L-R: Ceran St. Vrain, Col.; Christopher “Kit” Carson, Lt. Col.; J. Francisco Chaves, Maj.;
1st Regiment New Mexico Volunteer Infantry
June 1861 At this time Brevet Lt. Col. Edward Canby did not know the disposition of the Confederates in Texas. He had heard the rumors of preparations for a Texan invasion. But as to when they would attack, and from which direction, no one knew. Because of this Canby could not concentrate his troops in any specific area in anticipation of where the attack would come from. If it came from the northeast, Fort Union would be a better base of operations, if from the east, he should concentrate in Albuquerque, from the southeast, Fort Stanton, and from the south, Fort Fillmore. In attempting to detail his troops for that duty, Canby quickly realized he didn’t have enough men to garrison the forts, keep the Santa Fe Trail open, guard against the Navajo and Apaches, and scout for Texans – and the situation was about to become more complicated.
Col. Canby had been just ordered to send most of the Regulars east. He must have felt a surge of panic since only four cavalry companies were to remain in the Territory. He tried to stall for time, writing to the Assistant Adjutant General at the headquarters of the Army in New York that, “The preparatory arrangements for the movement of the troops from the department are being made with as much rapidity as possible, but the scarcity of transportation (both public and private) in this country will occasion some delay” (Canby 6/17/61 OR). He stated that the companies of the 5th US Regiment would be concentrated in Albuquerque while those of the 7th US Regiment would be gathered at Fort Fillmore. Then he proceeded to describe the rumors of a Texan invasion of the Territory and his preparations in that regard. He signed this correspondence “Major Tenth Infantry, and Brevet Lieut. Col., U.S. Army.” He still wasn’t sure of his rank, since confirmation had not come through from headquarters.
There were 1,500 regulars scattered throughout the southwest in small posts that were meant to guard against Indian attacks. Their job was to keep trails open and guard citizens traveling on the roads. Their other task was to keep citizens on the roads and to stop any unwarranted infringements upon the natives – anything that might start a war. Unfortunately, all too often, it was the army that started the wars. At the most, each post contained one or two companies of US infantry or cavalry. The regiments would not be in a position to repel a determined invasion (or to be sent east) without gathering all their companies together, so Col. Canby began the process of assembling his forces at strategic forts. Major Isaac Lynde, commander of the 7th Infantry Regiment, was ordered to go to Fort Fillmore in southern New Mexico, near the town of Mesilla. Four companies of the 7th under the command of Brevet Major G. R. Paul had already been collected there. Canby also ordered Lynde and Paul to be alert as to the movements of Texans as well as to the moods and sympathies of the locals. He thought the Mesilla valley might be disloyal to the Union. He also alerted all commanding officers to the possibility that agents might attempt to subvert the enlisted men along with their equipment to join the southern cause (Anderson to Lynde 6/16/61 OR). On the same day, Canby’s Adjutant, Allen Anderson, penned a letter to Benjamin S. Roberts, commander at Fort Stanton, warning that the Pecos River area in the east should be watched for a potential advance by Texans. Patrols should be made by ‘Mexicans’ or friendly Indians if possible. He suggested they cover their military purpose by posing as a trading group – and that secrecy of their mission was paramount.
Meanwhile, as Canby had feared, the Secessionists were on the move in Mesilla. Transplanted Texans were active in attempting to inspire the locals to welcome the idea of joining with the Confederate States of America. Major Paul, the US commander at Fort Fillmore, reported that the Texans had captured Union troops in Texas after promising to let them go. And they had taken over Forts Washita and Arbuckle in northwestern Texas and four companies of Texan militia were expected to arrive at Fort Bliss soon. At the moment, Fort Bliss was still unoccupied by either side. Major Paul also noted that a Confederate convention had been held in Mesilla on March 16, 1861, and that inducements had been made to entice the enlisted men to desert but there was no response at all from the rank and file. He sent along a copy of the resolution of the convention in Mesilla, which stated that they would no longer “recognize the present Black Republican administration” (Paul to Anderson 6/16/61 OR). Canby sent word on the same day to the Federal commander in Kansas that Texan troops were being mustered, possibly to attack the supply wagon trains on the Santa Fe Trail. He also asked for the status of any supply trains currently on the road (Canby 6/16/61 OR).
Despite Federal apprehensions, the Confederates were just as disorganized as they were, and were also busy marshalling their forces to secure northwest Texas. The Southern officers and agents still in contact with the US Army were attempting to draw the enlisted men to the Southern cause. The loyal Union officers could not imagine anyone of integrity, such as they considered all of their fellow officers, to be acting subversively. They could not conceive how much the men of southern sympathies truly hated the United States. Each new revelation of the disaffection of yet another officer, who only yesterday was considered the epitome of loyalty and patriotism, brought another shock. A typical sentiment described in a letter by Major Lynde reads:
COLONEL: I received your dispatches yesterday by Lieutenant Hall, and was very much astonished to receive such proofs of treachery against Colonel Loring. I had always believed him to be a man of the most unflinching honor and integrity. I was not so much disappointed in Major Sibley. I think the extracts inclosed [sic] do great injustice to the officers at this post. I fully believe that every officer at this post will do their whole duty as long as they retain their commissions in our Army, though some may intend to resign soon. I believe that if the post had been attacked before my arrival, Captain Garland would have fought with his command to the last extremity. (Lynde to Canby 7/7/61 OR)
The Confederate agents also tried to commandeer as much equipment and supplies from the United States as they could. They captured everything that was stored in Texas. What they couldn’t get their hands on peaceably they tried to steal. Bands of marauders posing as bandits went out under Texan orders to rustle horses – one group managed to steal forty-one mounts from A Company of the 1st US Dragoons (the future 1st US Cavalry). Meanwhile, Canby and his officers were asking the Texans if they knew anything about the banditos and of course they denied any knowledge of them. They also denied any attempt at subverting the US soldiers. But Union suspicions were soon fully realized when a letter from Confederate General Sibley to Loring was captured and presented to Canby, and this letter described exactly what subversions were meant to be in progress.
There are full supplies of subsistence and ammunition here [at El Paso] for two or more companies for twelve months. The loss of these supplies by capture or destruction would occasion serious embarrassment to the cause [the southern cause]. The gentlemen I have named have applied to me for advice in the premises. I have promised to hasten on from below by forced marches the cavalry force en route here. Meanwhile you may, by delaying your own departure a week or two, add much to the security of this property.
I regret now more than ever the sickly sentimentality (I can call it by no other name) by which I was overruled in my desire to bring my whole command with me. I am satisfied now of the disaffection of the best of the rank and file [towards the south] in New Mexico, and that we are regarded as having betrayed and deserted them. I wish I had my part to play over again; no such peace scruples should deter me from doing what I considered a bounden duty to my friends and my cause. I do not advocate the meeting of duplicity and dishonesty by the like weapons, but if I capture the treasury buildings I shall certainly not send back to my enemy the golden bricks. [In other words, he did advocate duplicity and dishonesty.]
Should you be relieved from command too soon to prevent an attempt on the part of your successor to recapture, by a coup de main, the property here, send a notice by extraordinary express to Judge Hart. Your seat in the stage may at the same time be engaged. (Sibley to Loring 6/12/61 OR).
On June 18 Captain Shoemaker, in charge of the Ordnance Depot at Fort Union, replied to a query from Canby regarding how many volunteers he could arm. Shoemaker reported that he had enough arms and equipment for two regiments although some of it was “old and outdated” (Shoemaker to Anderson 6/18/61). A few days later, Canby’s Acting Adjutant, 2nd Lt. A. L. Anderson in Santa Fe, ordered Major Chapman at Fort Union to “organize a small party of spies for the purpose of watching the road from Fort Smith to Anton Chico, and another to watch the country east of Fort Union and south of the road to the crossing of the Arkansas” (Anderson to Chapman 6/19/61 OR). In the same letter Chapman noted that two companies of the 5th US Infantry were moving from Fort Fauntleroy [located west of Albuquerque near Cubero], one to Albuquerque and one to Fort Union. In addition, he was sending a small group of Native Americans, presumably Pueblo Indians, to Fort Union. “Three or four Indians will be sent from this place to Lieutenant Walker's party, at Hatch's ranch, to be used for the same purpose as those you are authorized to employ” (Anderson to Chapman 6/19/61 OR). At last, Canby felt he had enough authority to request volunteers from Governor Rencher.
On June 20, 1861, Canby called on Governor Rencher for three companies of volunteers “to aid in the protection of the eastern frontier of this territory and guarding the trains on the routes from the Arkansas to this department.” These companies were to form a part of one of the regiments later to be organized under Order No. 15, May 4, 1861. (Twitchell II 371)
Governor Abraham Rencher immediately sought out Ceran St. Vrain and, appointing him the rank of Colonel of Volunteers, asked him to muster a regiment. Colonel St. Vrain had been a familiar face on the frontier for many years since he arrived in Taos in 1825, working as a freighter in partnership with Francois Guerin. He was described as a “courtly French pioneer, frontiersman, and trader” and, “charming and gentlemanly.” An orphan, he had been brought up by Bernard Pratte Sr. in St. Louis County in Missouri. In 1827 he began trapping furs and in 1830 became a trading partner with Charles Bent and Charles’ brother William. Together, they owned a trading post called Fort William near present day Pueblo, Colorado, and Bent’s Fort near the main fords on the Arkansas River. In Taos they ran a trading post, sponsored trapping expeditions, and were involved in the Santa Fe trade. St. Vrain’s business partner and brother in law, Charles Bent had become the first American civilian Governor of New Mexico, but he was killed during the 1846-47 Rebellion. As noted before, Ceran was also a well known militia leader, first as a captain of a company of mounted volunteers during the Taos Rebellion. Then he served as Colonel of a ten-company battalion of mounted volunteers in 1855.
St. Vrain immediately asked his good friend and other brother in law, Christopher ‘Kit’ Carson, to be his second in command with the rank of Lt. Colonel. Kit Carson is definitely the most well-known person of the period then and now. Kit was born in Kentucky in 1809. His father was killed when he was nine so he never attended enough school to learn how to read and write very well. He ran away from his saddlemaker apprenticeship in 1826 and joined a wagon train headed for Santa Fe. At nineteen he became a fur trapper, an occupation which he continued until 1840. His first two wives were Arapaho and Cheyenne, respectively. In 1842 he became a guide for John C. Fremont on his famous trek to California and when he returned to Taos the next year he married a third wife, Josepha Jaramillo of Taos. St. Vrain, Bent, and Carson had all married one of each of the three Jaramillo sisters, so the three families were very close. Carson returned to California with Fremont and was there when the Mexican War broke out in 1846. He was always fiercely loyal, patriotically as an American, but culturally as a Mexican, and always to his friends and family. He spoke Spanish fluently but often had to search for the right word in English. What struck people the most about him, was his straightforwardness, courage, and honesty. In 1854 he became an agent for the Utes in southern Colorado. He resigned that post to become a Lt. Colonel in the US Army.
L-R: Ceran
St. Vrain, Col.; Christopher “Kit” Carson, Lt. Col.; J. Francisco
Chaves, Maj.;
1st
Regiment New Mexico Volunteer Infantry
Major José Francisco Cháves was selected as third in command. He was born in 1833 in Padillas (Peralta), NM, on the family’s old land grant. His father was Mariano Chaves, son of Francisco Javier Chaves. His mother was Dolores Perea, the daughter of Don Pedro Perea. Francisco’s family was well-known through-out the province as his father had served a term as governor during the Mexican period. The Chaves family raised cattle and conducted trade on the Santa Fe Trail, where his uncle, Antonio Chaves, was murdered by Texans in 1843. Francisco studied at St. Louis University and therefore could speak English very well. He went on to study medicine for two years at the New York College of Physicians and Surgeons but his first love was politics. He made two commercial trips to California in 1852 and 1853 respectively. He was a soldier in various volunteer campaigns against the hostile natives and he served as a Captain of New Mexico Volunteers during the Navajo campaign of 1859-1860 under Lt. Colonel Manuel Chaves. While away on this campaign he was elected to his first term as a representative to the New Mexico Council, as the Territorial Legislature then was called. After his father died his mother married Doctor Henry Connelly. After the war broke out Chaves was appointed directly by President Lincoln as a Major of Volunteers. In 1857 Francisco married Mary Bowie by which he had two children (Twitchell II 400-401, footnote 326, and various other sources).
The regimental Chaplain was Father Damasio Taladrid a native of Madrid, Spain. As a young man, according to his mother’s wishes, he had studied for the priesthood but his first choice would have been a military career. Later his father helped him join the military and in a war with France he was captured and became sick. During convalescence he decided he had made a mistake and determined to return to the priesthood (Legacy 129). Taladrid was very well known to Carson and St. Vrain. He had come to New Mexico in 1854 and was appointed assistant to Father Martinez at Taos. Martinez was a brilliant but controversial figure who was constantly involved in politics. He had helped to foment the 1847 uprising in which Governor Charles Bent was murdered. Carson and St. Vrain who had lost a good friend and had had their families terrorized, as well as Judge Carlos Beaubien who had lost a son to the rebels, never forgave the old priest for his part in it. In 1856 because of his opposition to Bishop Lamy, Martinez resigned and Taladrid became the Taos parish priest. However, Martinez didn’t stay retired, he started a schismatic church and many people followed him. When it came time for Bishop Lamy to excommunicate Martinez, Carson, St. Vrain, and Beaubien strategically posted armed and sturdy men to prevent any repeat of the former rebellion and to protect Fr. Taladrid and his congregation (Twitchell II 338-340). Martinez stepped down. He was eventually pardoned by Lamy, but his flock still smoldered with blame for Taladrid; so Lamy was forced to relocate him to Isleta (Legacy 374-375 footnote 8) and send another priest to Taos. Now Fr. Taladrid joined the New Mexico volunteers. Perhaps he had finally found mediation between his two conflicting careers.
St. Vrain also selected the captains of the companies and they began recruiting in their various locals. Their regiment would be designated as the First New Mexico Volunteer Infantry (1st NMVI). It would serve for three years. It would be a full unit of ten companies, although only three companies had been authorized by Canby to begin recruitment at this time. Originally the volunteers were not meant to receive any uniforms. But to rectify the clothing problem, earlier in the month on the 7th of June General Order #16 had been issued: “…an allowance for clothing, $3.50 per month,” was added to the inducement for volunteers service, but “each company officer, non-commissioned officer, private, musician and artificer of cavalry, shall furnish his own horse and horse-equipment and receive therefore 40 cents per day for their use and risk” (Union 237). But, as we shall see, Canby either forgot about this allowance or completely ignored it. The expense for the clothing would be taken out of the men’s pay, but the stipend for hoses was never mentioned again by anyone.
St. Vrain eventually also selected the other staff members of the regiment. As Adjutant, he enlisted 1st Lt. Eben Everette. As Quarter Master he selected Lt., Lawrence Murphy who would be assisted by Sergeant Paul Romel. Apparently the First Regiment also had a band, the leader of which was 2nd Lt. Lucien B. Jewell, possibly assisted by Charles Hopping. For Principal Musician Henry M. Holmes was chosen. Holmes was a bugler so it is possible that all of the field music were buglers. The Ordnance Sergeant was Frederick Berger (he later became 1st Sgt of Co. G). The Medical staff consisted of Surgeon J. M. Whitlock and Assistant Surgeon, J. H. Shout with Hospital Stewards James W. Cadogan, John Drennan and Matrons Georgianna Monteeth, Leonora Monteeth, and Maria Sena. The Sergeant Major, the senior enlisted man of the regiment, is not listed. As for the enlisted men, they originally were meant to be given no clothing but would receive arms and camp equipment (Soldier).
Also on the 20th of June Canby penned another letter to the Headquarters of the Army in Washington D.C. outlining his problems in the defense of New Mexico. He wrote that he needed to garrison outlying Forts in order to protect the Territory from Indian hostilities; he had to defend from invasion as well as guard the Santa Fe Trail (the “communications with the east”). He stressed the need for regular troops as the garrisoning of important locations should not be left “entirely to new and undisciplined troops.” He requested that his department be allowed to keep one regiment of regular infantry and one of cavalry (10 companies each) in addition to the volunteers that were to be raised. He also asked Washington to consider the possibility of recruiting troops from Colorado. He rightly suggested that mounted New Mexican volunteers would serve very well as escorts, spies, and scouts. Then he noted that he had only two 24 pound howitzers available for service but the carriages were in disrepair (Canby to Washington 6/20/61). Then Canby asked Governor Rencher for more troops.
Sir: In addition to my requisition of yesterday, I have the honor to call for four companies of foot volunteers, to rendezvous at Albuquerque, N. Mex.; one company of foot and one of mounted volunteers, to rendezvous at Fort Craig; and one company of foot and one of mounted volunteers, to rendezvous at Fort Stanton; the whole to assemble at the points indicated as soon as possible, and to be mustered into the service of the United States in conformity with the regulations prescribed in War Department General Orders, No. 15,.of 1861. (Canby to Rencher 6/22/61 OR).
On the 23rd of June, the day that Colonel Loring left for his new ‘Cause,’ Canby penned another warning to Washington D. C. about a pending invasion by Texan forces and announced that he had called for ten companies of foot volunteers and two companies of mounted volunteers. He also complained about the hostility of the Apaches in southern New Mexico as well as the Comanches in the north (Canby to Army HQ 6/23/61 OR). At this time, he hoped to use Fort Fillmore as the first line of defense in protecting the Territory from attacks from the south. He decided to send arms, supplies, and reinforcements to Major Isaac Lynde who would be the commanding officer at Fort Fillmore. He wrote a letter to the effect that Lynde was being reinforced with two companies of regular cavalry and he was authorized to organize two or more companies of volunteers as he so wished. Three hundred rifles, and 12,000 cartridges as well as 20,000 rations were also being sent to him. He also expressed hope that Fort Bliss could be recaptured from the Secessionists (Canby to Lynde 6/23/61 OR), but despite all the letter writing to that effect nothing was ever done about the stores at Fort Bliss by either Lynde or Paul. On the same day, the 23rd of June, Ceran St. Vrain left Santa Fe to take up his new post at Fort Union. Anderson informed Brevet Lieut. Col. Chapman, the commander of Fort Union:
“Sir, I am instructed by the Lieut. Colonel Commanding to inform you that Col. [Ceran] St. Vrain will leave this afternoon for the purpose of hastening the organization of the volunteer companies that are to be mustered into the service of the United States. The Governor of the Territory has delegated to Col. St. Vrain the selection of the companies that are to be presented to you for muster, and upon their arrival at Fort Union.” (Texans 55)
At this time, a Union man named Mills who lived in El Paso went to Mesilla to visit his friend Judge Watts. Watts was not there so Mills wrote a letter for him describing the situation he found there.
LA MESILLA, N. MEX., June 23, 1861
Hon. JOHN S. WATTS:
SIR: I came up here two days ago hoping to meet you. I assure you that I find matters here in a most deplorable condition. A disunion flag is now flying from the house in which I write, and this country is now as much in the possession of the enemy as Charleston is. All the officers at Fort Fillmore, except two, are avowedly with the South, and are only holding on to their commissions in order to embarrass our Government, and at the proper time to turn over everything to the South, after the manner of General Twiggs [in Texas]. The Mesilla Times is bitterly disunion, and threatens with death any one who refuses to acknowledge this usurpation. There is, however, a latent Union sentiment here, especially among the Mexicans, but they are effectually overawed. Give them something to rally to, and let them know that they have a Government worthy of their support, and they will teach their would-be masters a lesson. The soldiers also, in defiance of the teaching of their officers and the offer of gold from Hart, are yet faithful, and if a second lieutenant were to ask them to follow him, they would tear down this flag and throw the Times office into the river in one hour. Fifty of them could now go to Fort Bliss and bring up all the Government stores from that place, but instead of this a few thieves came up from El Paso a few days ago and stole 40 of the horses belonging to the mounted company at Fillmore. No effort was made to retake these horses, although the soldiers plead with their officers to allow them to follow the thieves. If Colonel Roberts, from Stanton, or any other faithful officer, would come here and take command, all would be right in three days. About 300 Texas troops are expected at Fort Bliss in about two weeks from this time, and if something is not done before that time Fort Fillmore will be surrendered. I have yet faith that this will be prevented. The only reason why I do not go immediately to Santa Fé is that I think I can be of some service to you here when you come to hold your court, and I claim it as my right to take part in the fight here, if fight it must be. I go to El Paso to-morrow, but will return in a few days to await coming events. I hope to find a letter from you at El Paso. I have nothing late from the States or from my brother.
Hoping that you will excuse my great haste, I am, very respectfully,
W. W. MILLS.
This letter was so impressive that Canby sent a copy of it to Washington in order that army headquarters might be appraised of the situation in Mesilla. As things were in a panic in Washington D.C. it was excusable if this news was not exactly a priority for them. In various forms, this sort of thing was happening all over the country, especially in the border states, between the North and the South, and the Capital of what was left of the United States was located in a border state. Two days later, Anderson wrote to Captain R. M. Morris at Fort Craig notifying him that he would receive two companies of volunteers, one mounted and one foot. This letter is notable because it gives details related to the mustering of the volunteers.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO, Santa Fé, N. Mex., June 25,
1861.
Capt. R. M. MORRIS, Commanding Officer, Fort Craig, N. Mex.:
SIR: For the purpose of strengthening your post and enabling you to furnish escorts of sufficient strength for public property that may be sent to Fort Fillmore and other posts in the South, a requisition has been made upon the governor of the Territory for one company of mounted and one company of foot volunteers, to be mustered into the service of the United States at Fort Craig.
Mr. Robert H. Stapleton, who lives near your post, will be authorized by the governor to raise the mounted company. Col. M. E. Pino, appointed by the President to the command of the Second Regiment of New Mexican Volunteers, will designate the foot company. The mounted company will be mustered into the service as an independent company and for the period of three months. The foot company will be one of the companies of the Second Regiment, and will be mustered in for three years, unless sooner discharged. The organization in both cases will be the minimum prescribed by General Orders (War Department), No. 15, of 1861. You are charged with the duty of organizing, inspecting, and mustering these companies into the service, and you will be governed in this duty by the instructions of the War Department of June 12, 1848, as modified by General Orders (War Department), Nos. 15 and 25, of 1861, and the General Regulations of 1857.
It is supposed that a copy of the instructions above referred to will be found with your company records. For fear that it should not, extracts that relate to the muster into the service will be sent to you. The General Orders, Nos. 15 and 25, are inclosed herewith. There are no blank muster rolls on hand, and it will be necessary to muster on manuscript rolls. A form is sent herewith. The oath of allegiance to the Government of the United States must be taken by all who enter the service, and the refusal to take it will be an absolute cause of rejection. The oath of the commissioned officers of the company will be attested by a civil magistrate and sent to this office by the mustering officer. To the non-commissioned officers and men it will be administered as prescribed by the instructions of 1848, paragraph 104.
As soon as mustered, these companies will be armed and equipped for immediate service. Arms, ammunition, and camp and garrison equipage will be issued upon requisitions approved by you, but no clothing will be issued without further orders. If you have not on hand a sufficiency of camp equipage (tents, axes, spades, camp kettles, and mess pans), you will make your requisitions upon the department quartermaster at Albuquerque, who will be instructed to fill them without reference to department headquarters.
The mounted company will be armed with rifles and the foot company with muskets. The arms for this purpose and the necessary ammunition have been ordered to be sent you from the depot at Fort Union. If they should not reach you in season, you can probably obtain for temporary use the arms in the possession of the volunteers in the neighborhood of your post, to be returned when the regular supply is received. A list of these will be sent to you herewith.
The action of the State of Texas and of the people of the Mesilla Valley make it necessary that your post should be strengthened, so as to enable you to keep open the communication with the posts in the South. Your own company, the company (F) of the Seventh Infantry, and the two companies of volunteers will probably be sufficient for this purpose.
Your views
in relation to this are invited, bearing in mind that strong escorts
will be required for all trains going South, and that it is known
privately that a movement against New Mexico is being organized at Fort
Bliss, and, if not frustrated, will take place soon after the Texan
troops reach that post. They are expected about the first of next month.
By direction of Brevet Lieutenant-colonel Canby:
Very respectfully, &c.,
A. L. ANDERSON,
Second Lieutenant, Fifth Infantry, A. A. A. G.
For arms most of the foot volunteers would receive surplus .69 caliber smoothbore muskets left over from the Mexican War. Some were 1842 Springfields and others were older models, 1822 and perhaps some even earlier. These muskets had been converted from flintlocks to percussion caplocks and the barrels had been re-bored into rifles during the 1850s. It seems from accounts that they fired a round ball or ‘buck and ball.’ Apparently a few of the muskets in the stores had not yet been converted to rifles and they were still smoothbores. Perhaps these are the “old and outdated” muskets that Captain Shoemaker mentions earlier. The mounted troops were to receive rifles of the Mississippi or Harper’s Ferry type. These were shorter than the infantry muskets and were a little easier to handle on horseback. Essentially, the mounted volunteers would be outfitted as mounted rifles rather than as cavalry. Raphael Chacon notes that except for the NCOs (non-commissioned officers) the men of his mounted company were not issued pistols or swords at his own request. He felt they were not experienced enough with those types of weapons (Legacy 192). Their other equipment would be mostly surplus Mexican War white leather gear, canvas haversacks, and surplus canteens, if enough could be obtained from the stores at Fort Union and perhaps Fort Leavenworth. As yet, the new 1855 Springfield rifled ‘minie guns’ were reserved for the use of US Regulars. It was a new type of conical projectile that replaced the musket ball. When fired, the rear edges of the cone spread out against the muzzle of the gun barrel. Then the spiraled ‘rifling’ on the inside of the barrel caused the projectile to spin. It was much more accurate than any musket ball, and for a greater range too. The Confederates in New Mexico would complain a lot about these ‘long-range guns.’ In addition, the Minie gun was easier and quicker to reload since the minie ball did not have to be as large as a round musket ball had to be in a rifled gun. Previous to the development of the minie ball, most rifled muskets were cursed with fouling problems after firing a few shots.
In the next few days Canby ordered the authorization of additional volunteer companies, two at Fort Stanton and two at Fort Fauntleroy, one foot and one mounted at each location. Then on the 30th of June he ordered Chapman at Fort Union to organize one hundred regulars and two companies of volunteers for the purpose of protecting the supply wagons which were expected to be on their way to Fort Union from the east. This was a problem for Chapman since no volunteer companies had arrived at the fort yet. Chapman had served in the US Army for 25 years. He did not like the New Mexicans whom he thought were only good for patrolling and digging. There would be no love lost between him and the volunteers to whom he would come to be known as ‘El Viejo,’ the old man; and friction soon developed with the volunteer officers that would stay with him throughout his command at the fort. Captain Duncan of the US Mounted Rifles was to be in charge of the expedition. Thomas Duncan appears to have a completely different opinion of the New Mexicans as he never spoke of them in negative terms. The patrol would take thirty days rations and move with as little equipage as possible (Canby to Chapman 6/30/61 OR).
L-R:
Major William Chapman, Fort Union; Captain Thomas Duncan, 3rd
US Cavalry.
Then Canby ordered the abandonment of Fort Buchanan in Arizona, near the Sonoita River between Patagonia and Sonoita. He also wrote another letter to Washington DC indicating that the Texans would positively attack in the near future and that he was concentrating forces at Fort Fillmore. He also reported a significant Indian attack near Socorro and some smaller attacks that had been proved to have been committed by citizens, not native Americans. He also worried that the Texans might attack from the east and northeast and that he was making preparations to guard against that liability (Canby to Washington 6/30/61 OR). By now Canby was convinced that the horse raids in the south were not being committed by banditos but rather by Texans who were gaining mounts for their Army and that Texan officials were blindsiding him as to their true intentions (Canby to Lynde 6/30/61 OR).
On the 1st of July, Canby informed Roberts that the Texans were not expected to be able to make any significant forays from their base at Fort Bliss at least until after the 10th of the month. Canby implored him to get his post in a ready defensive posture in the near future. He also warned Roberts that any outright war with the Apaches in the area would be a great embarrassment to the Army, and at any rate, such a necessity would be second to defending against a Texan invasion (Anderson to Roberts 7/1/61 OR). Canby wrote to the Governor the same day asking again for two more companies of volunteers to muster at Albuquerque (Canby to Rencher 7/1/61 OR). It’s not clear whether he was asking for additional companies or the same previous two.
The same day, on the 1st of July, Colonel Chapman received the first company of New Mexican Volunteers to report for duty (NA 23). They were 89 men from the town of Mora and José María Valdez was their captain (Union 239). Since the men had all brought their own horses this company was mounted. So it happened that the first volunteer company to report for duty in the Territory was from Mora, the town that had been attacked by Texans in 1843. They became Company A of the First New Mexico Volunteer Infantry. Captain Valdez was 48 years old (NA 25) and this was not the first time he had fought for the Americans. In 1848 he served against the Jicarilla Apaches as captain of a company from Taos County. 1854 he led a forty man mounted company from Mora that assisted Major William Grierson of the 1st US Dragoons in a campaign also against the Jicarilla Apaches. In the 1855 campaign he was again commanding a company, also from Mora. In 1859 his reputation was such that the Army authorized him to raise a company of spies and guides to take the field against the Comanches. Valdez and his men were to be armed and supplied at Fort Union, but before they could muster the crisis had passed. Valdez also had served as Prefect of Taos County in 1848 and again in 1850. Mora did not organize its own county until 1860 when it became separate from Taos County. Now Valdez was at Fort Union, again reporting for duty. “There was some delay, however, in putting Valdez’ company on the [Santa Fe] Trail, for “they had to return to Mora to obtain clothing” (Union 239). Apparently the volunteers expected to be fully provisioned and equipped, including uniforms. This was to be the first of many disappointments.
Arthur
Morrison Captain Co. B
1st NMVI
On July 2, Captain Arthur Morris [Morrison] brought in another company (NA 23), ninety-one men from Las Vegas” (Union 239). Captain Morrison’s unit became Company B of the 1st Regiment. This company was on foot. Arthur Morrison sounds like a respectable name. He is listed with the Spiegelbergs as being one of the first Jewish settlers in New Mexico. I thought he must have been a merchant in Santa Fe until I came across the following information. Within a short time after Fort Union was established in 1851, it was quickly surrounded by whiskey shanties for the entertainment of the men. This was very frustrating to the officers since the founding of the post was an attempt to get away from the evils of Santa Fe and now the evils had followed them. The Federal commanders suspected that stolen supplies from the fort were ending up at the shanties and decided to make a raid in May 1852. Arthur Morrison and nine other men were clapped in irons and sent to Santa Fe for trial. The shanties were burned to the ground and witnesses say that Mexican women scattered in all directions. Oy gevalt! The amount of Federal property recovered is staggering, and one wonders how such a quantity was stolen, presumably by the soldiers for barter at the whiskey houses, and also how it could be stored without large warehousing. For example, the soldiers recovered 9400 pounds of bacon, 1200 pounds of ham, 3400 pounds of flour, 4000 pounds of coffee, etc & etc. After that Fort Union’s lands were extended to an eight mile square (Fort). Morrison must have gotten through the trial somehow, paid the fine, served some time, or cleared himself (Fort). In all probability he was merely the booze supplier of this group since he was the owner of a mercantile store in Las Vegas at the time. He had married an Hispanic woman and converted to Catholicism, which was why he was no longer mentioned in Jewish circles. He was born in Germany in 1821 not far from Frankfurt and his original surname was Marko. Like most educated Europeans he spoke several languages. He arrived in New Mexico in 1849 and settled in Las Vegas starting both the store and a stock-raising business (Tiger 79, footnote 213). By 1861, he had become influential enough to enlist ninety-one men and he felt patriotic enough to deliver them and himself to muster at Fort Union.
On July 3rd Judge Perry E. Brocchus of New Mexico was visiting in Washington D. C. and had just met with President Lincoln and talked with him about the situation in the Territory. Lincoln asked him to advise Secretary Simon Cameron as to the volunteers who would be raised there, asking for three regiments with as many companies as possible to be mounted troops. Brocchus wrote:
I have seen Adjutant-General Thomas, and he concedes the propriety of having some cavalry, and is willing to recommend the addition of one regiment of mounted men to the two regiments already authorized; but it is almost unanimously agreed by officers of the Army and civilians who are acquainted with the character of the country, its wants, its population, and the existing emergency, that there should be at least three regiments, and that a majority of them should be cavalry. Every man will furnish his own horse for the mounted service, and thus a heavy preliminary expenditure will be avoided by the Government.
Major-General Fremont and Colonel Blair, whom I had the honor of meeting at the President's, fully concur in the opinion that infantry troops are not well adapted to active service in the field in New Mexico, and the experience of those gentlemen in the country in question invests their opinions with the weight of high authority. The zeal I have manifested in this matter is prompted by no interest beyond that which every patriot should feel in his devotion to the integrity, the honor, and the flag of his country. (Brocchus to Cameron 7/3/61 OR)
It is a singular fact that ancient Roman military commanders wisely employed their newly conquered or allied auxiliary troops to fight in the manner to which they were most accustomed. That is, they did not try to ‘Romanize’ their style of fighting, but allowed them to fight in the way they were used to. For example, in those days the Romans fought on foot as infantry in tight formations. They often employed auxiliaries as archers, slingers, and cavalry. They did not have Roman mounted troops in any numbers until after Caesar’s time. Curiously enough, the most common mounted troops they employed were from Spain. After the Roman Empire fell, and throughout the following Medieval Ages, the Spanish kept their tradition of fighting from horseback and when they came to the New World the caballeros came with them. But unlike the rest of Europe being a caballero (knight) was not contingent on noble birth, so even the less wealthy were accustomed to fighting on horseback, usually ‘a la jinete,’ skirmishing as individuals. And this tradition was the backbone of New Mexico’s defense throughout its long existence. The insight of President Lincoln and the authorities in Washington D.C. is indicated by the fact that they also were aware of the mounted capabilities of the Hispanic volunteers; a fact which Canby did not seem to fully appreciate.
His strategy was completely the opposite. He wanted to employ the New Mexicans in stationary garrisons, behind defensive works. He would only use a few mounted troops for scouting and escort. Canby failed to grasp that the Spanish in New Mexico had always deployed in defense of their homes in the form of mounted troops, almost never behind fortified works unless it was totally necessary. It was not their preferred style. Moreover, more often than not, they had won their punitive conflicts with the natives. Many of the American veterans of the Mexican War had made favorable comments on the fabulous riding abilities of the Mexicans. Nevertheless, according to Canby’s plan, the formation of the two infantry regiments continued. In addition to fighting on foot, it was difficult for New Mexicans to understand why they must join the army for three years. Most family men couldn’t make a commitment like that. They were used to banding together as militia during emergencies but not for serving for such a long time, normally a few weeks to three months at most.
On the same day, July 3, 1861, Company C reported for muster at Fort Union under the command of twenty-nine year old Captain Francisco S. Abreu. He was the brother of Jesus G. Abreu who had received a substantial gift of land including the village of Rayado from his brother-in-law, Lucien Maxwell. Lucien had inherited the 1.7 million acre land grant from his father-in-law, Charles Baubien, a French Canadian who had moved into Taos in 1823 and started a supply store. Kit Carson’s ranch, which is now part of the Philmont Boy Scout Ranch, also came from a portion of this land grant. The inhabitants of Rayado subsisted on ranching and prospered by fighting off the numerous Indian attacks. After giving the land to Abreu in 1858, Maxwell built a new ranch on the Cimarron River where the Cimarron Cut-off of the Santa Fe Trail passed by. This is the Maxwell’s Ranch that Federal correspondences refer too. It is certain that Francisco was very familiar with the hard life of a pioneer rancher and as a result, was also steeped in Indian fighting. Captain Abreus’ men were surely from Rayado and surrounding ranch lands. They were the third volunteer company to report for duty. Like Company B they were on foot.
On July 4, Independence Day, 1861, President Abraham Lincoln spoke to Congress, calling for 400,000 volunteers and 400 million dollars to pay for them. The money and the authority to raise volunteers were granted. But precious little of that money would come to impoverished New Mexico, at least not for a while. At this early stage, each state was responsible for the cost of mustering, arming, and clothing its own volunteers. But these states had a financial base. New Mexico’s treasury was empty. Moreover, Canby had no money either. Many of the regulars had not been paid in a long time and the Army owed money to a lot of people for supplies and support. Since things weren’t moving fast enough for him, Canby put into motion the enforced roundup of the New Mexico Militia troops by means of armed coercion. Lt. Col. Roberts wrote to Col. R. H. Stapleton (of the N. M. Militia): “If any of the Officer or Soldiers of the Militia, called into service under your orders from your immediate commanding general, refuses to obey your call, I am instructed to send you Military force to compel their obedience, but it is hoped there are no New Mexicans so ignoble in their natures as to refuse to respond to this call of duty to defend their Territory and their homes” (Union 241). The Militia was considered a separate organization from the Volunteers; they were to be recruited in the manner in which they had been mustered to meet various Indian crisis. Unlike the volunteers, the militiamen would not be paid or clothed and would receive no compensation for the use of their own horses.
On the same day, July 4th, 1861, the fourth company of volunteers was mustered in at Fort Union (NA 23). This was Company D commanded by Captain Julian Espinosa, whose men were mounted. They were followed by another foot company on the 6th. This was Company E which belonged to Captain Albert Pfeifer. He was a well-known figure on the frontier. He had emigrated from his native Germany at the age of twenty-two. He reached New Mexico in 1846 and became a Taos trapper, guide, and mountain man. His body was covered by many battle scars and he once fought on after being pierced completely through by an arrow. Carson, St. Vrain, and Bent knew him well. He was described as “a very paladin of the frontier – mild-mannered, blue-eyed, kindly man, and, in the estimation of his fellows, probably the most desperately courageous and successful Indian fighter in the West” (Twitchell 374, footnote 298). Like Carson, he once was employed as an Indian agent for the Utes so they were both well-known and trusted by the Utes.
L-R:
Julian Espinosa, Captain Co. D; Albert Pfeiffer, Captain Co. E; 1st
Regiment.
Almost immediately, the volunteers presented Canby with an unexpected problem. A Don of Mora had one of his peones arrested there, presumably a man of Company A, because the peone had enlisted in the US Army without the Don’s permission. For generations, the New Mexicans had been recruiting militia companies in their own fashion. The local landowner would call on his immediate relatives, neighbors and friends, including their hired men and peones. It was a medieval pastoral society. In a sense it was not entirely voluntary, but it was based on loyalty not law. Canby refused to let the peone go, suspended the right of any claims in Territorial Courts, and went so far as to promise freedom from peonage upon recruitment. Dons all over New Mexico immediately put a clamp on recruitment. If Canby had been more familiar with local customs he would have realized what he was doing. Unfortunately, this put the Dons who objected into the position of appearing disloyal to the Union. This may have been one of the things Canby was referring to when he said the natives were more concerned with their own “petty interests.” I think I can guess what President Abraham Lincoln might have said about it, “One war at a time.” Sure, the peonage system had to be broken up, but perhaps not now
United States Army service provided a release from bondage. To the ricos, on the other hand, peon army service was a blow at “voluntary bondage,” equally as disruptive as abolition to the Southerner. As a consequence of the flow of peons into the New Mexican Volunteers, Canby, on July 6, found it mandatory to support recruitment by issuing a circular on “Reclamation of Peones.” All officers were advised that the question of reclamation of peons enrolled in the volunteer companies would no doubt be raised at their posts. (Union 239)
The effect of this circular was that all peones would be accepted into service and could not be excused from duty except by a writ of Habeas Corpus from a United States court of law (Anderson 7/6/61OR). One way to view this is to think that the New Mexican Ricos were not loyal enough to the Union, but on the other hand, it can be seen that the New Mexicans who did join were all the more remarkable for it. Some who joined, including Raphael Chacon, brought their own peones with them even though that meant they would be free. Later, without realizing he had caused it himself, Canby and others would complain that most of the volunteers were not the best sort of New Mexicans, and that many of the ricos and their vacqueros had not joined.
On the 6th of July Canby wrote to the Governor of Colorado stating that he did not have enough volunteers to garrison Fort Garland in southern Colorado and he asked the Governor to provide two companies of Coloradans within the next three months for that purpose. They would be armed and equipped but no clothing would be issued (Canby to Colorado 7/6/61 OR). Governor Gilpin was an experienced military man and he was fiercely loyal to the Union as well. A graduate of West Point he had served as a Lieutenant in the 2nd Dragoons during the Seminole War. After leaving the service, he served in Fremont’s expedition in 1843, and again as a major in Doniphan’s regiment of Missouri Volunteers during the Mexican War. After the War he was asked by the governor of Missouri to raise a battalion to protect the Santa Fe Trail, which he did. It was said that he was the only man in Jackson County, Missouri, to vote for Abraham Lincoln in the recent election. That took some guts. And during Lincoln’s inauguration Gilpin served in the security detail at the White House. After this Lincoln appointed him as Governor of the Colorado Territory (Twitchell II 368-369, note 291). But, unfortunately for Gilpin, Colorado was in no better financial condition than New Mexico was, and it was having even more trouble with secessionists than New Mexico did. For a while, he wasn’t even sure he could hold onto Colorado for the Union. The next day, on July 7th Lt. Col. Canby authorized the formation of a new camp at Fort Union for the housing and training of new volunteers (Texans 59).
For instruction and discipline, the commanding officer of Fort Union [Chapman] designated Captain Francisco Abreu, “the senior officer of Volunteers present,” to accept all recruits at an adjacent camp – for lack of a name known as “Camp of Instruction,” later named “Camp Paul,” – and there he would “constitute a police guard… [and] a picket Guard to be stationed near the Spring to prevent any improper use of the water, such as washing or bathing in the spring [the source of Fort Union’s drinking water] …and to protect the public gardens from depredations.” Since the sanitary facilities of the post were inadequate for the increased number of soldiers, “a sink [latrine] would be dug for the Camp, which will be surrounded by brush to screen it from view.” (Union 240)
Also occurring on July 7, 1861, companies A & B, 1st Regiment left Fort Union along with Captain Duncan’s command (so much for the Camp of Instruction). Per Canby’s order their mission was to protect incoming supply trains on the Santa Fe Trail. On the same day, Canby reported to Army Headquarters at Washington DC that he would proceed with calling for the volunteer companies that would fill out the 1st and the 2nd infantry regiments. He still felt that recruitment was proceeding very slowly and that New Mexico would not furnish enough troops to defend itself. One wonders why he worried about numbers when he and other regular officers continually expressed the opinion that no amount of New Mexican troops could or would defend the Territory anyway. Canby seemed to be of two minds, one desperately needing the volunteers, and the other desperately loathing them. He represented to Washington that he needed the volunteers in order to comply with Washington’s request that the regulars be sent east as soon as possible. He also reported that he had requested two companies from Colorado to garrison Fort Garland, and spoke of the threat of increased Indian attacks as well as the mustering of Texan forces at El Paso. He related Col. Loring’s departure on the 23rd of last month and reiterated that he (Canby) had been exercising command ever since Loring’s resignation. He also reported the gathering of Federal troops at Fort Fillmore as well as Duncan’s expedition of 300 men to guard the wagon train on the Santa Fe Trail (Canby to Washington 7/7/61 OR).
Also occurring on the 7th Major Lynde wrote that he had reached Fort Fillmore on the 4th and found things in order. He stated that “From the best information that I can obtain, there are four companies of Texas troops at Fort Bliss, with two 18-pounders and four or more small guns.” He also believed there could be two Texan companies at Fort Stanton. He felt very confident he could hold out against an attack (Lynde to Canby 7/7/61 OR). However, on the same day, after looking around the fort a little better, Lynde completely changed his mind about the security situation. He immediately wrote another letter to Canby relating that Fort Fillmore could not make a stand against an invasion in force, and he began to think about an escape route and mentions Fort Craig. He added a footnote, “P. S.--From what I have just learned, I think I can raise one or two companies of volunteers, and they are the kind of troops I want to act as spies” (Lynde to Canby 7/7/61 OR).
On the 8th Captain Jesus Maria Sena y Baca and his Company F of the 1st Regiment was mustered in at Santa Fe (NA 23). This company was also on foot. On the same day, Henry Hopkins Sibley presented his New Mexico invasion plan to Jefferson Davis at the Confederate Capital in Richmond, Virginia. Davis agreed. Sibley was appointed a Brigadier General and was given authorization to recruit a brigade in Texas – the Sibley Brigade. Also on that day, Canby complained to Chapman, now also a brevet Lt. Colonel, that recruitment was going too slowly (Texans 61). He must have felt that way even more when a rumor from Captain Morris at Fort Craig reached him that the Texans were on the move. Apparently an Apache told the scouts at Lemitar that a Texan Army was traveling up the Pecos River. He reported that their camp and herds covered three miles of ground, and that they also had artillery with them (Morris to Canby 7/19/61 Texans 62).
Of course this was just a rumor, or an outright lie, or a mirage. The Sechesh [period slang for secessionists] couldn’t even occupy El Paso at this time, despite Major Lynde’s assessment. On July 12th Captain Vidal’s Independent Mounted Company was mustered in at Santa Fe to serve for three months. They were ordered to report to Fort Craig. About the same time Captain Antonio María Vigil’s Independent Company comprising about 80 men was also recruited at Santa Fé for a three month enlistment. They were sent to Fort Union. Vigil and his men were from Abiquiu and he had commanded volunteer companies before. On July 14th Canby wrote another letter to the HQ in Washington, reporting that all was quiet on the southern front and the troops at Fort Fillmore had been “increased to seven companies of infantry and two of rifles [US Mounted Rifles].” He said he was making arrangements to send the regulars east but he complained that, “…The organization of the volunteer regiments, particularly the Second (Colonel Pino's), progresses very slowly” (Canby to Washington 7/14/61 OR). This is just Canby worrying again, since most of Pino’s regiment would be recruited by the end of the month even though not all of the companies would be up to strength.
The first of the military supply trains from Fort Leavenworth arrived at Fort Union on the 18th of July. All of the first few trains carried rations. On July 20th John Mink’s Independent Company of about ninety mounted volunteers was mustered in at Santa Fe to serve for three months, whereupon it was also sent to active duty at Fort Craig. The next day, on the 21st, Anderson sent Chapman news that, “One or possibly two parties of Pueblo Indians will be sent out to you in two or three days. They are represented to be reliable and well acquainted with the country east and south of your post” (Anderson to Chapman 7/21/61 Texans 63). That day Anderson wrote another letter to Chapman that the regular dragoons at Hatche’s Ranch would be relieved by Captain Antonio Maria Vigil’s independent company of mounted volunteers.
“He [Canby] also wishes that a volunteer command of three or four infantry companies may be held in readiness, to be ordered on the lower road to the Arkansas as far as the crossing of the Cimarron, if from any information you can obtain, this course will be necessary for the protection of the trains crossing by that route. Lieut. Colonel [Christopher] Carson will be assigned to duty with this command. (Anderson to Chapman 7/21/61, Texans 62)
On July 21, 1861, a large battle was fought in the east, the Battle of Bull Run or Manassas Junction, depending on which side of the Mason Dixon line you lean towards. A Union Army of 37,000 men under General Irvin McDowell marched (somewhat awkwardly) to Manassas Junction, Virginia, and fought against 35,000 Confederates under General P. G. T. Beauregard. It was the first large scale battle of the war. The battle could almost have been considered a draw, except that the Union troops left the field in disarray. Since most people thought this one battle would end the war, the result was not very encouraging, especially for the Union.
On the same day, Major Lynde reported to Canby on events in southern New Mexico. Strangely enough, he notes that in accordance to orders, he suspended the enlistment of volunteers in his area. He does not explain why. The really odd thing is that he told the locals that they will get help against the Indians when the volunteer companies have been organized – yet he admitted in the very next paragraph that he had been ordered to stop recruiting.
The Apaches have commenced operations in our immediate vicinity. On the night of the 19th instant they killed 2 persons 2 or 3 miles in rear of the post, and stole a pair of horses and the harness, and the next morning killed 2 men and drove off over 2,000 sheep. Application was made to me for mounted troops to pursue them. I declined furnishing any, but stated that when the volunteers called for were forthcoming I would then assist them as far as was in my power.
In compliance with instructions received yesterday from department headquarters the enlistment of volunteers is suspended. About 50 names were on the list up to that time. (Lynde to Canby 7/21/61 OR)
Santiago
Hubbell Captain Independent Co.
Three companies of regulars were not present with the 7th US Infantry Regiment at Fort Fillmore at this time. Companies F, C, & H, were still marching in from outlying forts. On July 23 James Hubbell’s Independent Mounted Company was mustered into service at Albuquerque for three months duty. James Lawrence Hubbell was born in Connecticut. He joined the US Army at the outbreak of the Mexican War and was sent to New Mexico where he met and married Juliana Gutierrez. The young couple received from her father 45,000 acres in the Parajito area (Taylor 64). He was a Don now, a landowner, and a wealthy trader. He assimilated well into the culture and became known as Santiago (James). His first lieutenant was his brother Charles and second was Francisco Aragon. Santiago was fiery in combat and obviously enjoyed a very good rapport with his men.
At Fort Union, the Native American and New Mexican scouts hired by the Army were sent out. On the 21st Lt Ebenezer Gay of the 2nd Dragoons reported from his camp near Hatches Ranch to Chapman that no sign of hostile Indians or Texans had been detected as of yet.
My Indian spies have not yet returned. I sent them out with the Indian women, giving them 15 days rations. They should have been back last night. Should they on their return report any thing of importance, I will inform you at once. No rumors of Indian depredations have reached me of late. (Gay to Chapman 7/24/61, Texans 63)
On the Same day Confederate Col. John R. Baylor moved up from Fort Bliss to surprise Lynde at Fort Fillmore. The Texans camped about 400 yards from the fort and were soon discovered. The next day Baylor and his men, still unmolested by Lynde, move into Mesilla, about twelve miles to the north. If the morale of the US Regulars in New Mexico was suffering at this time, it was about to get worse. That day, the 25th of July, Major Lynde’s forces moved north out of the fort and fought a dispirited battle a few miles south of Mesilla with the much smaller Texan force and for no apparent reason, withdrew back to the Fort after a few shots. The Union officers and rank and file were vexed at their commander’s lack of fortitude. On the 26th a few companies of Lynde’s men fought a much more energetic engagement in the town but it was a draw and they again withdrew back to the fort. On the 27th Lynde decided to give up the Post without a fight and retreat through the desert to Fort Stanton, but the movement was so disorganized the troops ended up surrendering piecemeal to the few Confederates that followed them. They were then paroled by the Rebels who did not want to feed them or guard them. As a condition of parole they swore not to fight against the Confederacy again. Thus they would no longer be of any use to New Mexico. If they had all resigned and gone home it would have had the same effect. Sure, most of the officers and men wanted to fight and they only retreated under orders; but is there any excuse for professional troops who cannot sustain themselves on the march without falling apart and getting captured piecemeal? At least they didn’t join the Confederacy. It was said that many veteran officers and men wept like children. But these experienced and conscientious men had not been able to make sure the rank and file had water in their canteens instead of the generous whiskey ration that had been doled out the night before. The prisoners were then set free to proceed north to Fort Union to be shipped east. News of the debacle reached Canby on the following 4th and he didn’t have the heart to send the news to HQ at Fort Leavenworth until the 16th.
What this news did to the New Mexican people, the volunteers, or those about to volunteer can only be guessed. Imagine how they felt when they found out that a large force of Federals had surrendered to a lesser force without a fight. If they thought the regulars had been useless before, it was now proven. As W. W. Mills had written about the natives earlier, “Give them something to rally to, and let them know that they have a Government worthy of their support, and they will teach their would-be masters a lesson.” But at this point there did not seem to be much to rally to. Canby had lost 1/3 of his regulars; seven companies of the 7th US, two companies of Mounted Rifles, and another company under Alfred Gibbs that had escorted supplies to the fort - not to mention all the supplies, muskets, and cannon that were lost. Yet, in spite of these events, Canby continued to believe that his regulars were his mainstay and the volunteers would not be useful. He reported to Army headquarters in St. Louis:
On the 25th of July a Texan force occupied the town of Mesilla, and after an unsuccessful attempt to dislodge it Major Lynde abandoned his post, and on the 27th surrendered his entire command (about 500 men) to an inferior force of Texans. I have abstained from making any comments upon this transaction, for the reason that Major Lynde's conduct will be made the subject of a judicial investigation.
[And in a following paragraph] …It soon became apparent that the volunteer forces could not be relied on for the defense of this Territory, unless supported by a considerable force of regular troops” (Canby to St. Louis 8/16/61 OR).
Canby presents a strange sequence of thoughts in this correspondence. He seems to be implying that since the regulars had failed the volunteers were now proven to be unreliable. Perhaps he meant something different but that is how it reads. What must also be ‘read between the lines’ here is that if the volunteers were disheartened by Lynde’s surrender Canby was almost in a panic. He sent orders to Chapman at Fort Union to begin fortifying Fort Union, and Roberts would do the same at Fort Craig.
Meanwhile, amidst the dramatic events occurring in the southern part of the state, Christopher ‘Kit’ Carson was sworn in as a Lt. Colonel of volunteers on the 25th of July at Fort Union (NA 23) – a quiet but momentous event for the First Regiment. To try to stem the general feelings of dismay and near panic among the people of New Mexico, Governor Rencher wrote a proclamation on July 26 to “…call upon all good and loyal citizens to uphold the authority of the laws and to defend the Territory against invasion and violence from whatever quarter they may come from” (Horn 88). On the 28th Lt. E. Gay, still at his camp near Hatches Ranch reported to Chapman at Fort Union regarding the Pueblo scouts he had sent out. They had found a Comanche camp on the Canadian River, the inhabitants of which informed them that, “they did not wish any more war with Troops or Mexicans and that they would observe the treaty hereafter” (Gay to Chapman 7/28/61, Texans 64). The next day, on the 29th of July, Canby reported to Washington that New Mexico was in deep trouble because only twelve companies of volunteers had been assembled thus far.
SIR: I have the honor to report that thus far only twelve of the volunteer companies called for in this department have been organized, and that the enrollment of the others is progressing very slowly. It is certain that a sufficient force cannot be raised to hold the posts in Doña Aña and Arizona Counties, and it is questionable whether Fort Stanton can be retained. The withdrawal of the regular troops will leave the lower counties entirely exposed to Indian and Texan depredations, and the upper country to invasion by two routes that are now covered by Forts Fillmore and Stanton. My opinion of the result of such an invasion, if opposed only by New Mexico volunteers, has already been communicated through Captain Wainwright.
The troops from the most distant posts are being withdrawn as rapidly as the circumstances of the country and the slow organization of the volunteers will permit, but a strong force will be kept at Fort Stanton and Fort Fillmore until the troops have been withdrawn and the public property removed from the most exposed points.
The disturbed state of the lower country and the difficulty of procuring transportation will delay these movements, but I expect that the first column (six companies of infantry and four of cavalry) [the 1st Regiment] will be in readiness to march from Fort Union by or soon after the middle of next month.
Indian depredations, particularly in Arizona, continue to be very frequent. In other respects the state of affairs has not materially changed since my last report. (Canby to Washington 7/29/61 OR)
On July 30th Captain Duncan’s command returned to Fort Union from duty on the Santa Fe Trail. His report on the 31st to Lt. Col. Chapman read:
I have the honor to report that, in obedience to instructions from Dept. Hd. Qtrs. Of the 30th June & Orders No. 41 dated Fort Union July 4th 1861, I left this post on the 7th Inst. In command of Cos. “D”, “E”, and “H”, R.M.R. [Regiment Mounted Rifles], and Companies “A” & “B” 1st Regt. N.M. Volunteers.
…Proceeding as rapidly as practical via “the Raton Route”, we reached Fort Wise on the 19th Inst.” (Texans 65)
In the last two days of July, two more captains of the 1st Regiment and their companies mustered into service (NA 23): Captain Louis Felsenthal’s Company G on the 30th, and Captain Santiago Valdez at the head of Company H on the 31st. If the other captains were traders, rum-runners, mountain men, ciboleros, and rancheros, Louis Felthensal was from the other end of the spectrum. He was a clerk. He arrived in New Mexico in 1858 as a young Prussian Jew immigrant from Iserlohn, Westphalia. A year after his arrival he became a clerk for the Territorial Council (the state legislature), and he also became a founding member of the Historical Society of New Mexico at this time. At the behest of Mrs. Levi Speigelberg he joined a small congregation of Jews that met at the Speigelberg residence for community and worship. He was fluent in several languages including Spanish which must have greatly aided him in command of a company of Hispanic volunteers. As the war seemed imminent Felsenthal applied for a Captaincy and was accepted. His troops were recruited from the Santa Fe area. He seems to have adapted well to his new task as commander of a company of volunteers (Dorgan 1-32) and probably didn’t like clerking much anyway. Not much could be found on Captain Santiago Valdez except that he was thirty years old at the time.
On the 1st of August Col. Baylor in Mesilla made a proclamation declaring that all of New Mexico, which also included the present state of Arizona, below the 34th parallel would now become the new Confederate Territory of Arizona. In contrast to the dismayed feelings of the locals in Mesilla (pobrecitos), Confederates everywhere were celebrating that the Confederacy now had, not only one more slave territory, but also a connection to California, which they thought would be overtaken by their compatriots there. But they could not have known how hollow that vast new territory actually was, since the largest group of inhabitants by far was hostile Native Americans and even worse, events would not turn out in their favor in California. Rebel sympathizers there were repressed and it became a Union state. By the end of the month California would begin mustering volunteers who would come to the aid of New Mexico, even if they would be just a bit late. Interestingly, New Mexico was still considered by easterners to be a border state that could swing either way and maps of the day were drawn in that fashion. Baylor set himself up in Mesilla as the acting governor of the new Confederate Territory. Because of his recent successes and the apparent softness of the Yanks, Baylor thought he could easily capture all of New Mexico if he had a few more men and horses. But instead of being preoccupied with Yankees he was so beset by Apache Indian attacks he had to form a company of Arizona Rangers in defense. Baylor, like the U.S. Regulars before him, quickly found out that the Indians were a formidable foe that could not be ignored. The invasion of New Mexico would be left to General Sibley who was still assembling his brigade in San Antonio, Texas.
On August 2nd Lt. Col Roberts received news of Lynde’s surrender and he began preparations for abandoning Fort Stanton. He set fire to the fort but heavy rain quelled the fires. It would seem that Roberts’ evacuation was rather hasty because that was pretty shoddy work for a professional engineer. Confederate Captain Walker moved into an intact fort with most of the supplies still available, including cannons (Twitchell II 370, footnote 293). Local New Mexicans had moved into the comfortable fort as soon as the Federals left, but they were beset by banditos who stole most of the supplies. However, the Confederates were easily able to remove the occupants and recover most of the goods. By this time there were seven companies of N. M. volunteers at Fort Union; six foot and one mounted (Fort). Kit Carson returned there on the 2nd of August and he related to Chapman some worrisome news he had heard on the way. Chapman promptly reported it to Canby at Santa Fe:
Sir: Col. Carson returned from Taos today and heard on the road a report coming from Indian Traders among the Comanches, that a large force of white men were coming up the Canadian or Pecos river in this direction.
Col. Carson thinks if the Texans are coming he can collect in a few days Mexicans and Ute Indians sufficient to steal all their animals before they reach here. I think it advisable to employ him for that purpose if time will permit. (Chapman to Anderson 8/2/61 Texans 67)
Of course, this was only another rumor, probably a misguided report of Walker’s men at Fort Stanton. Also, on the 2nd of August Canby called on Governor Rencher for a battalion of four more companies of mounted volunteers under the command of a Lt. Colonel to serve for three years. And still on the same day Chapman at Fort Union wrote to Anderson in Santa Fe that he had decided to begin construction on new fortifications. His scouts had reported two men spying on the Fort and the news lit a fire under him. He knew the Fort as it stood currently was indefensible. Using the volunteers he would begin building a new fort – which was referred to as the field works. He also reported that the New Mexicans were being trained as artillery crews. Chapman, like Canby, also felt strongly that the volunteers would not hold up in a fight without fortifications. In his mind they couldn’t fight anyway, but they could dig. He wrote:
…I have determined to cross to the east Side of the creek out of range of field pieces & small arms & construct an entrenched camp with a bomb-proof magazine and store houses sufficient to contain all the stores. …Capt. [Cuvier] Grover will have charge of the working party on the entrenched camp and it will be pushed forward day and night to completion. I will defend it at all hazards and as long as I have a man to pull a trigger. The men off duty have been drilling at Artillery for several days and are progressing very well. [Obviously, the carriages of the 24 pounders had been repaired.] These drills will be continued daily.
These Mexican volunteers are more afraid of the Texans than they are of death, and in case of an attack by the latter, I cannot rely upon them. If I can use them in constructing the proper defenses and get them in station them behind entrenchments they may render good service. (Texans 69)
Regardless of Chapman’s opinion the New Mexicans would be tested in time. As can be noted in many correspondences, the US officers can hardly be cited as authorities on what the native people were thinking. To be fair, the New Mexicans no doubt, met the insulting attitude of the regulars with their own form of abrasiveness. Some of it was regulars versus volunteers, and some of it was Hispanos versus Gringos, the rest of it was a pastoral society versus an industrial one. The instructors of artillery were 2nd Lt. John F. Ritter and 2nd Lt. Robert W. Hall, but contrary to Chapman’s report, the volunteers would be doing a lot more digging than drilling. On the 3rd of August Lt. Col. Carson assumed command of Camp Chapman, the camp of volunteers (NA 23).
Captain Charles Deus (pronounced dáis) in charge of Company I, which was mounted, mustered in his men on the 4th of August (NA 23). Captain Charles Deus was forty–five years old and was from Santa Fe. He had done militia work before when he commanded a company during the Apache crisis of 1855. Only one more company was needed to fill out the First Regiment.
L-R:
Louis Felsenthal, Captain Co. G; Charles Deus, Captain Co. I; 1st
Regiment.
Canby thought that Carson’s suggestion to organize a party of Utes and New Mexicans to harass the Texan advance was a good one and should be executed as soon as possible (Anderson to Chapmen 8/5/61 OR). The next day Chapman gave the order to Kit. On August 6th Anderson informed Chapman that there were no more tents available in the Territory for new troops: “There are no tents in the Department that can be furnished but it is believed that very good temporary shelters can be made from the remains of the old fort” (Texans 72). The temporary shelters were never built and apparently many of the volunteers slept on the open ground. On the 7th Col. Carson and Captain Pfeiffer began their assignment to gather a force of Ute Indians. The ostensible reason for assembling Native American allies as scouts was to keep as many volunteers as possible working on constructing the new field works. Carson noted that the Army would have to feed the families of the Ute volunteers while they were away and Canby agreed. Chapman sent some of Captain Vigil’s men under a Lt. Pike to scout in the direction of Fort Stanton and then he reported to Canby on the work: “We are working about 200 men every four hours day and night on the entrenchments. They are progressing very well, and in [a] day or two more it will be sufficiently advanced for defense” (Chapman to Anderson 8/7/61 Texans 74). Actually work would continue for another five months.
Early in August Col. Carson requested uniforms for the volunteers. Since there was no money for them, they would need Federal support and this had been recognized as of June 7th prior. But even though a stipend had already been approved for clothing, nothing had as yet been issued. In truth, Canby had not even requisitioned any uniforms for them from Fort Leavenworth yet. Perhaps he had forgotten about it. Anderson’s reply misrepresented the fact that the volunteers were already authorized to receive clothing as of two months earlier and he stated that they would order them now. Anderson reiterated the instructions of General Order #16. Then he closed by attempting to flatter the volunteers, “Col. Canby is much gratified with the favorable account given of the progress of the volunteers and he hopes that they will soon be in such an effective condition as to be able to give a good account of any enemy whatever” (Anderson to Carson 8/7/61, Texans 74). This statement appears to be conciliatory in nature, indicating the awareness of a rift beginning between the regulars and volunteers.
A more immediate problem than clothing for some of the volunteers was how to feed their families who had come to live with them at Fort Union. It was a common practice for Mexican women to follow their men – most of them were safer there than they were at home. Fearing imminent desertions, Canby authorized that rations could be issued to the families, the cost would be deducted from the soldier’s pay (Anderson to Carson 8/7/61 OR). On August 8th, Canby issued a circular to the effect that the Territory was under martial law (same as the rest of the Union at this time). “The writ of habeas corpus has been suspended in order to enable every commander to guard against the treasonable designs of persons disloyal to the Government of the United States, particularly agents and spies, persons engaged in furnishing information to, or in other treasonable correspondence with, the enemy, or in inciting insurrection or rebellion” (Canby 8/8/61 OR). That same day he issued General Order #27 which stated that Lt. Col. Roberts would now command the southern district of New Mexico from his new headquarters at Albuquerque (Canby 8/8/61 OR). Three days after Carson and Pfeiffer left for the Ute country, Canby again urged Chapman to have them hurry up in their assignment (Chapman to Carson 8/10/61, Texans 76), not that he could do much about it.
On August 10th the Battle of Wilson’s Creek took place at Springfield, Missouri. A Federal force under Nathaniel Lyon attacked a Confederate army twice its size. Boy, were they surprised. There occurred a lot of close-range slaughter but the results were inconclusive and the Federals withdrew. Meanwhile, back in New Mexico, Lt. Col. Carson was ready to leave for Fort Union with a Ute party. He had recruited twenty warriors with others soon to follow. Fearing an imminent Confederate assault, Canby ordered that the women and children at Fort Union be removed to Mora or Las Vegas if the Fort was attacked. The Confederates were not even close to being ready to do anything yet, and Canby’s worrisome precautions seem to represent the level of panic that existed among the Federal officers at this time. Although he was personally a brave man his preparations appear to be confused and dubious. The next day Col. St. Vrain reported that the women and children could be housed at Mora. He maintained a house and grist mill there and was very familiar with the community. Written on August 13, 1861, another request from the Assistant Adjutant-General, E. D. Townsend, of the Army headquarters in Washington D. C. reminded Canby to send the regulars east.
SIR: Under instructions from the War Department, the General-in-chief directs that you withdraw the regular troops from New Mexico, &c., as heretofore ordered, at such time and in such manner as will not expose the Territory to conquest or invasion from Texas before the volunteer forces of New Mexico are properly organized, armed, and posted. The general, nevertheless, urges upon you the greatest possible dispatch in these movements. (WOR Townsend to Canby 8/13/61)
Raphael
Chacon Captain Co. K
1st Regiment
At last, the muster of the ten companies of the First Regiment New Mexico Volunteer Infantry was complete on the 13th of August, 1861, at Fort Union, with the induction of Captain Raphael Chacon’s Company K (NA 23). Raphael was the son of Presidio Captain Albino Chacon. At a very early age he was sent to Chihuahua to study at a military academy. And therefore, at the age of thirteen, he found himself in command of a gun crew at Apache Canon in 1846 before Armijo dispersed the militia. Later, he served in Colonel St. Vrain’s battalion in the 1855 Ute/Apache war as First Sergeant of Company B. Now, at the age of thirty, he found himself a captain in the US Army. His company was fully mounted, much of it at his own expense. Some of the men did not have horses or the full purchase price for one, so he purchased horses at Mora, which his soldiers paid back to him from their wages. He and his men expected to be fully recompensed for loss of horses and equipment and believed they would receive replacements as the horses and furniture wore out (Legacy 119). Seemingly for this purpose, each man’s horse was rated for value upon mustering into service (Legacy 119/Fort). Originally, the regiment was supposed to be all on foot, but some of the men could not be persuaded to fight as infantry. Therefore, four of the regiment’s companies were mounted and six were on foot.
Sources:
Source 1 (Taylor) Bloody Valverde, A Civil War Battle on the Rio Grande, February 21, 1862; by John Taylor, University of New Mexico Press, 1995.
Source 2 (Dorgan) Louis Felsenthal; Citizen-Soldier of Territorial new Mexico, University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, 1982; by Jacqueline Dorgan Meketa.
Source 3 (Legacy) Legacy of Honor. The Life of Rafael Chacon, a Nineteenth Century New Mexican; edited by Jacqueline Dorgan Meketa, University of New Mexico Press, 1986.
Source 4 (Wilson) When the Texans Came; by John P. Wilson, University of New Mexico Press, 2001.
Source 5 (Twitchell) Leading facts of New Mexican History, Ralph Emerson Twitchell, Esq. The Torch Press, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1912.
Source 6 (Josephy) The Civil War in the American West, Alvin M. Josephy, Jr. Vintage Books, 1991.
Source 7 (Felsenthal) Louis Felsenthal, Citizen-Soldier of Territorial New Mexico, by Jacqueline Dorgan Meketa, University of New Mexico Press, 1982.
Source 8: (Union) Fort Union and the Winning of the Southwest, Chris Emmett, University of Oklahoma, 1965.
Source 9: (Soldier) Soldier/Sailor online database
Source 10: (Fort) an online book on Fort Union by the National Park Service; www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books
Source 11: (Tiger) Desert Tiger, and the Civil War in the far Southwest, Jerry D. Thompson, University of Texas at El Paso, 1992
Source 12: (NA 22) United States National Archives, Compiled Service Records, E522 U5 Roll 23.
Source 13: (NA 25) United States National Archives, Compiled Service Records, E522 U5 Roll 25 Special thanks to Tony Campisi for his help at the UNM microfiche records.