Chapter Four - Recruiting Continues

July-August 1861

Sometime in July, the 2nd Regiment of New Mexico Volunteer Infantry also began recruiting. Colonel Miguel Estanislado Pino was appointed commander. Miguel was born in 1821 into a prominent New Mexican merchant family in Socorro. His parents were Don Pedro Pino and Maria Baca. He had served in the New Mexico militia all his life. He was a captain in St. Vrain’s battalion in 1855, a colonel in 1860, and by this time was known well enough in the United States to have been appointed a colonel of volunteers directly by President Lincoln. His brother, Nicholas de Jesus Pino, who was two years older than he, would become Colonel of the 2nd New Mexico Militia. Miguel Pino selected his old comrade in arms, Manuel A. Cháves, as his second in command with the rank of Lt. Colonel. The major of the regiment was Jesus M. Baca y Salazar. On the 1st of August Lt. Col. Cháves reported for duty at the army post in Albuquerque. He was sworn in by brevet Major N. B. Rossell. Cháves’ first assignment would be as commander at Fort Fauntleroy. Along with reporting the muster of Manuel Cháves, Rossell stated that the people of Albuquerque “are a good deal scared. If we only knew who we could trust, but it seems as if the Devil had possession of so many that it makes me suspicious, and I am by nature just the contrary” (Rossell to Canby 8/1/61, Texans 112). Rossell was the man who had written that he wished he were back east and away from the New Mexican people. It is easy to wonder just who was scared of who. It’s possible that the news regarding the 7th US Infantry had already reached Albuquerque at this time.

The first eight companies of the Second Regiment were mustered in at Albuquerque simultaneously with the First Regiment, but a little lagging behind their progress - the last two companies came more slowly. The first company to enlist was Company A under Captain Manuel A. Pino, possibly a younger relative of Col. Pino. Company B was commanded by Captain José D. Sena, a native of Santa Fé. His father, Don Juan Sena had immigrated to New Mexico from Mexico and become a merchant trader. Captain Sena, along with the help of Lt. Col. Francisco Perea, quickly raised a company of infantry; most likely they were also men of Santa Fé (Twitchell II 388, footnote 314). Company C reported for duty under the direction of Captain Manuel Baca y Delgado while Company D swore in under Captain Gregorio Otero. The next company, E, was commanded by Captain Román Antonio Baca. Baca was Lt. Col. Manual Cháves’ half brother. After Manuel’s father died his mother had remarried to Román’s father, José Antonio Baca. Often by his brother’s side, Román had risen through the ranks of New Mexico volunteers through personal exploits of bravery and he had been appointed Captain of a company during the Navajo campaign. It was he who had hung the Indian prisoner rather than turn him over to Canby and it was his older brother, Manuel Cháves, who had been present at the time, and Col. Pino had been their overall commander. As this incident had occurred barely six months earlier, it is more than conceivable that Canby had not forgotten nor forgiven it yet. Politically, this put the 2nd Regiment in a difficult position with Col. Canby from the very beginning of its inception. Its leadership had defied him before and he might have thought they would do it again. Canby definitely would keep an eye on them.

       
L-R: Manuel A. Cháves, Lt. Colonel; Román A. Baca, Captain Co. E;
José D. Sena, Captain Co. B.; 2nd Regiment

On July 29th John Minks’ Independent Company was sworn in for three months service at Fort Craig. On August 8th, Lt. Colonel Manuel Cháves arrived at Fort Fauntleroy and took command of the garrison of three companies of the 2nd Regiment New Mexico Volunteers: companies A (Pino’s), B (Sena’s), and C (Baca y Delgado’s). Fort Fauntleroy, located at Cubero west of Albuquerque, was a very important post as a frontier guard against marauding Navajos. It also served as a place for trade with the natives and it was the location from which the US Indian agent gave the allotted disbursements to the various Navajo tribes. Therefore, there was a lot of Navajo traffic at this post. Cháves’ duty at this time was to maintain (or enforce) Canby’s recent peace agreement with them. The other companies of the 2nd Regiment were stationed at the headquarters in Albuquerque. Throughout early August, enrollment of the volunteers continued and despite Canby’s incessant worrying, volunteer companies were rolling in. So much so that on August 13, 1861, Anderson reported to Chapman at Fort Union that a third regiment of New Mexico volunteers would now begin recruiting: “Sir: I am instructed to inform you that the Governor has appointed Jose Guadalupe Gallegos of San Miguel, Lt. Colonel, José María Cháves of Abiquiu, Lieut. Colonel, Manuel Baca of Socorro and Joseph Cumming of Santa Fé, Majors of the regiment of New Mexican Mounted Volunteers” (Chapman to Anderson 8/13/61, Texans 78).

José María Cháves

Strangely enough, none of these three men, Col. José María Cháves, Major Manuel Baca, or Major Joseph Cummings, are listed in the enlistment records for the Third Regiment of volunteers. Most likely this was the early command structure of the Third Regiment and it was reorganized later. Some of Canby’s later remarks seem to support this. José María Cháves was a longtime figure on the frontier and had been a general of New Mexico militia since 1851. Major Joseph Cummings was a professional Santa Fé gambler and a person of ‘colorful’ repute. Later, Cummings would serve as Gen. Carleton’s Provost Marshall when his true ‘colors’ would be revealed (Legacy 192-203).

The next day, on August 14th, Canby again wrote to Governor Gilpin of Colorado asking for two companies of volunteers, however, the Governor had already complied with that request.

Governor Gilpin in his response to the request made by Colonel Canby August 14, 1861, reported the organization of two volunteer companies of infantry – Company A, Captain J.P.Slough, 101, Company B, Captain Samuel F. Tappan, 101, which had been ordered to report for muster into the service of the United States at Fort Garland. Gilpin states that there was “…a strong malignant element [in Colorado] essential to be controlled. The dependence exclusively of this industrial population upon supplies imported from the states over a line of communication of 800 miles liable to be cut off by Indians as well as other hostile attacks, makes a complete home organization peremptory for self-defense.” (Twitchell II 368-369 footnote 292)

On the 16th Lt. Col. Roberts reported to Canby that Albuquerque had a sizeable force of men in garrison there.

The command now consists of Companies “F”, “C” and “H”, of the 7th Infantry, and “D” and “F”, 5th Infantry; “C”, “G” and “K”, Mounted Riflemen, “D” & “G”, 1st Dragoons; Captain [James “Santiago”] Hubbell’s company of mounted volunteers, and the [2nd Regiment] foot companies of Captains [Gregorio] Otero [Co. D], [Ethan W.] Eaton [Co. F], and [Román A]. Baca [Co. E]; making a total present of 850 rank and file. Of this number, 675 are regular troops, in effective condition, and all loyal and true men. (Roberts to Canby 8/16/61, Texans 114)

Roberts also reported that at least half of his men did not have canteens and he understood that there were none to be had in the department (Roberts to Canby 8/16/61, Texans 114). Many of the volunteers would have crafted their own gourd canteens; others might have used bottles, tied with ropes or leather. Also on the 16th of August Canby wrote a long report to General Fremont at Army Headquarters in St. Louis which was to be the HQ for all western operations for the Union Army. He reported that Col. Loring had left the NM department and that he had not received any further instructions concerning the volunteers. He reiterated Indian problems and also re-stated that he believed the volunteers could not be relied upon “for defense of this Territory, unless supported by a considerable force of regular troops.” Then he went on to relate how a superior force of these ‘reliable’ regulars had surrendered to a few hundred Confederates and were now, after having been paroled, on their way to Fort Union. He also notes that the headquarters of the 1st Volunteer Regiment was stationed at Fort Union and that of the 2nd Regiment was at Albuquerque. He finished by wondering where the supply train was and whether Army Headquarters wanted to defend this department at all. In light of his lack of instruction it was a fair question.

I have heretofore called the General-in-Chief's attention to the destitute condition of this department in military resources and supplies of every kind. There is not artillery enough in the department to arm a single post properly, and the supply of ammunition, except for small-arms, is exceedingly limited. Remounts for cavalry horses and draught animals for the quartermaster's department cannot be procured in the department, and the estimates made upon the Quartermaster-General have not yet been answered.

No information has yet been received with regard to the annual supply of ordnance stores required for the use of the troops in the department. If it is the intention of the Government to retain this department, I urgently recommend that the supplies necessary for the efficiency of the troops (regulars or volunteers), and especially those already estimated for, should be furnished as soon as practicable. (Canby to St. Louis 8/16/61, OR)

On the 17th of August Captain W. R. Shoemaker, commander of the ordnance depot at Fort Union wrote to Col. Canby to report that the stores at his depot amounted to two hundred seventy thousand dollars worth - which he noted would be a great loss to the Union if the Texans attacked after the regulars had been sent to the east. He also stated that the New Mexicans would not be able to defend this property without the support of the regulars. He had Ceran St. Vrain and Christopher Carson sign agreement to the letter. Then he wrote a similar cover letter to Major General J. C. Fremont in St. Louis and enclosed the first letter. To Fremont he wrote, “I know that you are well acquainted with the character of this population, and need only to inform you that the volunteers recently raised here are not composed of the rancheros, or even of the better class of Mexicans, but, on the contrary, for you to see how entirely defenseless the Territory will be if the U.S. Army is withdrawn” (Shoemaker to Fremont 8/17/61, OR). This was the same Fremont that Kit Carson had guided years ago to California and back. They had become fast friends and Fremont esteemed Carson’s friendship and judgment. Perhaps it was this letter alone that convinced Fremont to allow the remaining federals to stay in the Territory until the crisis of the Texan invasion had passed. Some people feel that this often-quoted letter is proof that Carson also lacked confidence in the volunteers. However, we shall see later that this is not at all the case and Carson simply felt that New Mexico needed all the help it could get.

Canby continued to cling to his plan to employ the New Mexicans in static positions. On the same day Chapman reported to St. Vrain that 400 Texans were now in possession of Fort Stanton. The actual number was closer to forty than 400. He asked that St. Vrain have Carson send the Utes in that direction to “annoy this party.” He felt that Fort Union was vulnerable at this point and decided to keep the volunteers “close in hand” (Texans 80). Then he wrote to Lt. Joseph G. Tilford of the US Regiment of Mounted Rifles that Captain Pfeifer would leave for the Fort Stanton area with a party of Utes. At this point Canby still wasn’t sure if the Confederate invasion would come from Fort Stanton or from the Mesilla area. His plan was to have ten companies of volunteers, six foot companies of the 2nd Regiment and four mounted independent companies, stationed at Fort Craig with the 1st Volunteer Regiment at Fort Union and he would place a body of regulars in reserve at midpoint in Albuquerque (Anderson to Roberts, 8/17/61, Texans 82). That way he could easily reinforce whichever direction was threatened first. While foot companies continued to work on the earthworks at both forts, the mounted companies were employed in scouting on the eastern and southeastern plans. And the rumor mill kept grinding them out.

I have just received information that I believe to be perfectly reliable, that the Texans now at Fort Stanton amount to eighty men. A man named Beckwith and others in the neighborhood of Rio Bonito have joined these troops & increased their numbers to about one hundred & fifty. It is said that they have treated the people badly, all about that part of the country. (Rossell to Anderson 8/19/61, Texans 161)

On the 19th of August Canby again expressed his fears to Chapman, “I have not much faith in the disposition of the Mexicans to second us in this matter [the defense of NM] but will do whatever I can to rouse them and put the Territory in the best possible position for defense” (Canby to Chapman, 8/19/61, Texans 84). Chapman replied the next day that the mounted scouts had reported in. They had found no sign of Texans in the Sierra Gallina area (towards Fort Stanton) and points in between there and Fort Union. He looked forward to Captain Pfeiffer’s return with the Utes and he noted that the volunteers had a better system for getting news than he did. “There appears to be a regular system of expresses between Santa Fé and the volunteer camp here, and I frequently hear news from the volunteer officers some hours, or even a day before it is communicated through the official channels” (Chapman to Anderson 8/20/61, Texans 85). Well, the volunteers weren’t going to get all their news from the Army. The next day Anderson sent out a circular that mounted volunteers were wanted at all locations (Anderson circular 8/20/61, Texans 86). Roberts reported to Canby on the same day on affairs at Fort Craig.

The people in the towns along the river are disposed to defend their own homes, but they seem indisposed to leave them to join in the defense of our posts. They don’t see the necessity of organization. Volunteers are coming in here daily in small numbers. This is the busy season, when the Mexicans are mainly securing their crops. I am of the opinion that after the crops are secured, the Regiments of Volunteers will be filled up as well as the National Guards. (Roberts to Canby 8/20/61, Texans 121)

On the 21st Captain Pfeiffer and the Utes returned to Fort Union. They found no signs of Texans on the eastern plains. Chapman complained that the number of volunteers out on scout duty would impede the work on the new fort, and he informed Anderson in Santa Fé that the Utes were on their way home because of sickness in the chief’s family (Chapman to Anderson 8/22/61, Texans 88). Carson and Pfeifer could not convince them to stay. At this time Chapman was aware that wagon trains containing uniforms for the volunteers had left Fort Leavenworth on the 22nd of July. “That train contains some seventy boxes of clothing &c. for the Volunteers…” (E.O. Perrin Special Agent to Chapman 8/23/61, Texans 89). To protect the incoming trains Chapman dispatched Lt. Col. Carson in charge of three companies of the 1st Regiment; Senna’s (F), Deus’ (I), and Pfeifer’s (E); as well as Captain Vigil’s Independent Mounted Company. Chapman also organized a hand-picked group of mounted men from the 1st Regiment to leave on the next day to watch the approach from the Pecos River.

The Federal officers noted that the lack of pay among the volunteers was beginning to be a problem and it would continue to get worse unless something was done. It was starting to affect morale. Since the last payroll had been stolen with the group of trains that were taken into Mexico, most of the regulars and none of the volunteers had been paid. Rumors began to circulate that it was not intended that they would ever be paid. Chapman reported as much from Fort Union. “Captain Vigil’s Company of Mounted Volunteers have declined to extend their time to six months. His men have become dissatisfied from a report…that they are not to be paid by the U.S. Govt. from the funds of the Territory.” He also noted a significant problem in the distribution of horses among the volunteers. “The men and horses of the Mounted Companies at this post are unequally distributed, some companies having more men than horses and others the reverse” (Chapman to Anderson 8/24/61, Texans 90). Anderson quickly emphasized that the volunteers would be paid and the unequal distribution of horses would be rectified by direction of the Chief Quartermaster (Anderson to Chapman 8/25/61, Texans 92). Meanwhile, Captain Barrientos returned from his patrol to the Fort Stanton vicinity and reported on conditions at the fort most of which he had learned from the locals.

The [Confederate] Captain who commands the sole company at the fort on the Rio Bonito [Fort Stanton] is James Walker. The company has eighty men. According to reports I have received by trustworthy persons, these parties intend to occupy Manzano at once. By the road from Texas no forces are coming. From this, the people of the Plaza de Jicarilla suspect that if troops are coming, it is from La Mesilla. I have this information from Don Francisco Sanches, who was a prisoner of theirs nine days. (Barrientos to Canby 8/24/61, Texans 163)

Captain Saturnino Barrientos’ Mounted Independent Company began service in early August at Fort Craig for three months duration. Also on the 24th Major Lynde and several of his officers reached Fort Union, the rest of his command arrived the next day.

Major Chapman had orders to “provide them with a suitable place to encamp about a mile above the post.” Such equipment as they had would be turned over to the Ordnance Depot. Captain J. H. Potter, yet growling that “That damned old scoundrel traitorously surrendered us,” too, had orders “to point out a suitable place to encamp.” He selected a site above the first location [that Chapman had chosen] but “on the same water.” When morning came, however, “the water had ceased to run.” Investigation disclosed that Captain Shoemaker had diverted the spring water to irrigate his cabbage patch. Chapman, when appealed to, pretended to the waterless parolees that the area was “not within Fort Union environs – not government property,” and he would not interfere. But Captain Potter was made of sterner stuff; he posted a guard of parolees with orders to see that the water was not diverted from its usual course. Shoemaker then appealed to Fort Union headquarters, asserting that he had been in undisturbed possession of his garden and the water with which to irrigate it for ten years. While the water flowed alternately to the cabbage patch and to the parolees, Chapman “regretted exceedingly that Potter’s remnant [of troops] was having a dearth of water, “and referred the controversy to [headquarters in] Santa Fé. On September 13, Canby ruled, of course, that Fort Union was the center of an eight-mile-square reservation, that the water was government property and subject to troop use. (Union 245-246)

These ill-fated men of the 7th Regiment seemed to have been cursed with water problems. First they were parched in the southern desert between Mesilla and San Augustine Pass, then they played second fiddle to a cabbage patch at Fort Union, and when they finally would set out across the plains bound for the east, many of them became deranged with thirst and some of them even drank their own blood. Hopefully, they fared better back ‘in the States.’

Santiago Hubbell
Captain Ind. Co.

Meanwhile Lt. Col. Benjamin Roberts had sent twenty men of the Dragoons and Mounted Rifles with Captain Hubbell and his company south from Fort Craig to scout the area around Robledo where the Texans were known to keep their advanced guard. Hubbell found them, about one hundred strong, thirty miles south of Fort Craig. On the 25th Confederate Col. Baylor reported to Confederate headquarters that Captain Hubbell had been captured with nine of his men (Baylor to C.S. HQ 8/25/61, OR). However, the next thing we hear is that Captain Hubbell is chasing the Texans back to Mesilla. If he was captured he probably wasn’t paroled because he kept on fighting. Most likely, if the Confederate report is true, his brother Charles rescued him and the battle continued. Captain Moore of the 1st Dragoons does not mention any capture of Hubbell in his report but instead states that Hubbell “opened a spirited fire upon their Camp, and seizing a good position, he skirmished with their entire force until daylight, when they abandoned the Camp and returned toward the Laguna.” Upon learning of this, Roberts immediately dispatched two groups of eighty regulars, one under Captain Moore to reinforce Hubbell and one under Captain Lane to attempt to cut off the Texan retreat. When Moore arrived, he and Hubbell set off after the Texans (Roberts to Anderson 8/24/61, Texans 121). Later, on the 26th Roberts reported that the Texans were not overtaken as they were “well mounted and had extra horses” (Roberts to Anderson 8/26/61, Texans 124). The important thing here is that Hubbell and his men were not, “more afraid of Texans than they were of death.” The NM Volunteers had fought their first engagement and they had won, with the Texans fleeing as fast as they could back to their base in Mesilla.

On August 30th the Third New Mexico Regiment began recruitment. This new regiment would consist of mounted volunteers. Now there occurred something that fully illustrates the preference of the New Mexicans. Canby couldn’t fill out the Second Infantry Regiment and the First still needed some recruits. He thought the New Mexicans were just being totally unpatriotic, but then he called for the Third Regiment to be mounted. It was originally intended to have only four companies but so many men joined that it soon had eight and then ended up with a full ten. And the regiment apparently was filled out in a very short time! Keep in mind that almost half of the First Regiment was mounted and many companies of the Second were unofficially mounted also. Following that, it soon became obvious that another mounted regiment, the Fourth, could also begin recruitment. Lieutenant Manuel Ortiz reported to Fort Union on the 30th with a company of forty-eight men from Las Vegas. They became Company A of the 3rd Regiment and Ortiz became the 1st Lt. of the company. Chapman also reported that another thirty men would arrive that afternoon, presumably belonging to the same company (Chapman to Anderson 8/30/61, Texans 98). The Third Regiment quickly mustered companies A, B, and C with Captains William Mortimore, Ricardo Branch, and Pedro Sanchez respectively. Records are unclear but the regiment would muster at least somewhere between 900 and 1,000 men. These companies were soon followed by the Regiment’s 4th and 5th companies; Company D under Captain Severiana Martinez and Captain Jose Esquibel with Company E; soon after by their 6th, Company F under Captain John Brosee and 7th, Captain Juan Sarracino in command of Company G. The final companies were: Company H with Captain Pablo S. Martinez, Company K under Captain Tomas Valencia, and Company L, commanded by Captain Santiago Gonzales. There was no company I.

While the Third Regiment was mustering the recruitment of the 2nd Regiment continued to plod along and by the end of August they had picked up two more companies and their respective captains: Captain Ethan Eaton with Company F and Captain Anastacio Garcia of Company G. At the end of the month or in the first part of September, the eighth company of the 2nd Regiment would also be mustered. They would be designated as Company H under the command of Captain Juan Labadi. The last two companies of the Regiment would come in later. On the 31st of August, Captain José María Valdez joined the new Third Regiment. He resigned as Captain of Company A of the 1st Regiment to become a Lt. Colonel of the Third, apparently replacing Lt. Col. José María Cháves as second in command. 1st Lt. Francisco Gonzales became the new Captain of Company A, 1st Regiment.

September 1861

Doctor Henry Connelly
Governor
New Mexico

September brought New Mexico a change of governors and on the 4th, Governor Henry Connelly was sworn into office. He had been directly appointed by President Lincoln. It’s surprising how much attention the beleaguered Lincoln paid to this far-flung Territory. Unlike many presidents before him (and after), he took his office very seriously. Col. Canby now had a very firm and active supporter in public office. In his acceptance letter Connelly wrote:

I have the honor to inform you that I will accept the high position which the President has been pleased to confer upon me. I was born in the state of Virginia [1800], but at the age of four years, my father immigrated to Kentucky, where I lived until 1824. Since then I have been, most of the time, a resident of this Territory. (Horn 93)

Henry Connelly had attended medical school at Transylvania University at Lexington Kentucky. He graduated in 1828 and that same year he moved west and became a clerk in a store in Jesus Maria, Chihuahua, Mexico. By 1830 he had bought the store. He married a Mexican woman (name unknown) in 1838 and she gave him three sons. He brought his family to live in Missouri but his wife died soon after. During this time, Connelly tried to find an alternate trade route from Independence, Missouri, through Texas straight to Chihuahua. He made the trip in a caravan of one hundred men, but it must have been a difficult journey because he never tried it again. In 1842 he formed a business partnership with Edward J. Glasgow. He re-married in this period to Dolores Perea Cháves, the wife of the late Don Mariano Cháves, parents of Maj. Francisco Cháves. Connelly built a mercantile store at Peralta near the Cháves family mansion. In 1846, he assisted Governor Armijo in his negotiations with Captain Philip St. George Cook and James Magoffin prior to the American invasion. He served on the Territorial Council from 1853-1859. Now he was Governor of the Territory (Horn 93 and Twitchell II 391 footnote 316). Connelly moved fast. On September 9th he issued a proclamation.

Citizens of New Mexico, your Territory has been invaded, the integrity of your soil has been attacked, the property of peaceful and industrious citizens has been destroyed or converted to the use of the invaders, and the enemy is already at your doors. You cannot, you must not, hesitate to take up arms in defense of your homes, firesides and families… (Horn 99)

At Fort Craig, Col. Roberts wanted to send the regulars to the grassy open plains east of the mountains to escort a train of equipment to Fort Union. He planned to leave the volunteers guarding Fort Craig and points south. From Fort Craig, Roberts wrote to Canby on 9/4/61:

I send the moving command from this Post, taking the Abo pass by Punta de l’Agua for Fort Union. This cuts off some 70 or more miles, is a better road, better watered & better grass. I send from here all the tents, horse equipments &c. that may be needed at Union, to put the columns that march from there in condition to cross the plains [Lynde’s regulars]. No stores will be left here not needed for the volunteers. It takes all the small ordnance at the post to supply the regulars with 100 rounds each for the march. The columns march with 12 days Rations, and they exhaust the commissary stores of the Post; but the train en route from Albuquerque will supply the volunteers to include the middle of October (maybe).

N.B. By moving across by Manzano, I avoid all the river towns, where the small pox is making its ravages. There is not a case in the command, although it is all round the Post. There is no serious sickness at the Post, and yet the malaria of Forts Buchanan & Breckenridge keeps some 60 on the sick list. It is thought crossing the country will do more than the entire pharmacopeia to remove this malaria.” (Roberts to Canby 9/4/61, Texans 124)

Edward R. S. Canby
Colonel
NM Mil. Dept.

On the 6th of September Captain I. N. Moore of the First Dragoons was ordered to set up an advanced guard at Abo Pass east of Fort Craig to give early warning as to any movements of the Texans in that quarter. Provisions would be sent to sustain them there. Abo Pass is in the Manzano Mountains near the present day town of Mountainair. It was on a route that could have been used by an invasion force from Fort Stanton. When the volunteers were ready they would be sent to relieve the dragoons (Anderson to Moore 9/6/61, OR). On the 8th Canby notified the HQ in St. Louis that he would be happy to arm the Coloradan volunteers but at present he only had enough arms for the New Mexicans. He asked for more supplies to be sent from Fort Leavenworth (Canby to St. Louis 9/8/61, OR). Canby must have received his promotion to Colonel as department commander, because he now signed his correspondences as Colonel of the Nineteenth Infantry. The Nineteenth was a new regular army unit but it was not deployed in New Mexico. With this correspondence he enclosed a letter from Governor Gilpin of the Colorado Territory reporting that the two companies of the 1st Colorado Volunteer infantry had been recruited.

On the 8th Canby also reported to St. Louis that the defensive works at Fort Union were nearly complete and could be turned over to the volunteers in a day or two. Actually work would go on for several more months. He also announced that volunteering had slowed and would be supplemented by martial law, “Governor Connelly will call out the militia of the Territory, and then force the people to do what they seem indisposed to do voluntarily” (Canby to St. Louis 9/8/61, OR). On the same day, Canby reported to Governor Connelly the status of the present force of volunteers.

SIR: I have the honor to state for the information of your excellency that the volunteer force required from the Territory of New Mexico is as follows: Two regiments of infantry, 2,092 officers and men, and two regiments of cavalry, 1,632 officers and men. The term of service, both of infantry and cavalry, is three years, but upon the representation that cavalry could not be obtained for that term of service, I have authorized the mounted companies to be mustered in for the period of six months. Of this force the regimental organization of the First (Col. St. Vrain's) Regiment of Infantry is completed, but the companies are not yet full. It will require at least 200 men to bring this regiment up to its maximum organization. In the Second (Colonel Pino's) Regiment only eight companies have been mustered in, and it will require at least 400 men to complete the organization of this regiment. The organization of the cavalry regiments has just commenced, and only one company has been mustered in. Four other companies are reported to be nearly ready, but it will require at least 1,000 men to complete the two regiments, or 1,200 if they are raised to the maximum. In addition to the above force, independent companies of mounted volunteers are called for, but only three have been organized. It is intended to incorporate these companies with the cavalry regiments if the men consent to that extension of their term of service. If they do not, they will be disbanded at the expiration of the present term.

To recapitulate, there will be required for the infantry regiments 600 men and for the cavalry regiments 1,000 men: total, 1,600. The necessary expenditure incurred by the Territory in the organization of these regiments will be defrayed by the Government of the United States, and, as the appropriation for this purpose has already been made, there will be but little delay in securing the reimbursements. (Canby to Connelly 9/8/61, OR)

Eventually clothing was issued to the 1st Volunteer Regiment. Three of the company captains had something to report about that.

Captain Albert Pfeiffer, Company E: “The clothing supplied by the Commissioner is very bad in quality and will not stand ordinary wear. The camp and garrison equipage is also very poor in quality. There being no prices furnished the uniform is not charged on the roll.”

Captain Louis Felsenthal, Company G: “The clothing (uniform) which the men received could not be charged on this Muster Roll because we do not know the price of the same. The uniforms received are of a very inferior quality and can not withstand long wearing.”

Captain Santiago Valdez, Company H: “The clothing supplied by the commissioner is very bad in quality and will not stand ordinary wear. The camp garrison equipage is also very poor in quality. There being no price furnished with the uniform it is not charged. Every man on the roll has received a complete outfit including clothing, blanket, knapsack, canteen and etc.” (NA 22 & 25 – these notations come from the regimental histories that were compiled later, but as they are written in the first person, they are presented here as quotes or near quotes.)

One clothing list for a private Ruperto Burgorques, a musician with Abreu’s Company C, was found in the archives. The list is dated 7/3/61 which was the date that company C mustered in. It cannot be determined exactly when Burgorques received this full amount of clothing - the companies listed above did not remark on upon their clothing until this time period. It’s possible that there were several clothing issues and this list is what he owed money for upon mustering out (list presented by Tony Campisi)

There was no way for the New Mexicans to know it at the time, but poor quality clothing for volunteers was not unique to New Mexico. All over the nation and on both sides of the conflict, this type of thing was happening in various degrees. In the rush to clothe and equip thousands of volunteers orders were given to contractors who furnished the various items a soldier needed. Some suppliers were conscientious and some were not, and all were trying to make a lot of money. Many regiments found themselves with outdated muskets, cheap equipment, and clothes that fell off their backs. The 1st NM Volunteers seem to have made out better than some, not as well as others – having received a full issue of clothing, but it was of poor quality. Even Col. Canby remarked on it a one point. From this list we can deduce that with some slight variation (Mexican style blankets and shirts and surplus US equipment), the Volunteers looked pretty much like most Civil War Union troops. And we can assume that once the men received their uniforms, the officers tried to keep their men looking as regimental as possible so it’s more than likely that they did not look like ciboleros or comancheros - they looked like US soldiers (thanks for the list Tony). In fact, the Confederates at Valverde mistook the First Regiment to be Regulars and the clothing may have contributed to that fact.

On the 10th of September Anderson informed Roberts at Fort Craig that he could not set up an advanced camp yet because, “none of the companies of mounted volunteers that were to have been stationed at the Abo Pass have yet been raised (Anderson to Roberts 9/10/61, OR). But he had men soon enough and Captain Saturnino Barrientos with his Independent Mounted Company was sent there on picket duty. On the 16th Barrientos reported back that he had captured two men, Tedosio Aragon and Gregorio Montaño, whom he believed were Texan collaborators (Barrientos 9/16/61, Texans 164). Four days later Captain Moore captured another New Mexican in the same area whom he believed was also a Texan collaborator His name was Pablo Diretts [Alderete] (Moore 9/20/61, Texans 165).

Manuel A. Cháves
Lt. Colonel
2^nd NMVI

Meanwhile, the 2nd Regiment was still garrisoning Fort Fauntleroy, Fort Craig, and Albuquerque, with Lt. Col. Manuel Cháves at Fauntleroy with three of the companies. Now, as stated before, if Manuel Cháves had a fault it was horseracing and it was going to get him into trouble again. The surgeon and sutler of Fort Fauntleroy was one Dr. F. E. Kavanaugh. He had been appointed sutler of the post by virtue of being the owner of a store in nearby Cubero, a small town of about 500 people, and also as post surgeon because he was the only doctor in the area. He was one of only four non-Hispanic inhabitants of the town. He had once served in the Territorial Council. Now, Kavanaugh had a fine race horse, a Kentucky thoroughbred. The soldiers had nothing to compete with it but if they did win horses in other races Manuel would allow them to sell the new horses to the army, and if they lost, the post clerk had some juggling to do. It seems that even though they were designated as an infantry regiment many men of the 2nd Regiment had horses.

Apparently the Navajos were also avid horse racing gamblers and as they came to the fort regularly to trade and draw rations, they soon wanted to give it a go. In a short time they lost a lot of goods to Dr. Kavanaugh against that horse. In the first week of September a delegation of Navajos under Chief Miguelito entered Kavanaugh’s store, which also served as a kind of officer’s club, and informed Captain José Sena that they wanted to challenge the thoroughbred to a race in the following week. When the day came, two lesser races were run in the morning. Suddenly just as the time for the race neared, 200 fully armed and mounted renegades, known as Ladrones de Chelly (pronounced ‘shay’), appeared. Cháves probably should have stopped the racing at that point, but he couldn’t resist. In all likelihood, there was no stopping it anyway. The Native’s champion turned out to be a sorrell owned by a six-foot four inch tall Navajo called Pistol Bullet. An Indian boy would be his jockey. Lt. Ortiz of Company A would ride Kavanaugh’s thoroughbred (Simmons 167-168).

As was the custom in New Mexico, horse races had no starter, the contestants themselves deciding the moment to begin. Three times the competing horses leaped forward, and in each instance the Indian rider turned them back, saying they had not started together. On the fourth try, the animals were given their heads and shot out neck and neck across the field. What happened next was not clear, even to the spectators, owing to the close-packed crowd and the boiling dust. Sergeant Nicholas Hodt [1st Sgt. Company C], standing some distance away, said later, it appeared to him that Pistol Bullet’s horse did not go a hundred yards before it ran off the track. “I could not see the cause of it,” he stated, “but the report was that the Indian’s bridle broke.” (Simmons 167-168)

The Navajos took the loss of the race very badly. It had appeared to them that the bridle had been tampered with, and it didn’t help any that the New Mexicans celebrated their victory just a bit too much. While Chief Miguelito attempted to calm his people, the Ladrones broke into two groups, one towards the fort and a smaller band towards the army horse herd that was out to pasture. Some of Miguelito’s people followed, including women and children. The Ladrones and guard in front of the guard house opened fire on each other. Manuel sent a platoon to help the horse guards. When it was over he had to report to Canby, whom he knew would not receive it well, especially since his mission was to keep the peace.

It is with deepest grief that I have to report that about the hour of four o’clock, a large meeting [200 men] of the Navajo Indians [the Chelle Ladrones], were racing their horses about 200 yards in front of the guardhouse. Then they all approached to 100 yards and one attacked a sentinel, trying to take his arms from him. Immediately the Officer of the guard, supported by the whole command fired into them, leaving 12 dead and forty prisoners. At this time, another party of Indians attacked the herd party and their escorts. First Lt. Jose M. Sanchez of Capt. Jose D. Sena’s company was sent with 12 mounted and 32 foot recovered all the property except 5 horses volunteers and 1 mule and 2 oxen (US Govt.) without losing a man and capturing 7 of the Indian horses. “I hope you will send me the companies that have to fill the garrison of this Fort as soon as you think proper, as our circumstances require it (Cháves to Canby 9/13/61, Texans 126).

Candelario Garcia
1^st Lt., Co. E
2^nd NMVI

This was the kind of thing Canby had been waiting for. He began his own investigation into the affair and found some discrepancies in the post books although none of it was incriminating. Meanwhile, smallpox and malaria were still ravaging the river towns along the middle Rio Grande. Lt. Col. Roberts decided to get the regulars out into the open country which he said would be better than any doctor or medicine. But he did not want to leave the river towns entirely unguarded, so he decided to deploy the 2nd Regiment throughout those towns to provide protection of wagon trains as well as the populace. As many of those troops were from that area they probably did not mind the assignment. Writing to Canby again from Fort Craig on the 17th, Roberts had come up with a strategy for deployment of the volunteers. He wrote:

I have the honor to submit to you my plan for the general disposition of the forces in this Military District. I propose to hold all the regulars at this post and at Albuquerque, the greater portion of both mounted and foot being kept well in hand here. Colonel Pino’s Regiment of 2nd Foot volunteers, I shall post in the main towns along the river, from Albuquerque down to Socorro, say one company at Los Lunas or Peralta, two at or near Sabinal, and two at or near Limitar [Lemitar]. The other three Companies of the Regiment garrison Fort Fauntleroy, and this arrangement disposes of the eight Companies at present organized.

By this disposition, these forces can furnish all the details for the escort of trains, and no escort will be obliged to make more than a two-days march… The towns will moreover be protected from Indian depredations, and the people, under the sense of security of arms, will more willingly rally to repel incursion, should one be made. The habit of Mexican soldiers to have their wives follow the Camp, can in this way be somewhat indulged, as their families can be housed with them, and their general poverty will find relief in sharing the rations of the men. I doubt not many more volunteers will enter the ranks, encouraged by this plan, and by the presence and efforts of officers in their midst.

This arrangement….will enable me to hold all the regulars at this post & at Albuquerque, ready for emergencies; and save the constant waste of mounted forces by calls for escort duty. The Mounted Volunteers should be held here to operate with the regulars. They serve exceeding well for scouting and picket duty.” (Roberts to Canby 9/17/61, Texans 128)

The regulars were very happy to receive all the new recruits coming in, inferior though they supposedly were, but every new company brought additional problems in supply and equipage. Chapman at Fort Union was especially beset by these problems. The lousy equipment and uniforms was aggravating the already strained relations between the volunteers and the regulars. No equipment at all was even worse. It is remarkable that the volunteers endured all the shortages rations and equipment, clothing and pay, not to mention the racial castigation quite patiently. But things were getting a bit thin in the third Regiment - even they had limits.

During the height of the Confederate spy scare Governor Rencher arrived at Fort Union with orders that he be provided with “transportation and the Necessary Camp Equipage….and any other arrangements that may be necessary for the Safety and Comfort of the party.” He was crossing the plains with his family and leaving the Governorship to Henry Connelly, a resident of Santa Fé since 1848. This unanticipated drain on Fort Union’s escort facilities was followed by another of a similar nature, when Assistant Surgeon B.J.D. Irwin required an escort of “one non-commissioned officer and eight men to protect him on his journey to Fort Leavenworth. The doctor’s requirements were more than Fort Union could provide: “There were no more Kettles on hand.” Furthermore, even Captain Sanches’ [Co. C 3rd Regiment] newly recruited company was limited to “mess pans and one iron pot,” and still another Company (31 aggregate) [probably part of Co. D] just arrived... from Mora” could only be furnished “mess pans and axes.” But on Sept. 20, regardless of the shortage of “Kettles,” the doctor with twelve mounted volunteers took the trail eastward. Learning at Fort Wise that the Santa Fé Trail was ‘entirely clear of rebels,” the doctor thought it imprudent to continue with the escort as “they are very destitute of the proper outfit,” and they were instructed to return to Fort Union. (Union 248)

Without pay, and without the necessities of life in the field, with constant derision by the ‘Gringos,’ the volunteers everywhere were beginning to fairly seethe with rage. A very indignant Captain Severiana Martinez, Company D 3rd Regiment wrote a scathing letter to his superior Colonel Jose Gallegos. He had been sent on patrol and he found his destitute men straggling back towards Fort Union.

Mr. Jose G. Gallegos,
My Superior in this place:

I meet Six men of my Company, who by order of old Chapman were dispached [sic] to the U.S. [with] a certain Doctor, a man of consideration [this is a compliment], to whom my men were delivered by the accoused [sic, probably meant ‘accursed’ rather than ‘accused’] old man, seeing that they were not in any manner recommended by him [referring to Chapman’s apparent dislike for the volunteers], to suply [sic] them with what was necessary to live upon nor on account of their pay, I determined to return them back to my Company. These miserable and unfortunate men with difficulty arrived here with their horses with their provisions behind them, and all this the fault of the old commander, I have referred [sic] to. I suppose he does so believing that we greasers, as they treat us, do not know to distinguish the bad faith with which they [the Anglo officers] conduct themselves in their duty.

My Colonel, I pray you, will have the kindness to cause your interpreter to explain to the commander Chapman what I say in this letter. I have met with no accident and will proceed on my march, God willing, with all the regularity posible [sic] to defend and protect the property of the federal government which has been confided under my orders…

I am affectionately, your Servant who desires to see you. (Martinez to Gallegos 9/20/61, OR)

Most of the correspondences in the Official Records were written by ‘Anglo’ Officers so it is difficult to appreciate what the volunteers and especially the Hispanic volunteers were going through at this time, however, this letter gives us a good idea. The volunteers were met with revulsion and condescension wherever they went. Almost everyone referred to the Hispanics as ‘Greasers,’ even respectable people back in the States. The Anglo volunteers fared better but they were still slighted by association with the ‘inferior’ people. Even men such as St. Vrain and Kit Carson were not always taken very seriously in their recommendations, as some people sometimes referred to them as having ‘too much Injun in them,’ or, as ‘having gone native.’

By the 22nd of September Captain Moore of the 1st Dragoons (1st Cavalry) was reporting in from his camp near Manzano at Abo Pass. He was searching for a good location for a volunteer scout camp in order to post them to watch the eastern and southeastern approaches from the Pecos River and Fort Stanton. Barrientos’ company was still in the Manzano area under Moore’s guidance. Moore was ordered to send them once again to the vicinity of Fort Stanton (Chapin to Morris 9/22/61, OR). There seems to be some confusion in the correspondences between Captain Moore of the 1st Dragoons and Captain Morris of the Mounted Rifles. On the same day, Canby reported to HQ in Saint Louis that recruitment of the volunteers was proceeding well, “650 volunteers have been mustered into the service since my last report, and I think that six companies of the Fourth Regiment can be raised in this Territory and the remainder can be procured in Colorado.” Apparently Lt. Col. Roberts had been correct that harvest time had impeded recruitment for a while. Canby also briefly reported Lt. Col. Cháves’ altercation with the Navajos at Fort Fauntleroy (Canby to St. Louis 9/22/61, OR).

On September 25th Minks’ volunteers clashed with the Texans at Cañada Alamosa. This time the Volunteers didn’t do so well. Minks had just been sent from Fort Craig to set up an advanced camp there. It seems from the start that Captain Minks did not enjoy a good rapport with his men and things quickly disintegrated. He wanted to set up some breastworks for the protection of the camp but some of his men were not very cooperative. About 5pm his pickets reported seeing horsemen towards the south. He sent six men towards Laguna who returned reporting that they were Hubbell’s men who were pasturing horses. Knowing that Hubbell was stationed on the east side of the river, Minks took this group to be deserters and he intended to arrest them if he got the chance. Later when his pickets reported seeing mounted men again, he assumed they were still Hubbell’s men. This was a big mistake. They were two companies of Texans under the command of a Captain Coopwood. Sometime between 2 and 3 in the morning Minks was aroused by a guard who had heard noises from the direction of the town. He assembled his men and ordered them to saddle the horses, but something stampeded the herd, some said it was a gunshot but Minks did not hear it. He told 8 or 10 men to retrieve the mounts but more than 30 men left after them. As he had already detailed 10 men to guard a wagon train and five more were in the hospital at Fort Craig his company was seriously reduced. He only had about 40 men left. Then he heard a “terrible Indian yell” from the direction of the town but before he could give any orders he heard a shout that their camp had been located by the enemy, “Here’s their camp; give them hell!” Firing broke out and the Texans retreated back to the town. John Morrin, a teamster, was wounded in the leg. Minks deduced from the amount of return fire that there were not very many of them and he and a few men went to the edge of town but did not find any Texans there.

When he returned to camp more of his men had skedaddled, probably after the horses. He asked for volunteers to mount and ride into the town with him and Lt. Medina, Sgt. Mennett and a few others agreed to go with him. They quickly found out there were far more Texans than he had thought and they retreated back to camp. By daybreak he found he only had ten men left with him. Some Texans had taken a position on a hill to watch the area for any movement they might make and seeing that he was about to be charged by 60 men and could not retreat, he surrendered. Then he found out the Texans actually numbered 114 men. The next day Lt. Medina was wounded by friendly fire from some of Minks’ men presumably that had not been captured. Coopwood wrote that he had captured the two officers and 23 enlisted men of Minks’ Company (Coopwood 9/29/61, OR). The captured enlisted men were paroled and sent away but Minks and Medina were held as prisoners. The war was over for both of them. Confederate Lt. Col. Baylor reported, “Capt. Coopwood with one hundred and eighteen men was ordered up to Fort Craig to reconnoiter, and had an engagement with the enemy, 180 strong, about Fort Thorn [Alamosa], losing two men killed and several wounded, he killing ten or twelve of the enemy” (Baylor to Stith 9/28/61,Texans 150). Minks had not reported the loss of these men. At any rate, Captain Morris of the Mounted Rifles (3rd US Cavalry) arrived on the scene with Mounted Rifle companies C, G, and K. He sent word for Captain Hubbell to join him from across the River but Hubbell was out, presumably on patrol, so his brother Charles brought the remainder of the company to help Morris. With one contingent of his men flanking the Texan camp on the right, Morris advanced until both sides opened up a firefight which lasted one hour and forty-two minutes. Then he pulled back to see if he could draw them out of their position but they wouldn’t follow, so he made camp in the village (Morris to Selden 9/29/61, OR). The Texans retreated the next day.

Alexander McRae

Meanwhile Rossell, the commanding officer in Albuquerque, warned Chapin in Santa Fé that citizens in the Albuquerque area were refusing induction into the New Mexico Militia forces and that the regulars would have to be ready to apply force as necessary (Chapin to Rossell 9/27/61, OR). Chapin had replaced Anderson as acting adjutant for Canby. Alexander McRae at Fort Craig sent Rossell orders to send the two new companies of Volunteers from Albuquerque to Manzano to relieve Captain Moore’s company (McRae to Rossell 9/27/61, Texans 129). On the 29th of September Captain Moore left the camp near Manzano for Fort Craig (Moore 9/29/61, Texans 167).

Alexander McRae was born in 1829 in Fayetteville, North Carolina to a family that kept a few slaves. He studied at Newark College in Newark, Delaware and was accepted to West Point at seventeen years old. Four years later he joined the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen (RMR) which had been organized during the Mexican War. The regiment performed very well during the war, but was plagued with desertions in its later years in the western United States, as most of the regular units were. McRae joined the RMR in 1851 and was sent to serve in western Texas. After a leave of absence he returned to duty at Fort Union, New Mexico, in 1856 and was placed in command of Company E as a lieutenant for the next five years. Then he was transferred to Company F. He was sent east in early 1860 on recruiting duty and returned to New Mexico in September of that year and he was placed in command of Company K, as Captain Walker was away on leave. In January, 1861 he had participated in a battle under the command of Lt. Col. Crittendon against a Comanche-Kiowa coalition which was defeated. In April, 1861, he was sent to assist Alexander Hatch and neighbors in securing a treaty with the Comanches. No doubt, this is the peace referred to earlier in the text. When the Civil War broke out McRae did not resign along with his fellow southerners. In June he was sent to Fort Stanton as part of the garrison and received confirmation of his promotion to Captain while he was there. When brevet Lt. Col. Roberts shifted his command to Fort Craig in August McRae and his men went with him (Destiny).

The next day, on September 30th, 1861, Colonel Ceran St. Vrain stepped down from command of the 1st Regiment. He went to his home in Mora to run his mills. His reason for resigning was given as on “account of a multiplicity of private business,” which made him unable “to do justice to myself or be efficient in the service.” St. Vrain owned two mills at this time, one at Talpa, near Ranchos de Taos, and one at Mora. In 1850 he had purchased the millstones called “French buhrstones” in Kansas and brought them to New Mexico, when he began to supply the army with flour. His first mill at Mora was built out of wood that same year (Mill). Throughout the 1850s and up until the present, the US Army had been the greatest promoter of commerce within the Territory. The Army bought flour, hay, corn, salt, and cattle (Fort). Kit Carson was promoted to Colonel in St. Vrain’s stead. J. Francisco Cháves moved up to Lt. Colonel and Captain Arthur Morrison was promoted to Major. José Gutierez became the Captain of Company B.

October 1861

On October 1st Confederate Colonel John Baylor reported to HQ that Captain James Walker had captured 48 New Mexican militiamen near Fort Stanton, however the captured unit was not identified. “They were disarmed and released on parole” (Baylor 10/1/61, OR). This is a total mystery. At first I thought this might have been Barrientos’ company but none of the Federal officers report this incident and his company remained active. It is possible that it was a local militia. At any rate, Baylor decided to abandon Fort Stanton as his force was spread out too far and Walker was losing too many men to Indians. On October 3 the Mesilla Times reported that the Apaches in southern New Mexico (I mean Arizona) were on the warpath in a very big way.

By an express from Pino Alto and the Rio Mimbres, bringing urgent appeals for assistance from the citizens, we have startling intelligence from that quarter. The Apaches seem to have united, and their tribes have gathered in hosts and commenced a war of extermination against the whites, in earnest. In such formidable numbers they have never assembled before on the war scout, and never before have they, in all time, evinced such boldness and daring as to attack a town of two or three hundred houses in open daylight. (Texans 150)

The Confederates continued to have more trouble from natives than from Yanks. On a lighter note, on the 4th of October, Lt. Col. Cháves of the 1st Regiment complained that he was required to share his tent with Fr. Damasio Taladrid, the regimental Chaplain. The officers of the regiment had only received fifteen tents out of the thirty-two authorized for an infantry regiment. It can be assumed that the enlisted men were no better off at this time. Without a doubt many of them just slept on the open ground. Cháves closed the letter with, “Hoping that the department commander will authorize me to retain this tent for my personal use” (NA 22). Col. Roberts at Fort Craig had other problems on his hands. On the 5th he wrote to Canby that all his problems at Fort Craig stemmed from drink.

I am merciless enough to charge all our misfortunes in this Territory to drunkeness [sic] of officers. In my estimation, it is the cause of the great demoralization throughout the ranks. If officers daily debauch themselves with whiskey, what can be expected of [the] men? …I am resolved to abate this nuisance in this region, and am destroying all the whiskey about me and seizing the property of all persons who bring it about the Post or sell or give it to the soldiers. (Roberts to Canby 10/5/61, Texans 130)

Chapman at Fort Union was beginning to encounter drinking problems also. Liquor vendors had moved onto the Army reservation again and started selling booze. Since none of the soldiers had been paid yet it was a good bet that the enlisted men were taking the fort apart, one piece at a time, for trade to the vendors. Roberts also reported that Captains Moore and Minks were still posted with their companies ten miles below Fort Craig. He added that of the five Independent Volunteer companies under his command, they did not average 50 men each (Canby states that Roberts had four companies, which makes more sense). Roberts was possibly counting Graydon’s company which had not begun recruitment yet. He had Hubbell’s, Minks’ (what was left of it), Barrientos’, Vidal’s, and Captain Hatch’s, whose company was also just being currently organized. Captain James Graydon was on temporary duty with Minks’ men until his own company could be mustered (Roberts to Canby 10/5/61, Texans 130). With Minks and his lieutenant captured someone had to run the company and luckily, Graydon was available. As it was, Graydon’s company would not be ready until the end of October.

Captain Patrick “Paddy” Graydon was born in Lisnakea, Ireland, in 1832. He came to the US in his teens and joined the US Army, 1st Dragoons, as a bugler, arriving in Santa Fé in 1853. He had fair skin, blue eyes and was about 5’ 7” tall. In 1856 Graydon’s company of the 1st Dragoons was sent to present-day southern Arizona where he served out his term. At the age of twenty-six he left the army and opened a hotel called Casa Blanca, also known as the United States Boundary Hotel, in Arizona, near Fort Buchanan, 60 miles south of Tuscon. His place was run with a good deal of controversy but not too much of it bothered him as he was the self-proclaimed law in the area. He also served as a guide to the troops at Fort Buchanan. When the Dragoons left Fort Buchanan for New Mexico, Graydon went with them. It is said that he lead 70 volunteers for the Union. But if that was true, where were they? Between Connelly and Canby, he received a commission as a Captain authorized to recruit an independent company. He mustered 84 Hispanics from Lemitar, New Mexico. Graydon designed his own silk battle-flag, a blue field with a white cross, and each recruit swore to the banner on his knees by “Jesus Cristo y Santa Maria” to be loyal to the Union. In all likelihood most of his recruits did not actually volunteer. Most people consider Graydon to be the most colorful man of the era, a quintessential western, self-made, “tough hombré.” And this style of volunteering would have been entirely in keeping with his reputation (Tiger, and various online sources).

Raphael Chacon
Captain Co. K
1^st NMVI

In view of events in the south, Canby decided to shift more of his forces to the middle reserve point in Albuquerque during October. He ordered that the regimental headquarters and four companies of the 1st Volunteer Regiment be sent there – companies I, K, E, & H. However Fort Union did not have enough flour to provision the column so they had to wait for some to arrive from St. Vrain’s mill at Mora before they could leave (Fort). No doubt, this was the real reason that St. Vrain resigned. The flour arrived on October 10th and Chacon’s Company K and the other companies finally left for Albuquerque on the 15th with Chacon designated as battalion commander. At Algodones a large number of the men somehow located a quantity of alcohol and became drunk. The regular officers in the group began to fear for their lives and had to hide (there’s nothing quite like a couple hundred drunk ‘Mexicans’ to scare a handful of Gringos). Chacon, with the flat of his sword, and the help of his cousins and the rest of his company soon made short work of the carousers. Chacon states that after that the Americans treated him with respect (Legacy 132-133). It is assumed that Col. Carson and the regimental staff were already at Albuquerque. The remaining companies of the 1st Regiment stayed at Fort Union under the command of Lt. Col. Francisco Cháves, and were still working on the star fort (field works). Chacon says that many officers, Carson and Chacon included, sent for their wives to come live with them at Albuquerque, and he fondly recalled Carson’s conduct with his family, how loving he was to his wife and how playful with the children (Legacy 123).

Sometime in mid-October the trading company owned by the Spiegelberg Brothers was officially designated as the sutler for the 1st Regiment at Fort Union. They moved in beside the other sutler, William H. Moore, who was serving the regular troops. As the volunteers had not been paid yet, and the regulars hadn’t seen cash in a year, both sutlers must have accepted a lot of credit if they did any business at all. Yet, despite regulations to the contrary, somehow liquor was still getting to the troops, some of whom became too drunk to work. Although it was known that others were selling liquor too, the Spiegelberg Brothers were accused of illegally selling it. They responded that their agent on site had been carefully instructed not to sell any liquor to the troops. Chapman replied that he had been doing that anyway, and now he had been ordered to stop. There doesn’t seem to have been any further violation from their firm for the rest of the year (Fort). Canby reminded Chapman about the eight mile limit (again) and told him he had authority to clear out the rumrunners. Besides drink, another problem occurring at Fort Union was that the jails were filling up with alleged Confederate sympathizers. Canby suggested that the jail at Mora could be used and tried to find means to get hearings and trials to move faster (Fort).

On October 11th Canby wrote to Governor Gilpin in Colorado that he was disappointed in the lack of recruits in Colorado. He had hoped the Coloradans could have relieved the regulars at Fort Wise and Fort Garland for duty in New Mexico (Canby to Gilpin 10/11/61, OR). Captain Vidal’s Independent Company was mustered out on October 12, 1861. On the 13th Canby authorized Captain E. Otis of the 1st Dragoons at Fort Wise to begin to raise his own volunteer companies, two infantry and two cavalry (Canby to Otis 10/13/61, OR). On the 18th of October Captain Samuel Archer commanding Albuquerque received Deus’ and Chacon’s companies (1st Regiment) at his post.

I have the honor to report the arrival at this Post, from Fort Union, of Companies “I” & “K”, 1st. Regt. New Mexican Foot Volunteers, with the following Officers, -- 1st. Lieut. R. E. [Eben] Everett, Regimental Adjutant.; 1st Lieut. L. [Lawrence] G. Murphy, Regimental Quarter Master.; Captain R. [Raphael] Chacon [Co. K], 1st Lieuts. A. [Augustin] P. Damours [Co. K] and B. [Bonifacio] Machowicz [Co. I]; and 2nd. Lieuts. J. [Julian] Soliz [Co. K], A. A. [Antonio Avan] Gallegos [Co.I], and J. [John] Murphy, same Regiment – the latter unattached [company unkown, he started as a private and became a lieutenant; served in companies D, E, & B]. The oaths of allegiance, which were administered to the above named Officers to-day, will be forwarded by tomorrow’s express. (Archer to Canby 10/18/61, Texans 131)

Captain Deus himself is not mentioned here. Perhaps he was absent at this time. Since these companies had already been sworn in at Fort Union, the fact that they were sworn in again at Albuquerque indicates the confusion reigning as to the volunteers. In addition, some of Chacon’s men had enlisted for a shorter duration than the rest of the regiment, for only six months. Companies I & K remained at Albuquerque but companies E & H continued south to Lemitar, probably escorting a supply train to Fort Craig (NA 22). Later they returned to Fort Union. By the 22nd of October, companies of the 3rd Regiment were being sent out on patrols east and southeast of Fort Union. They were taking over responsibilities handled by the 1st Regiment (Nicodemus to Chapman 10/22/61, OR). On the 23rd Governor Gilpin wrote to Canby that he had his hands full.

The malignant secession element of this Territory has numbered 7,500. It has been ably and secretly organized from November last, and requires extreme and extraordinary measures to meet and control its onslaught. The core of its strength has at present withdrawn to gather strength from Texas, Utah, Arkansas, and from the country of the Confederated Cherokee, Creek, and other Indians. They contemplate to return with overwhelming strength and precipitate the neighboring Indians upon us. To prepare for what may be accomplished by them is my duty. This country, everywhere open to the east, can only be defended by a sufficient force to meet the enemy in the field. It also enters into their plans to capture Forts Wise and Garland; to surround New Mexico and invade it from the north. The Indian populations west of Arkansas have united with the rebel war to the amount of 64,500, capable of furnishing an efficient army for operations upon these Territories, familiar with this country, and allied to the Georgians, who sympathize with secession, and form a large proportion of our mining population. (Gilpin to Canby 10/23/61, OR)

Once again battered by bad news, Canby wrote to headquarters in St. Louis.

SIR: I have the honor to report that there has been no material change in the state of affairs in this department since my report of the 20th instant. Twelve companies of regulars (six of infantry and six of cavalry) and eleven of volunteers (seven of infantry and four of cavalry) are now concentrated at Fort Craig. With some difficulty, and by uniting two cavalry companies, a harnessed battery of four pieces (two 6-pounder guns and two 12-pounder field howitzers) has been organized, and will march for Fort Craig on the 30th instant. These preparations have been greatly delayed and embarrassed by the want of supplies and the difficulty of procuring such as could be found in the country from the want of funds. The trains en route for this country are again threatened by marauding parties from Colorado Territory, and the presence of an experienced officer at Fort Wise is so important in this connection, that I have instructed Captain Otis to remain at that post with the cavalry portion of his command until affairs in that quarter are in a more settled condition. No volunteers have yet been furnished from Colorado Territory for either Forts Garland or Wise, and very little progress is now being made in organizing volunteers in this Territory. (Canby to St. Louis 10/27/61, OR)

Canby was still keeping a close watch on the officers of the 2nd Regiment. On the 30th Captain Alexander McRae of the regulars reported that Colonel Miguel Pino was AOL [absent without leave] in Santa Fé, since he had not gained any new recruits. “That this want of success is due to a lack of exertion on the part of the officers detailed for this duty is plain from the fact that Captain Graydon of the independent Mounted Volunteers, who has just returned here, after an absence of less than eight days, has succeeded in raising sixty men. …the aggregate of the four volunteer companies [of the 2nd Regiment] is 254…” (McRae 10/30/61, Texans 133). Obviously, Pino had not tried Graydon’s recruiting methods. Captain James Hubbell’s company mustered out the same day. The remainder of Captain John Minks’ company had mustered out the day before. Minks could not reenlist but Hubbell proceeded to organize a new company which became Company B of the 5th Mounted Regiment. Hubbell’s brother Charles would remain with him as his 1st Lt., but his 2nd Lt., Francisco Aragon, decided to go out on his own. He joined the Perea Battalion as a Captain and proceeded to ‘recruit’ his own company.

…by hiring “Expressmen,” the Tiente Segundo [2nd Lt.] soon had the constables at Corrales, San Antonio, Las Padillas, Parajita, and Albuquerque informed of his dearth of volunteers; whereupon these Alguacils readily presented him with seventy-four “volunteers.” Upon delivering recruits, however, neither messengers, constables, nor justices of the peace neglected to tender accounts for services rendered typical of which was the following [receipt]:

The United States to O. P. Hovey, November 13, 1861, For amount paid for Collecting recruits from the 3d Division for Captain Francisco Aragon’s Co. as per….vouchers herewith viz: For Amount paid Expressmen, constable, $68.75. [signed] Francisco Aragon, Capitan, N.M. Militia. (Union 242)

Colonel Francisco Perea

O. P. Hovey had been appointed by Governor Connelly as the commander of all New Mexico Militia with the rank of major general. His Adjutant was General Clever (Wesche). As noted before, there wasn’t enough money to pay the militia, but it is curious that there was enough to pay to round them up. We have not heard the last of Captain Aragon. The Perea Battalion was raised by Colonel Francisco Perea to serve for three months. They were in fact the 3rd New Mexico Militia Division but they are referred to historically as the Perea Battalion. Francisco Perea was a cousin to José Francisco Cháves of the 1st Regiment. He was born in Las Padillas to Juan Perea and Josefa Cháves in 1830. He attended local private schools in his youth and from 1843 to 1845 he studied at a Jesuit college in St. Louis. He received further education in New York City from 1847 to 1849. After that he raised cattle and conducted trade on the Santa Fé Trail. Like his cousin, Francisco, he became a member of the Territorial Council in 1858. He was appointed Colonel by President Lincoln. “At the outbreak of the Civil War Colonel Perea, after consultation with his grandfather and with his uncle, José Leandro Perea, became active in his efforts for the Union, visiting many localities in the Territory and urging the people to remain steadfast for the government.” During the summer he had helped raise the 2nd Regiment and now he was mustering his own unit at his own expense. (Twitchell II 399, footnote 323). Perea’s unit recruited almost 500 men in five companies to serve for three months. Besides Aragon, the other four captains in the battalion were Juan de Dias (Dios?) Baca, Francisco Montoya, Augusto del Balle and John R. Hubbell who was probably a relative of James and Charles Hubbell. It appears that recruitment for the militia was so difficult at this point that men were being pressed into service at gunpoint.

Some things must be said in order to understand why New Mexicans who were ‘dragooned’ into service (as Kurly calls it) performed so well once engaged in their duties. They certainly had many opportunities to desert on the lonely frontier, but by and large they didn’t. A few Hispanos deserted but less than Anglo companies on the frontier, whose desertion rates were sometimes was as high as 25%. In California some entire companies of US Regulars ran for the gold fields. It is a fact that thousands of New Mexicans showed up willingly and stayed on duty despite unfamiliar food, hard labor, lonely vigilance, lack of pay, and worse, constant disparagement by the foreigners they were serving (Kurly). In addition, most of the men knew that their families were hungry and exposed to Indian attacks back home. Americans in the northern states did no better when only small percentages of them enlisted voluntarily and a draft had to be invoked in order to bring the numbers up. Was the American who stood on the docks to find the next pauper just off a boat from Europe in order to pay him to be drafted in his place, any better than a New Mexican peasant who hid in the woods because this war of foreigners didn’t make any sense?

So why, once dragooned, did they fight so well under Americans? Why did the New Mexicans respond well to men like James Hubbell, Paddy Graydon, Kit Carson and others, and so poorly to other Anglo leaders? I think the answer was aptly explained by Kit who said that, “when well officered, their courage is unquestionable.” I believe that went for their loyalty also – loyalty and courage. New Mexicans really appreciated a competent leader who was aggressive and knew what he was doing. What troops ever didn’t? The New Mexicans asked a lot of themselves and in turn they expected even more from their leaders. That’s why bookworms like Canby, Roberts, and Chapman could never gain their respect. To be sure, Canby was personally very brave in battle, but his actions up to this point were not inspiring anyone. He must have appeared terribly confused and indecisive – a man who only wanted to build forts and have his men stand in line for roll call, without pay. A more aggressive man would have retaken Mesilla, Fort Fillmore, Fort Stanton, and Fort Bliss by now. Canby would not even allow the troops to respond to Indian depredations, and sometimes they were personal ones. This was a fact that only corroborated what they had learned about him during the previous Navajo campaign. He was a slow and cautious leader. The NM Volunteers knew from experience that such a man would not win peace on this frontier.

Another good question is why did New Mexicans go along with the drafting by agents of the law, and once caught serve so well? I think the answer goes back to the ancient Hispanic traditions of recruiting for a campaign. It was done by custom and peer pressure. Tio Juan or some relative or neighbor would send a son, vaquero, or peon over to your place to let you know your services were required and if you didn’t want to be at odds with your extended family and neighbors you showed up. If you didn’t want to go you could conveniently be out hunting. The peones, if they didn’t want to be found, would go looking for a lost sheep or out to fetch firewood, etc. If it was a genuinely urgent need almost everyone would show up, leaving enough peones and younger sons to protect the homesteads and flocks of course. Governor-General Manuel Armijo, whom almost no one respected, once collected 3,000 men in three days in this way and more were on the way. The simple truth was that New Mexicans loved to go on campaign - the thrill of the hunt, the camaraderie on the trail, the exhilaration of battle and honors it brought to the individual as well as the group. And the plunder that could be captured was more of a sign of bravery and honor rather than an just extension of riches. These were not just mere trophies and stories for bragging. They were proof of the skills for survival. Also, as an ancient law, military service was officially expected of every male citizen in lieu of paying taxes. Often it had to be done at great expense to impoverished families who sometimes sold children to pay for the horse and equipment. It was all just part of the game and if you were caught shirking you pretended innocence, went along with it, and did your best or were shamed when you went home. It was a harsh life but that’s the way it was.

The First Militia Regiment, the umbrella organization for the militia had at least three “divisions.” This was a New Mexico term and was not used in the regular military sense. These were actually quite small and should have been termed regiments. The First Militia Division (1st NMMD) was commanded by Colonel Manuel Armijo, either a descendent or namesake of ‘His Exellency’ Governor-General Armijo. His second in command was Lt. Colonel Diego Archuleta. The 2nd Division was led by Colonel Nicholas Pino, older brother of Miguel E. Pino, Colonel of the 2nd Regiment. Nicholas had moved to Socorro as a young man and became a successful merchant like his parents, Don Pedro Pino and Maria Baca. He married Juana Rascon in 1842. Nicholas had begun his militia career with the Americans the same time as Manuel Cháves with Ceran St. Vrain’s volunteer company of 1846-47 and he remained active with the militia mostly in the Socorro/Lemitar area. His second in command was Lt. Col. Jesus Maria Baca y Salazar, who was followed by Major Charles Emil Wesche. Major Wesche was a Prussian by birth, born in 1831, the youngest of twenty-four children. When 18 years old in 1849 he emigrated to Guatemala and Costa Rica where he became successful as a merchant. Eventually he moved to San Francisco and then Durango, Mexico, but he lost most of his wealth during the 1857 revolution. Then he moved to Santa Fé and did quite well. He could speak seven languages, five of then fluently. He became an American citizen and a War Democrat in 1861. The unit included ten medium-sized companies, some of which were infantry, but as of yet they had not been activated (Wesche).

   
L-R: Col. Nicholas Pino, Major Charles Wesche; 2^nd Militia Division.

On the 30th of October Captain Barrientos, still near Manzano, had trouble with Native Americans who were trying to steal horses. He solved the problem almost single-handedly, a fact that he could not help mentioning in his report.

Having complied with your order, I inform you of what resulted, which seems to me mere child’s play.

Immediately upon my arrival, it was brought to my attention the Navajos had stolen the greater part of the horse herd from the companies stationed at Abo [Captain Gonzales and Captain Sarracino]. I set off at once with fifty-seven soldiers including two officers. Of those in pursuit, two soldiers and the undersigned caught up. The rest of the troop did not arrive because six worn-out horses stayed behind. We came away with fifty-eight horses, having left in the camp one dead Indian, a dead horse and another injured one. (Barrientos to Canby 10/30/61, Texans 168)

Sources:

Source 1 (Taylor): Bloody Valverde, A Civil War Battle on the Rio Grande, February 21, 1862; by John Taylor, University of New Mexico Press, 1995.

Source 2 (Legacy): Legacy of Honor. The Life of Rafael Chacon, a Nineteenth Century New Mexican; edited by Jacqueline Dorgan Meketa, University of New Mexico Press, 1986.

Source 3 (Wilson): When the Texans Came; by John P. Wilson, University of New Mexico Press, 2001.

Source 4 (Twitchell II): Leading facts of New Mexican History Volume II, Ralph Emerson Twitchell, Esq. The Torch Press, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1912.

Source 5: (Union): Fort Union and the Winning of the Southwest, Chris Emmett, University of Oklahoma, 1965.

Source 6: (Mill): A Brief History of the St. Vrain Mill, by Ray Marchi, http://moravalley.com/st_vrain_mill.htm

Source 7: (OR): Official Records of the War of the Rebellion

Source 8: (Union) Fort Union and the Winning of the Southwest, Chris Emmett, University of Oklahoma, 1965.

Source 9: (Soldier) Soldier/Sailor online database

Source 10: (Fort) an online book on Fort Union by the National Park Service; www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books

Source 11: (Tiger) Desert Tiger, and the Civil War in the far Southwest, Jerry D. Thompson, University of Texas at El Paso, 1992

Source 12: (Destiny) Destiny at Valverde: the Life and Death of Alexander McRae, Marion Cox Grinstead, the Socorro Historical Society, 1992

Source 13: (NA 22) United States National Archives, Compiled Service Records, E522 U5 Roll 23.

Source 14: (NA 25) United States National Archives, Compiled Service Records, E522 U5 Roll 25

Special thanks to Tony Campisi for his help at the UNM microfiche records.