized that congressional delegate Miguel Otero did not speak for New Mexicans at all. In fact, the only person he had ‘spoken for’ was his new bride, Mary Josephine Blackwood, a native of Charleston, South Carolina. In 1861, after Miguel’s stint in Congress, President Lincoln asked him to become the US minister to Spain, but Miguel declined the offer and went back to New Mexico where he was nominated to become secretary of the Territory. However, this position was not ratified by the Council because of his pro-southern politics. To Otero’s surprise, New Mexico was no place for a Confederate.
Even Governor Rencher attested to that fact. Soon after Fort Sumter, he had become concerned when rumors regarding his loyalty began to circulate in Santa Fe as well as in Washington D. C. But there was no reason to worry. Although he was an avowed southerner, he had taken an oath when he became governor and he stood by it, remaining true to the people of the United States and New Mexico. On April 20th he wrote to William H. Seward, Lincoln’s Secretary of State:
The people of Santa Fe are a law abiding people and loyal to the Union; the governor [meaning himself], I well know, never expressed or entertained any other sentiment….
I regret existing national difficulties and….have an…. anxious desire that they might ultimately be compromised upon some permanent and peaceful basis…
In all the popular meetings which I have noticed, the people express great attachment to the Union, and an earnest desire that it may be preserved… (Horn 87)
Thus, the character and temperament of New Mexico was not at all as it had initially appeared to the Southern States. Ironically, the abolition of slavery was not a new idea to New Mexicans, such as it was to Americans. It had already been illegal under Mexican rule. The slave laws that had been passed and repealed here had not changed anything for the locals. In their minds, there was no slavery in New Mexico. There was peonage and there were captive Indians but no slaves. And states rights? That argument did not seem to apply either, especially since they lived in a territory and were not even considered citizens.
It has been stated by some historians that the New Mexicans, so far as they had any knowledge of the great questions which brought about the war of secession, were southern sympathizers. This is not true. There were a very few of the more prominent families whose tendencies were in that direction. The masses of the people, however, were union men. The feelings entertained by some of the most prominent were quickly changed when the first invasion of New Mexico came from Texas. The New Mexicans had not lost their hatred for the people of that state. (Twitchell 357)
Unfortunately for the South, very few people understood how New Mexicans felt about Texans. Even General Sibley didn’t have a clue. When rumors of yet another pending Texan invasion reached the populace, all thoughts of altruistic debates of freedom, slavery, peonage, and state’s rights took a back seat to all other concerns. Now it was personal, and for some, it was extremely personal. The news that the Texans were also Confederates and intended to invade New Mexico, brought the few recalcitrant Ricos into line with the sentiments of the majority of the Territory. Now the native Hispanic element either supported the Union, or at least were not openly opposed to it. This left transplanted southern whites as the majority of the pro-Southern, pro-Texan element in the Territory. And although at a disadvantage, they still tried to demonstrate their presence in order to sway or force the opinions of the people towards the South. Thus the actual mobilization for the Civil War in New Mexico began the same way it started in many border and western states, with shows of patriotism to either cause and demonstrations intended to influence the sympathies of the general populace. But events here were not as dramatic as in many places, including Colorado and California. Inauspiciously, the Civil War here in New Mexico began with a very small incident in the village of Taos:
Christopher
“Kit” Carson
“While Kit [Carson] was in Taos, the American flag was torn down in the plaza [and a Confederate banner was erected], an action which aroused the entire village. Kit, St. Vrain, Captain Simpson, and five others went to the mountains and cut a long cottonwood pole. To it, they nailed the flag of the Union, then set it up in the center of the plaza. Colonel Carson, with his hand on his gun, gave orders that the flag would fly day and night. He posted two men at the old Bent-St.Vrain store to guard it, for he knew there were many Southern sympathizers in Taos. (Estergreen 230)
In honor of this incident and under the approval of the United States Congress the flag in Taos traditionally still flies day and night. Prophetically, Kit had ‘set the stage’ of the development of New Mexico as a northern state, and events followed suit. Except for a lot of tongue-wagging, and the declarations of Texans living in Mesilla, that was pretty much the end of overt Southern demonstrations of loyalty in New Mexico. Although a few natives would join with the Southern forces, the state itself was overwhelmingly Union and its volunteers would fight for that cause. Unlike the US Army, and the rest of America, there would be no ‘pronounced disloyalty,’ and when it came time to ‘ante up,’ contrary to prejudiced reports, they would fight toe-to-toe, equal or better than the US Regulars. On May 4th, 1861, General Order No. 15 called for the mustering of 39 companies of New Mexico Volunteers, but it was not until June 16th that Canby was finally awakened from his confusion and indecision by another order from headquarters which required that the US regular army troops leave the Territory.
Sources:
Source 1: (Twitchell) Ralph Emerson Twitchell, Esq., Leading facts of New Mexican History, Volumes 1 & 2, The Torch Press, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1912.
Source 2: (Josephy) Alvin M. Josephy Jr., The Civil War in the American West, Vintage Books, 1991.
Source 3: (Simmons) Marc Simmons, The Little Lion of the Southwest, First Swallow Press/Ohio University Press, 1996.
Source 4: (Ream) Glen O. Ream, Out of New Mexico’s Past, Sundial Books, Santa Fe, New Mexico, 1980.
Source 5: (Keleher) William A. Keleher, the Fabulous Frontier, The Rydal Press, Santa Fe, New Mexico, 1946.
Source 6: (Davis) W. W. H. Davis, El Gringo, New Mexico and her People, University of Nebraska Press, 1857.
Source 7: (Twitchell) Ralph Emerson Twitchell, Esq., Leading facts of New Mexican History, Volumes 1 & 2, The Torch Press, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1912.
Source 8: (Estergreen) M. Morgan Estergreen, Kit Carson, a Portrait in Courage, University of Oklahoma Press, 1962.
Source 9: (Wilson) John P. Wilson, When the Texans Came, University of New Mexico Press, 2001.
Source 10: (Southwest): Time Life Books, The Old West Series, The Spanish West, Time Inc., 1976.
Source 11: (Blanket): Charles and Jacqueline Meketa, One Blanket and Ten Days Rations, Southwest Parks and Monuments Association, Globe, AZ, 1980.
Source 12: (Militia): New Mexico Adjutant General Records 1847-1911; http://elibrary.unm.edu.
Source 13: (Wesche): Ed., “With the New Mexico Militia: The Civil War Diary of Major Charles Emil Wesche,” Password, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, 1994.
Source 14: (Tiger) Desert Tiger, and the Civil War in the far Southwest, Jerry D. Thompson, University of Texas at El Paso, 1992