J. Francisco Cháves, Lt. Col., 1st NMVI
Not much is recorded in official correspondences in November 1861. The First Regiment foot companies were still working on the star fort at Fort Union. It is assumed that Companies E & H had returned to Fort Union from their escort to Lemitar. Towards the end of October Captain Barrientos’ Independent company had been mustered out after three months service and apparently he really wanted a new one badly, so he began recruiting at once. On the first of November he reported from the Manzano area, “As of now I have thirty-three men in my company and expect to fill it up this week. I will then leave promptly for Albuquerque to receive your orders” (Barrientos to Canby 11/1/61, Texans 170). Captain Raphael Chacon’s Company K had also been assigned to Manzano to search out some bandits who were terrorizing the area, and he noted Barrientos’ recruiting techniques. “In Manzano I encountered Captain Barrientos, who was there recruiting his company in a very original manner; it was nothing less than obliging the men to enlist by means of force” (Legacy 135). Obviously the idea to recruit in this manner was quite foreign to him. Captain Juan José Herrera, (Co. D, 4th Regiment) who had also been sent there for the same purpose as Chacon apparently was not too diligent in the task. Chacon captured the outlaws and returned to Albuquerque with the prisoners.
In the eastern and mid-western United States the fighting thus far consisted of small sporadic skirmishes the most notable of which was Ball’s Bluff on October 21. Although it was a small conflict it was a spectacular Union defeat. A Congressman who had volunteered was killed. President Lincoln wept while Congress fumed with rage. They responded by creating the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War to oversee further Union efforts. The next battle of note was Belmont on November 7. Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant loaded his Union brigade on steamboats and sailed to Belmont, Missouri, where he landed his troops and routed the Rebel garrison there. He destroyed large stores of Confederate supplies and withdrew as a counterattack was organized. The Confederates lost twice as many men as the Union. Finally, there was a little piece of good news.
In New Mexico, however, things were still watchful. Paddy Graydon’s Spy Company was now on guard at the Cañada Alamosa, as he had done previously with the remnant of Minks’ Company. On the 10th of the month, Alexander McRae at Fort Craig felt it necessary to warn Graydon that he should be careful. “To avoid a misfortune similar to that which occurred to Captain Mink’s Company, it will be necessary for you to observe the utmost vigilance, and to watch well not only the movements of the Texan Scouts, but those of the people at the Canada” (McRae to Graydon 11/10/61, Texans 134). But McRae’s admonishment came too late. If anyone on this frontier would not be careful it would be Graydon and Benjamin Roberts informed Canby of yet another altercation with a Texan patrol. “Captain Graydon’s Spy Pickets fell upon a party of 13 Texans scouting some 30 miles from this Post on Friday; killed one of them and took one officer and two prisoners. They are now in confinement here.” Roberts apparently considered this group to be outlaws rather than scouts and did not hold them as prisoners of war (Roberts to Canby 11/10/61, Texans 134).
In the middle of November Baylor was reporting to Confederate headquarters in Texas the appearance of smallpox in the area (Texans 152). Possibly it had moved downriver. Continuing his investigation Canby had asked Roberts to report on the officers in the 2nd Volunteer Regiment. Roberts replied:
The Commanding Officer of the District having endeavored to ascertain the character of the officers of Col. Pino’s Regiment, in order to point out those who deserve advancement…
Captains Román Baca [Co. E] and Gregorio Otero [Co. D] have been on recruiting service some six weeks, without securing a recruit...2nd Lieut. Mexicano, of Capt. Otero’s Company D has been AWL [AWOL] and 2nd Lieut. [Diego] Sisnero [Co. H] is incapable of instruction. These officers… [should] be dropped.
1st Lieut. William Brady, Adjutant, and 1st Lt. C. E. Cooley R.Q.M. [Regimental Quartermaster] are considered officers of merit and are recommended for promotion. (Roberts to Anderson 11/13/61, Texans 135).
This was bad. The commander of the regiment was considered AWOL, the second in command was under official scrutiny, and several officers including company commanders were recommended for dismissal. The white officers fared better. If Col. Canby had been able to act on these recommendations, things might have become worse for the Second Regiment but, luckily for them, they had to take a back seat to bigger problems. Canby was still plagued with immense financial conditions that were crippling the Territory. To his credit he really was trying to put the District into better straits. He and Major Donaldson, the District Quartermaster, looked everywhere to borrow some money. Canby described his woes in a correspondence to the paymaster General on the 18th of November.
SIR: The military operations in this department have for several months past been greatly embarrassed, and are now almost entirely paralyzed, by the want of funds in the pay department. Many of the regular troops have not been paid for more than twelve months, and the volunteers not at all. This has occasioned a great deal of suffering and some dissatisfaction in both classes, and has almost effectually put an end to the raising of volunteers. This condition of affairs, so far as it then existed, was officially reported by me some months since (June 13, 1861), and has since repeatedly, by reports and estimates, been brought to the notice of the proper authorities.
An unsuccessful attempt was made some time since to borrow money for the Government, and a recent attempt has been made, which promises to be partially successful; but to insure this success, the chief quartermaster and chief commissary have united with me in promising that this money shall be repaid in Treasury notes, bearing 7.3 per cent interest from the date of the loan; or, failing in this arrangement, I have personally pledged myself for the interest. (Canby to Paymaster-General 11/18/61, OR).
Canby wasn’t the only one who was embarrassed, the Paymaster-General was just as embarrassed as he was since Confederate General Sterling Price had carried off the cash that was on its way to New Mexico (Union 250). Sterling Price was the US commander who had put down the 1847 Taos Rebellion in New Mexico. Oddly enough, Confederate Colonel Baylor in Mesilla was fully aware of the loss of funds for the New Mexico Department and he wholeheartedly hoped that this would cause the New Mexican volunteers to revolt against the Yankees. Meanwhile, Yankee Canby knew the Territory was in trouble.
In the hope of warding off the growing crisis, Canby borrowed money “on the official and private credit of the quartermaster, his commissary and himself” through inducing “some of the leading capitalists [to] advance or loan the funds necessary to relieve the Government.” When the advances of loans from the capitalists, who entered into the agreement with “alacrity,” proved insufficient for the Colonel’s requirements, he introduced a system of assessments against persons suspected of sympathy for the Confederacy. (The degree of “alacrity” displayed by those “assessed” was not measured.) The rumors persisted, however, that the United States was bankrupt since it could not pay its soldiers. Canby railed that such rumors “secretly but industriously kept alive all the elements of discontent [among the volunteers] and fanned them into flames.” He feared that, as a result, “the volunteer forces, already organized, will melt away by desertion.” Perhaps such rumors would even stimulate “active opposition to the government.” (Union 250)
Canby had a lot to worry about. As he related above, even the regulars were not very happy and volunteering had dwindled. He felt the volunteers already mustered would desert en masse. He was wrong. To be sure there were some deserters, and likely in the regulars too, and yes, they were unhappy, but the main body of the volunteer forces was loyal and remained intact. On November 20th Captain Francisco Abreu and his Company C of the First Regiment were sent northern New Mexico to build a road for a shorter cut-off for the supply trains coming from Fort Leavenworth. The road through Raton Pass was considered to be a safer route but there was concern that winter snows would close the pass, so it was decided to improve a cut-off trail that led more directly to Fort Union. Another company of volunteers was sent to begin work from the direction of Fort Wise but it was not identified (Fort). This was possibly Martinez’ Company D of the Third Regiment which seemed to be usually deployed in that area. The two volunteer companies would work towards each other. It is not described how the road was made.
Throughout the previous months the hostile natives had not stopped raiding the countryside almost at will and by this time Governor Connelly was becoming fairly frantic. In response to the many requests for aid that were mostly being ignored at this time, Canby laid out a plan to placate the Governor. He hoped to cut out the raiders and send them to reservations and somehow to get the New Mexicans to stop contributing to the vicious cycle of raiding and counter-raiding as well (Canby to Connelly 11/22/61, OR).
On November 26th Lt. Col. Francisco Cháves of the 1st Regiment protested the treatment that the volunteers were receiving at Fort Union and no doubt everywhere else. His complaints echoed those of Captain Martinez. Part of his complaint was that the quarters assigned to the volunteer officers were “unfit for any officer or gentleman to occupy.” He also charged that the volunteers had been harassed with disrespect and “insulting language” (Fort).
Then Lieutenant Colonel J. Fancisco Cháves added substance to the complaint of the volunteers by filing, on November 26, a protest against discrimination, avowing the Neuvo Mexicanos at Fort Union were “slighted in every respect.” “That ‘accoused’ old man,” Chapman [as Captain Severiano Martinez, 3rd Regiment, had called him], immediately summoned Cháves into his presence and told him that, not only had “they not been slighted in any respect whatever,” but he would “venture to say that the volunteer soldiers of your command have never been so well fed, clothed and quartered as at present, and never will be again after they have left the Service of the U. States.” Canby himself took notice of Colonel Cháves’ complaint, reminding him that if officers “enter the service with the expectation of carrying with them the luxuries, or even the comforts of the home, it is an idea of which they cannot too soon divest themselves.” (Union 250-251)
Of course, Lt. Col. Cháves was not simply talking about luxuries. The New Mexicans were used to a very hard life, especially when on the trail. Even at best, life on the frontier was not easy. Cháves was an educated man; he had been schooled in the east, at St. Louis and New York, and knew the difference between good social treatment and bad. He was concerned about his men and he was basically talking about racial discrimination. But neither Chapman nor Canby ever admitted that. There was an investigation of sorts but no discrimination was found. Even so, not forgetting to remind Cháves that most of the troops would be wintering in tents, Canby ordered Chapman to issue mattresses to the volunteers (Fort). On November 27th a forty-wagon supply train rolled into Fort Union. It was loaded with clothing, camp and garrison equipment, and ordnance (Fort). The uniforms for the remaining volunteer regiments had arrived. New clothing, shoes and camp equipment would greatly help the comfort of the volunteers.
J. Francisco Cháves, Lt. Col., 1st NMVI
Even as the trains were rolling in another critical shortage was becoming obvious. Late in November Captain Raphael Chacon wrote a letter to Col. Christopher Carson requesting replacement horses, “My horses are in a dying condition from a want of protection from the inclemency of the weather and from starvation” (Legacy 134-135). The volunteer horses could not be stabled in inclement weather and by starvation Chacon is referring to the fact that the Regulars would not give the Volunteers fodder or forage for their horses even when it was amply available. It is difficult to understand why Canby would allow his mounted forces to be crippled that way. The Volunteers must have reacted vociferously to this treatment but were powerless to change it.
On the 28th of November, Captain Chacon was ordered by Col. Carson to lead 70 men to Mesa Prieta which was considered to be off limits to the Navajos. He was accompanied by Lieutenants Antonio Gallegos of Co. I and Pancho Griego (possibly Francisco Griego of Co. H, 3rd Regiment) and presumably some of their men. Because of the condition or loss of many of the horses the volunteers were forced to assemble parts of companies in order to put together a decent mounted force. As they had done for the past few months (and centuries past) Navajo raiders were using camps close to New Mexican settlements as bases from which to launch their raids. One raiding party that passed near Corrales with stolen horses was believed to be based at Mesa Prieta. Under treaty the Navajo were required to remain west of Cubero (Fort Fauntleroy). Chacon’s orders were to send peaceful natives back to Navajo country and to kill or capture raiders if caught, except for women and children. Chacon’s column went to Prieta Mesa but the raiders had fled so he followed their tracks as far as Ojo de San Miguel where the tracks were lost. Eventually a trail was found and Chacon followed it to Zia Pueblo. Some Navajos were hiding in some houses there. Through an interpreter Chacon ordered them to come out. There was no reply so with his men surrounding the houses, he and his cousins, the Velardes, broke the doors down and went in. There was a brief fight in which Chacon was nearly killed. The surviving natives surrendered (Legacy 137-138).
On the first of December Col. Canby reported to headquarters in St. Louis that the only change in the situation in New Mexico was that the Indian attacks had become worse - now New Mexico was beset on all sides by the Navajos (from the west), Mescalero Apaches (from the southeast), Kiowas, and Comanches (from the north and northeast). He also noted that his army still greatly lacked supplies. He stated that the consequences caused by the Ladrone raiders usually fell upon the peaceful Navajos. The New Mexicans sometimes perpetrated injuries to the Navahos also for the purpose of plunder, thus complicating the situation. “These acts are not restrained by the moral sense of the community, and so long as these marauders find a ready sale for their plunder and for their captives, it will be impossible to prevent these depredations and the consequent retaliations by the Indians.” Canby hinted at the not too distant future when he wrote that the only solution would be, “absolute extermination or their removal and colonization at points so remote from the settlements as to isolate them entirely from the inhabitants of the Territory” (Canby to HQ 12/1/61, OR). He was right. The vicious cycle had gone on for centuries and there was no good solution. The New Mexicans had never had the option of implementing either plan and probably wouldn’t have if they could. When they weren’t on the warpath the Natives were good trade partners and at least one Spanish attempt to establish hostiles on a reservation was a deplorable failure. Unfortunately, Canby’s words turned out to be all too prophetic, particularly for the Navajos and Mescaleros.
On the 4th of December, Lt. Col. Manuel Cháves of the Second Regiment was formally relieved of his command at Fort Fauntleroy and sent to Albuquerque to be placed under house arrest by Colonel Carson. Carson offered him a choice to stay at his (Cháves’) own home instead, but under the same conditions. No charges had yet been preferred. Perhaps Canby was not finished with his investigation. It seems that, perceiving no pardon in sight, Col. Manuel Pino had no choice but to promote Major Jesus M. Baca y Salazar to Lt. Colonel and Captain Manuel D. Pino to Major. Raphael Ortiz y Cháves was then promoted in his place from 1st Lieutenant to Captain of Company A. The three companies of the Second Regiment that had been under Cháves’ command remained on duty at Fauntleroy.
Manual A. Cháves, Lt. Colonel, 2nd NMVI
At this time Captain Juan Barrientos, whose command was now designated as Company A of the 5th Volunteer Regiment, was guarding the crossing of the river south of Fort Craig across from the town of Paraje (McRae to Barrientos 12/5/61, Texans 136). Paraje was located seven miles south of Fort Craig on the east side of the river. The next day, on the 6th, Col. Carson reported that twenty locals in the Fort Stanton area had gone there to see about the crops they had abandoned. They had a fight with Indians and then they saw a party of Texans which left as soon as they were seen (Carson to Canby 12/6/61, Texans 171). On the 8th of December Canby wrote to Headquarters in Washington D. C. regarding the situation of his troops. This letter is significant because he describes the arms and equipment of the different forces under his command.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your instructions of November 9, and to report as follows:
First. The number of regular troops is shown by the inclosed abstract A;(*) the number of volunteers that have already been received by the abstract B;(*) the number and position of all the troops in the department by the field return C.(*)
Second. The regular troops are in excellent condition. They are well instructed and disciplined, zealous and loyal, and, except for the want of officers and recruits to fill the companies, there are no defects of condition. The volunteer troops are improving slowly in discipline and instruction. They are not efficient, and, in my judgment, cannot be made so in any reasonable period. They are deficient in self-reliance and military spirit, and their ignorance of the English language and want of capacity for instruction are serious obstacles to a rapid improvement. For Indian or partisan warfare, and in conjunction with regular troops or volunteers of American origin, they will make valuable auxiliaries, and their services in these respects are already of considerable importance.
Third. The regular troops have the most improved arms--the infantry the Springfield rifled musket, .58 caliber, and the cavalry the Harper's Ferry rifle, Colt's pistol (Navy), Sharp's and Maynard's carbines, and a few of Colt's revolving rifles for experiment. The exact number of arms in the hands of the troops cannot be stated until the ordnance returns are received, but it is slightly in excess of the number of the troops. The volunteers have arms of older models--the rifled musket, .69 caliber; Harper's Ferry rifle, calibers .54 and .58; the cavalry mus-ketoon, the carbine, pistol, and a few companies the smooth-bore musket, .69 caliber. These arms are all in serviceable condition, but the troops are imperfectly equipped, as there is a great deficiency of all classes of accouterments. The clothing of the regular troops is good, and there is a sufficient quantity for all their probable wants until the right period of receiving supplies. Clothing for two of the volunteer regiments has been received and distributed. It is reported to be inferior in quality. For the two other regiments it is supposed to be in trains that are now near Fort Union. (Canby to Washington DC 12/8/61, OR)
Then Col. Canby proceeded to give the current estimates of the Confederate strength in Mesilla, adding that he thought they were very well armed. He also described that the horses and mules of this Territory were not satisfactory for cavalry or draught use, being too light. Then he talked about subsistence supplies, saying that local beef was too expensive, but flour, beans and an inferior salt could be obtained, with only beans and salt being plentiful. Next he wrote about money. He described the “embarrassments” he had experienced “from the want of coin.” Finally, he asked for troops from the east to be sent to New Mexico if and when the regulars were to be withdrawn and he reiterated that, “The New Mexican volunteers, without the support of regular troops or of volunteers drawn from some other section of the country, cannot be relied on to resist an invasion of the country, if one is attempted.”
An invasion of the country, if one is attempted? It seems that Canby did not consider the occupation of southern New Mexico an invasion. But he may have been aware of some incongruousness in his thinking because later, on the 14th of the month, he reported to Washington that he hoped to invade the Mesilla Valley. Still, the Mesilla Valley would be ‘invaded’ instead of ‘liberated.’ Regardless of how he perceived the situation, Canby remained passive. He also noted that the Department of New Mexico was still desperate for horses and mules. “Our operations are still greatly embarrassed by the want of transportation. The arrival of mules from the East in a few days will probably enable us to overcome this difficulty” (Canby to HQ 12/8/61, OR). In short, New Mexico needed just about everything except food. Again, on the 14th he stated, “The contractors for supplying horses for the regular and volunteer cavalry have failed entirely, in consequence of the disturbed condition of affairs on the Western frontier. New contracts have been made, and it is hoped that the contractors will prove more successful (Canby to HQ 12/14/61 OR). He didn’t mention that he could have taken better care of the horses his troops already had. The lack of replacement horses would be almost as much of a problem as the lack of payroll.
On the 9th of December Fort Union received a new commander, Colonel Gabriel R. Paul. Paul had just been selected by Governor Connelly as a Colonel for the new regiment, the Fourth Regiment New Mexico Mounted Volunteers. But apparently this action had not yet been ratified through regular army channels. The Fourth Regiment had actually begun recruiting in September at Fort Union. It had six companies of about 450 men: Company A - Captain Julian C. Shaw, Company B - Captain Julius, Company C - Captain Alonzo Adams (later Captain John Thompson), Company D - Captain Juan José Herrera, Company E - 1st Lt. George W. Cook, and Company F - 1st Lt. John Carmody. Carmody had transferred from the Third Regiment to the Fourth. When he arrived at Fort Union Col. Paul immediately began drilling the volunteers at Camp Cameron, the Volunteer Camp of Instruction near the field works, and he was not satisfied with what he saw. Apparently, the volunteers didn’t know ‘hayfoot’ from ‘strawfoot,’ or in this case, ‘izquierda para derecha’ (left from right), but they were hell at shoveling and construction. Col. Paul noted that while under Chapman’s command the volunteers had received very little time for drill. He petitioned Canby to change that and even went ahead before he got approval (Fort). Canby did approve and Paul put the political prisoners at the fort to work in order that the volunteers could spend more time at drill. Actually, although the new fort was basically defensible, the finishing work would go on until June, 1862 (Fort). Sometime prior to this, some Confederate spy must have viewed the structure because a description of the fort was printed in the Mesilla Times on December 12th, 1861, and it was described as, “one of the best pieces of engineering ever done in America” (Fort). It probably wasn’t but it was darn good advertising especially in Confederate occupied territory. Work was still continuing on the defenses of Fort Craig also.
Except for Indian raids New Mexico remained quiet for the rest of December, but rumors continued to abound. The Texans were not able to begin their invasion and Canby had not mounted his invasion, so the troops just watched and waited, and those not watching worked and waited. On the 22nd of December Captain Francisco Abreu’s company returned to Fort Union from their road building detail. He stated that they had made a very good road but it is not known if this road was ever used (Fort). On the 23rd Captain Barrientos was ordered to relieve Graydon on watch in the south near Alamosa. Apparently, at this time the advanced camp was located at Fort Thorne (Roberts to Moore 12/23/61, Texans 139). But Graydon was not there. He had made a scout south to El Paso. On the 25th Captain Lord of the 1st Dragoons (1st US Cavalry) reported that Graydon’s Company had returned from their patrol. “Graydon has just arrived from El Paso. He left there on the night of the 23rd. He says he counted on the 22nd at Harts Mill 900 Mt. [mounted] Men just from San Antonio. 11 Companies, 3 of Lancers, and two of Negros” (Lord to Fort Craig 12/25/61, Texans 140). The reference to two companies of black troops is unexplainable, but one thing is sure. Paddy was a man of action who did not rely on rumors but rather investigated for himself the movements and strengths of the Texans. One can’t help feeling that if Paddy Graydon had been in charge the Union army would have been half-way to San Antonio, Texas, by now, and there would be hell to pay on the way.
Graydon’s report must have energized Canby from his lethargy because on the next day he reported to Donaldson, the Department Quartermaster, “… I have ordered six companies of volunteers to be concentrated at Albuquerque as soon as possible, and can add two or three more if the news by the express should indicate its necessity. …send an express to Fort Garland with the orders for the company from that place” (Canby to Donaldson 12/26/61, Texans141). Then he lapsed back into lethargy and inaction. On the 28th Canby received more information of the Texans through Col. Roberts’ spies in Mesilla. The numbers were surprisingly accurate but the locations were not. Canby reported immediately to Washington.
On the 26th I received a report from Colonel Roberts, commanding the troops in this district, communicating the information derived from one of his spies from El Paso, to the effect that the Texas forces in the Mesilla had been re-enforced by 1,400 men and that 2,000 were moving up the Pecos for the purpose of attacking the central and northern parts of New Mexico. The first part of this information is no doubt mainly true, but the second I think doubtful, and circulated by the Texans for the purpose of dividing the force at this point. If it should be true it will involve some change in projected operations, and to provide for this contingency I have directed the reinforcement of Fort Union and Santa Fé and the concentration of a large force at Albuquerque. (Canby to Washington 12/28/61, OR)
By now everyone knew for sure that the Texan invasion of northern New Mexico was imminent. Col. Paul at Fort Union increased his defenses by having a well dug in preparation for a siege (Fort). On the 30th Lt. Col. Roberts ordered that the small towns of Paraje and Alamosa as well as the advanced camp be evacuated. He directed that all the townspeople and livestock be sent north. Only Barrientos’ company or part of it would remain on picket guard in the area (Roberts to Lord 12/30/61, Texans 142). On the 31st of December Canby finally received the report that listed the number of troops under his command and their locations. He had 4,752 men total. According to Governor Connelly’s December report 3,500 of these men were volunteers, not counting militia and independent companies. This is quite plausible since the first three regiments had nearly 1,000 men each, and the last two easily had over 500 combined. In addition, the two activated militia divisions (1st & 3rd) and the many independent companies could easily mark more than 1,000 men, so this would mean that Canby had in excess of 4,500 New Mexicans in the ranks or ready to go at this time. Because the population of the Territory was about 90,000 people the total percentage of troops per capita was 5%. Since the highest percentage of troops per capita for the entire war in the eastern Union states was 10% (claimed by two states), this is a very large percentage for the first year of the war, perhaps the highest percentage in the Union. These figures agree with Canby’s Field Abstract because he stated that he had about 1,200 regulars (apparently he had picked up a couple hundred more from outlying locations), leaving him about 3,500 volunteers. These figures are also consistent with the ‘Soldiers and Sailors’ database online, which are higher than this, but accounting for duplications for numerous name misspellings the database seems to agree with these figures. The remaining militia units waiting to be activated would add another 500 men to the above figures.
On the 31st of December Col. Carson sent a warning to Major Luis Baca of the 3rd Regiment to keep a vigilant watch in his sector as a Texan force was expected in that area at any time. This probably refers to the rumor that 2,000 Texans were marching toward Fort Stanton. Major Baca was commander of the advance guard in the Manzano/Abo Pass area at this time (Carson to Baca 12/31/61). Carson was making preparations for a Texan incursion from the east. If they were coming from Fort Stanton there were only two mountain passes they could use, Tijeras Canyon east of Albuquerque (it was known to some as Carnue or Carnuel Canyon at this time), or Abo Pass east of Socorro. Col. Carson began planning his strategy and informed Nicodemus, the acting adjutant at Fort Craig, of his plans.
I intend going out into the mountains some twenty miles east of this post with a view to examine the passes through which an enemy would have to approach this valley, and ascertain how they could best be defended. I shall not be absent more than two days or three at most. Should the Texans attempt to march upon this place, I shall make them fight their way through every mountain pass, and over every inch of ground that I can make tenable for a moment, and the country is well adapted for this kind of fighting.
Should I be reinforced by Colonel Cháves’ command from Fort Union, I will answer that two thousand Texans shall never enter this town. In case of a battle being apprehended, I shall order into service every man in this vicinity that can be armed. I am afraid, however, that we are sadly deficient in ammunition (cartridges) for a long contested battle.
Even with the present force I have no fear for the result, should we be attacked, as I think I could raise a thousand citizens in the valley, and nearly a thousand more troops under my command, and with the advantage of position I could, I think, make a successful defense.
…[a corporal of Co. “I” 1st NMV [Deus’ Co., 1st Regiment] was severely wounded in the throat on an escort to Cubero, returning last night.
PS Captain Pino [Co. A, 2nd Regiment] with his command, aggregate 146 [two companies, A & C, from Fort Fauntleroy], have just arrived. (Carson to Nicodemus 12/31/61, Texans 173)
The important thing about this letter is that Kit Carson did not ask for Regulars to reinforce him, instead he asks only for ammunition. He had “no fear of the result.” The only reinforcement that he mentions is for the remainder of his own regiment, Lt. Col. Cháves’ battalion at Fort Union, to join him at Albuquerque. If Carson had no faith in the volunteers as suggested earlier by Captain Shoemaker’s letter, surely he would have asked for Regulars; but he didn’t. Carson’s confidence in himself, the Volunteers, and the populace in general is in direct contrast with almost all of the Federal Regular officers. He didn’t panic and retreat as Roberts had done at Stanton. He wasn’t paralyzed as Lynde had been in the south or lethargic as Canby was now. He simply planned for defense and he would act on it. I believe most of the volunteer officers had the same attitude as Carson’s; they had the same confidence in themselves and their men. The wounded man mentioned above was Corporal Avita. He was in charge of a detachment from Company I that was sent to Fort Fauntleroy, presumably escorting a supply train. They were attacked by a Navajo party and he was wounded by an arrow in the throat. One of the natives was killed (NA 23). The 2nd Regiment was being drawn in to garrison the river towns along the Rio Grande and the Militia Divisions were taking more of the responsibilities previously held by the volunteers. Militia companies of the First and Third Divisions were being activated to relieve them. The Union forces were slowly shifting south.
In another spurt of excitement, on the 1st of January, Col. Canby sent a correspondence to Governor Connelly requesting him to prepare the remaining State Militia.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's communication of the 29th ultimo, and to state in reply that the reports in relation to the Texan forces are apparently better founded than the previous reports have been. There appears to be but little doubt that a considerable force (estimated at 1,200 men, with seven pieces of artillery) is now on the march to this place. Whether any are approaching by the Pecos is uncertain, but probable. I think it advisable that all the militia should be held in readiness to turn out when called upon, and that all the arms and ammunition should be collected and held for the use of the troops; that the citizens should be instructed through the proper officers to watch the roads and trails, to prevent the entrance of scouts, spies, or small parties who will enter the country for the purpose of cutting off our couriers, plundering trains, &c. They would be useful also in procuring information, preventing the passage of spies, &c., blocking up the roads if the Texans attempt to penetrate the country, &c. A portion of the militia should be held in readiness to re-enforce Santa Fé and another Fort Union. There are a considerable number of Territorial arms below Albuquerque, which should be collected and sent to that place to arm the militia. If powder and lead are taken from the merchants, it should be receipted for, and will be paid for by the Government if it should be used. (Canby to Connelly 1/1/62, OR)
Then Canby quickly wrote another letter again asking Governor Gilpin of Colorado to send Colorado troops to garrison forts Garland and Wise so he could draw those troops into New Mexico (Canby to Gilpin 1/1/62, OR). In response to the rumor mill Colonel Carson called in another company from Fort Fauntleroy and warned his pickets at Abo Pass to be vigilant.
…I have deemed it best to send out to-day three wagons with an escort of twenty men, and have ordered the Commanding Officer of Cubero to send in immediately Captain [Ricardo] Branch’s Co. [B] 3rd N.M.Vols.
I have this morning received a letter from Major [Luis] Baca [3rd Regiment], Comdg. Abo Pass. He reports the departure of Agent Labadi for the [Rio] Bonito with 70 men, and also that Capt. [Juan] Sarracino [Co. G, 3rd Regiment] with 40 men is scouting south of the Bonito on the Pecos, so that it will be impossible for a force to approach that country without being discovered. (Carson to Nicodemus 1/2/62, Texans 204)
Canby approved of his actions. At this time the Federals believed that Confederate demonstrations south of Fort Craig were diversions meant to take attention away from the Fort Stanton area (Nicodemus to Carson 1/3/62, Texans 205). Canby let all commands know that he was prepared to move east from Fort Craig if necessary. He now suspected three routes on which the Texans could approach, up the Rio Grande from Mesilla, up the Pecos from Fort Stanton, and up the Canadian River from Texas (pretty much the same routes he had always suspected, with the exclusion of the Santa Fé Trail). Suddenly, on the 2nd of January, a large group of Texans made a move on the Union advanced camp at Cañada Alamosa, but it was fruitless and they withdrew.
MAJOR: The Texan force that entered Alamosa yesterday morning was about 500 men, with two pieces of artillery. The object appears to have been the surprise of the outposts at that point. Information of the movement had been received from the Mesilla, and the immediate advance of the Texans was discovered by the advance pickets in season to permit the companies to retire without molestation and without loss of any kind. Failing in their object, the Texans retired rapidly by the same road. As soon as satisfied that this movement is not a feint, I shall move (probably this evening or to-morrow) with four companies of infantry, four of cavalry (regulars), and five of volunteers, for the purpose of opposing the reported movement up the Pecos, governing myself in the direction to be taken by information received on the road from the parties now in that direction.
I have conclusive information that this movement was intended when the Texan troops left San Antonio, and that a co-operating movement up the Canadian was projected, but there is now reason to believe that the Texans failed to raise so large a force as was expected, and that the expedition may be suspended for a time. In this case I will establish a reserve camp at or near Las Lunas or Peralta, with sufficient force to act upon either of the lines by which an invasion may be attempted. (Canby to Donaldson 1/3/62, OR)
Of course the Texan force advancing in the southeast was just another rumor, but the news of Texans at Alamosa was not. Canby was right to hesitate before moving east. He now suspected they might come from the south. A few days later Col. Roberts wrote to Canby, who had left Fort Craig for points north, that, “Major Baca [3rd Regiment] reports to me from Abo Pass of date Jany 3d that his scouts had just come in from the Rio Bonito, and having examined the country about Fort Stanton, report no signs of Texans in that region” (Roberts to Canby 1/6/62, Texans 174). There was no attack from the east. On the 7th Canby wrote a letter to Col. Paul at Fort Union, detailing his current strategy. He now situated his Headquarters at Camp Connelly which was located at Polvadera, New Mexico. The volunteer and regular companies were spread out among the river towns so that guarding the supply trains and watching for marauding Indians would be facilitated. Canby intended to collect a cadre of 500 Regulars to reinforce any point which might be threatened. It is not mentioned very much in the Official Records but work was still continuing on fortifying Fort Craig. Most of this work was being done by companies of the 2nd Regiment and possibly some militia units. Canby wrote, “The garrison at Fort Craig consists of seventeen companies, of which six are regulars and nine volunteers, having a reasonable degree of instruction and discipline; a sufficient force in my judgment to hold the post against any force that can be brought against it.” Since six and nine add up to fifteen it is not known what the other two companies were – possibly independent or militia companies. Canby now felt that the Confederates could not muster more than 2,000 men and he could easily assemble his own men in time to meet them. He directed all units to be ready to move on a moments notice. “The governor of the Territory has been requested to hold the militia in readiness for any service that may be required of them, and will furnish any force that may be required by the commanders of forts or districts” (Canby to Paul 1/7/62, OR). On the same day Canby sent word to Major Donaldson at Santa Fé that he had told Governor Connelly it was not necessary to activate the militia at this time (Canby to Donaldson 1/7/62, Texans 207). Meanwhile, Captain Lord of the 1st US Cavalry made a scout in force to the Canada Alamosa and reported no Texans there (Roberts to Canby 1/7/62, Texans 208). A few days later, Canby reported to Washington:
SIR: I have the honor to report that I left Fort Craig on the 6th instant, with a light battery, three companies of cavalry, three of infantry (regulars), and four of infantry volunteers, and have established a reserve camp at this place [Belen] with the regular troops, the volunteers having been sent back to Fort Craig to escort trains on the road to that place.
The valley of the Rio Grande can be reached from the Pecos by the Abo, Manzano, and Galisteo Passes. This point [Belen] is above the Abo Pass, and is centrally and conveniently situated for the concentration of troops to meet an enemy approaching from the Pecos by either of the above routes, or if the main demonstration should be against Fort Craig, with the entire force in that direction.
All the different approaches to the country are closely watched by scouts and spies, and I have no apprehension of the approach of the enemy without receiving several days' notice. The available force in this part of the department, about 1,500 men, can be concentrated at this place in about twenty-four hours.
I have left at Fort Craig nineteen companies--l,400 men--of which six are regulars, ten volunteers of several months' instruction and discipline, one of spies and guides, and two militia. In addition to these, Colonel Roberts has subject to his call six companies of volunteers that can join him in twenty-four hours.
The most reliable accounts from the Mesilla give 2,100 men as the force of the enemy in that quarter. Our scouts on the Pecos report no force on that river within 200 miles of this place. Two [Texan] regiments that left San Antonio, Tex., on the 9th and 16th of November for New Mexico are not accounted for among the troops that have reached the Mesilla. This fact, more than any other, gives probability to the reported invasion by the Pecos. (Canby to Washington DC 1/11/62, OR)
Canby was quite nervous, moving his troops and his headquarters this way and that, responding to every rumor as if the Texans could suddenly appear in his backyard without advanced notice – as if they didn’t have vast terrain to cross first, and numerous pickets to spot them. Even though he knew he had more men than the Confederates did he was still more afraid of the unknown than the known and this made him incapable of implementing his ‘invasion’ plan. Also on the 11th, Captain Dodd and his company of Colorado Volunteers reached a town in northern New Mexico and one of his men, Private Alonzo Ickis, wrote in his diary on the state of affairs there.
Leave Pueblo at sunrise. Travel over hills all day. The cattle can scarcely get along. Camp for night at hozarqui [Abiquiu?]. This is in the mountains and there are no men in the town. They are skulking over the mountains to keep out of sight of the Territorial pressman [sic] who are knabbing [sic] every man who is able to carry a musket and into the militia they go. This Territory is under “Martial Law.” (Mumey)
Ickis’ proclamation that every man in the village was hiding cannot be verified. Perhaps they were. It’s possible that this village had already given many men to the Union ranks. Consider the fact that if all the men were enlisted into the Army no one would be left to protect the village from Indians. The Militia Divisions had been originally created for that purpose but now they were being directed against another threat – a threat that was not constantly at their doors - and the men were being forcibly rounded up and sent away to… where were these Texans anyway? They weren’t near this village. Forced conscription must have appeared to have been a hostile act, detrimental to the community, not one that would save the Territory. The 1st Militia Division or elements of it were already on duty at Fort Union and the 3rd Division was also active. Only the 2nd Division and perhaps some independent companies had not been called out yet.
Meanwhile, Canby’s forces attempted to remove any possible forage from the Confederates if they advanced. Col. Paul at Fort Union was ordered to destroy forage at Giddings Ranch in the east where Captain Pablo Martinez, Company H of the 3rd Volunteer Regiment, was currently stationed (Donaldson to Canby 1/12/62, Texans 209). Then Colonel Kit Carson received similar orders for the Fort Stanton area (Canby to Donaldson 1/13/62, Texans 210). But even with a Texan army on the horizon internal problems would soon beset the Union troops and Kit Carson was the harbinger. On the next day he warned Canby about imminent trouble, not that Canby could do much about it.
I have this morning seen two or three letters from the States directed to Mr. S. Beuthner, which say that there have been several bridges burnt down in Missouri and that the mails have in consequence been stopped.
Major Martin, the paymaster for the Volunteers, is still at Leavenworth, and there is no money on the road to this country nor will there be any this winter sent here. Major Martin is not coming here this winter and there is no saying when the money will come.
If these reports as to the money are true, it will cause a great deal of dissatisfaction among our Volunteer troops, and I am afraid will produce serious trouble. I hope that these reports are not true, but I give them to you as I got them. (Carson to Canby 1/14/62, Texans 211)
Canby immediately wrote to Washington in a desperate attempt to stem disaster.
SIR: The last mail from the East brought information from private sources that the paymaster who was understood to be on his way to this country with funds for the payment of the troops has been detained at Fort Leavenworth, and that no funds would be sent out until spring. Whether this report be true or not, the effect of this circulation through the country at this time will be exceedingly unfortunate, and it is greatly to be apprehended that the volunteer forces already organized will melt away by desertion, and the people of New Mexico will be rendered still more apathetic than they now are, even if the disaffected of both classes are not stimulated into active opposition to the Government.
The Mexican people have no affection for the institutions of the United States; they have a strong, but hitherto restrained, hatred for the Americans as a race, and there are not wanting persons who, from the commencement of their troubles, have secretly but industriously endeavored to keep alive all the elements of discontent and fan them into flames. The long-deferred payment of the volunteers has given so much plausibility and coloring to their representation as to have produced a marked and pernicious influence upon these ignorant and impulsive people.
Without crediting these reports, I think it proper to state that, unless measures are taken at an early period to remove these causes of dissatisfaction, the consequences will be in the highest degree injurious to the interests of the Government. Canby to Washington 1/13/62, OR)
But Canby’s efforts would do no good. The word was out and in a few days it would spread to every military post in the Territory. If the US Army had only missed a couple of payrolls things would have been all right, but the word that was going out now was that the Government never intended to pay them. At this point it was a very difficult rumor to counter. If the Government had been paying New Mexican volunteers throughout the 1850s it would have been easy for them to believe that the mails had been stopped by circumstance not intention. But this felt like a betrayal. As the man said, “Give them something to rally to, and let them know that they have a Government worthy of their support, and they will teach their would-be masters a lesson.” They had sworn service to a government whose agents denigrated them, did not equip or clothe them properly, did not feed their horses, and allowed hostiles to attack their villages with impunity. The duty was harsh; and the language of their superiors was foreign and their customs were strange. At this point enlistment must have looked more like slavery than freedom – and men who had not volunteered did not need much convincing of that. It had become a matter of trust.
The next day Col. Paul’s scouts out on the eastern plains still reported no sign of Texans (Paul to Donaldson 1/14/62, Texans 211). In other locations, at points west and south, the Navajos were still on the warpath, especially in the southern part of the Territory. Nicodemus, the Adjutant-General in Santa Fé wrote to the Navajo Agent, John Ward at Cebolleta near Fort Fauntleroy asking him to gain as much information as he could about the war parties (Nicodemus to Ward 1/15/62). Then the thing Canby feared the most occurred – a mutiny. From Camp Connelly at Polvadera Captain Samuel Archer of the 5th US Infantry sent a report to Nicodemus at Canby’s HQ at Belen (Canby had moved the HQ to Belen).
I have the honor to inform you of rather a serious occurrence that took place in the two companies under the command of Capt. [Anastacio] Garcia [Co. G, 2nd Volunteer Regiment] on their march to this place, at their camp at the town of Socorro. About 30 of the men revolted. These companies were met by Major [Manuel D.] Pino [2nd Regiment] and directed to return to Fort Craig, in compliance with orders from Hd Qtrs Dept., which upon receipt of, they would not obey, stating they had not been paid or clad as they had been promised &c.
Upon receipt of this intelligence, Col. [Miguel E.] Pino started at once for Soccorro. The mutineers (30 in number) fled to the mountains, and the two companies were ordered to march to this Post by Col. Pino and are expected within an hour (it is now 11 o’clock). A detailed account will be sent to you tomorrow. (Archer to Nicodemus 1/16/62, Texans 212)
On the same day, there was another near mutiny staged at Fort Union in one of the militia companies. But it was quickly subdued by Col. Paul. He thought the officers were to blame though he could not get proof, so he discharged them, reduced the NCOs, and put the enlisted men on hard labor until evening. Then he distributed “all the enlisted men among the other companies of Militia at the post” (Fort). The unit is not identified in the correspondence but this could have been Company C of the 1st Militia Division, since that company appears to have been disbanded with the men going to other companies. The militia men had never been promised to be “paid or clad” at all, but perhaps their feelings were similar to the other mutineers. Again, it was a matter of trust.
For some reason the transfers of Lt. Col. Benjamin Roberts and Lt. Col. Gabriel Paul from the Regulars to the Volunteers were still not official in Canby’s mind. Perhaps he needed confirmation from Headquarters in Saint Louis. But most likely it was because he was desperately short of Regular officers. He turned them down, also citing, “Besides this, the prejudice of the Mexican population towards the Americans is so great that if the field officers are taken altogether from the latter classy it is to be apprehended that it will delay, if it does not defeat, the organization of these regiments. This is not, perhaps, a good military reason, but it is a necessity, from the character of the people we have to deal with.” Canby added, “I have also instructed two or three of the most efficient volunteer officers now in the service that, if they would induce the men of their regiments to enter the service for three years, I would recommend them for commissions as field officers. Colonel Gallegos and Lieutenant-Colonel Valdez are among them, and until I can learn what these men are going to do, I could give no definite answer to your question, even if there were no other obstacles to a favorable answer” (Canby to Paul 1/15-16/62, OR).
It appears that to gain some loyalty from the natives, Canby is offering commissions as Regular Army officers to Col. Gallegos and Lt. Col. Valdez of the 3rd Regiment if they would convince their men to extend their enlistments. Since Gallegos and Valdez were already officers of Volunteers, this must be what Canby means. If this is true, it is unprecedented. The US Army had never considered American ‘Mexicans’ as anything but support personnel, guides, and auxiliaries before this time. There had never been an official policy against Hispanics joining the Regular Army (Fort) but it was effectively discouraged on a local level. Even Col. Loring had offered commissions to the Hispanos before Canby did. As it would turn out, both Paul and Roberts would retain their new commissions, Paul as Colonel of the Fourth Regiment and Roberts as Colonel of the Fifth. But this brings up another mystery. Why would Canby start a fifth volunteer regiment when the Fourth had not filled up yet? It only had six companies and Roberts’ two companies of the Fifth should have been included in the Fourth. There is one possible reason to start a new regiment – so that Canby could make his friend Roberts a full Colonel – but this cannot be known for sure. One of the most striking things about the Union forces in New Mexico is the hodge-podge collection of mounted and foot volunteers, militia, and myriad independent companies. It must have been an organizational and logistical nightmare to control. To be sure, the regulars were used to having their companies dispersed, and perhaps they continued it by habit, but during the present crisis it must have been a difficulty.
On the 15th of January Confederate General Henry Hopkins Sibley arrived in Mesilla to take command of the Army of New Mexico, as the Texan force would be called. On the 16th Dodd’s Colorado Company reached Santa Fé where they were issued new clothing. Private Ickis wrote: “In Santa Fe NM. Have received our uniforms… Blue frock coat, good. Blue pants, poor. Overcoat blue, good… Forage cap… Hat and plume… Draw blankets, shoes, and blouse and shirt. Our company looks better since we got the regs on [regulation clothing]” (Mumey). If there was a shortage of clothing for the 2nd NM Volunteers, there certainly was none for the Coloradans. Meanwhile Canby had to deal with the mutineers who said “they had not been paid or clad as they had been promised.” On the next day, the 17th, he wrote to Donaldson, his Chief Quartermaster in Santa Fé.
The news in relation to the pay-master has been telegraphed all over the country, and one of the first fruits of it is a mutiny in two of Col. Pino’s Companies. The refusal of the militia at Fort union to do guard duty I suppose is another. I have instructed Col. Pino to reduce mutineers to absolute submission by force and to let me know if he requires any assistance to accomplish this. The men allege that they have not been paid and clothed as they were promised!! …Roberts has sent a support to his pickets and hopes to catch the party. (Canby to Donaldson 1/17/62, Texans 213)
What Canby means by his remark about the men’s allegations is puzzling. Had the men of these two companies been paid and clothed as promised - or not? It’s not clear. What is clear, however, is that the 2nd Regiment was not helping its image in the minds of the Federals. It was one more strike against them; proof to the Regulars that they would not fight well. New Mexico is quite cold in the winter, especially if one must sleep on the ground. It has already been established that the newer companies did not have proper camp equipage, tents, cooking pots, etc. Neither were blankets ever mentioned. Canteens are described as being scarce. And no one has mentioned shoes. So the highest probability is that the volunteers were correct that they had not been clothed as promised. In addition, those companies that had received uniforms that would not “withstand long wearing” back in September must have been almost in tatters by now. Furthermore, since the $12 per month stipend for horses was never implemented we can assume that the $3.50 for clothing never was either, even as credit. Unless the men received new clothing they would have had to rely on patchwork repairs or civilian replacement clothing. It’s not likely that they ever did receive additional army clothing because at this time First Regiment captains were reporting, “Every man on the roll owes for one complete set of clothing...” (NA 23-25). Back east when the volunteer clothing wore out they always got new ones (eventually), and they didn’t have to pay for them. Responding to the crisis Canby quickly sent orders to Col. Pino at the 2nd Regiment headquarters at Polvadera.
SIR: The colonel commanding the department has learned through Captain Archer that there has been a serious revolt in two of the companies of your regiment, the men engaged in it alleging that they have not been paid and clothed as they were promised. Without stopping to inquire into the correctness of these complaints, he instructs me to say that all such mutinous conduct or tendencies must at once be suppressed by the most energetic measures, and all who have participated in the proceeding, either directly or indirectly, reduced to the most absolute subordination to law and discipline. In doing this, you should make such an exhibition of force as will prevent any attempt to resist, but if resistance is offered, force must be used to the extent that may be necessary in order to overcome resistance and compel absolute submission. Until this is accomplished, no concession or compromise can for a moment be entertained.
The colonel commanding cannot believe that so serious a revolt as this is represented to be would have been undertaken if it had not been prompted and encouraged by designing and traitorous persons opposed to the Government of the United States, but too cowardly to undertake the risk of doing in person what they have prompted others to do, and he desires that you will rigidly investigate this matter, and ascertain, if possible, who have been the ringleaders of the revolt.
Should you need any additional force to enable you to carry out your instructions fully, you will at once report by special express. (Nicodemus to Pino 1/17/62)
On the same day, along with companies A (Gonzales’) & D (Espinosa’s) of the First Volunteer Regiment, J. Francisco Cháves arrived at Los Lunas as commander of that section of river towns and he promptly received orders to pursue the mutineers. He responded quickly, “I will immediately send out a company of men under the command of Capt. Espinosa [Co. D] & Lt. D. Montoya [Co. I], both of the 1st R.N.M. Vols., and the instruction which I received in your communication will be obeyed to the letter” (J. F. Cháves to Nicodemus 1/17/62, Texans 214). Apparently a section of Company I (Deus’) was there also, possibly on escort duty.
L-R: Captain Julian Espinosa Co. D, 2nd Lt. Donaciano Montoya Co. I,
1st Regiment
Col Roberts at Fort Craig thought it was time to begin the evacuation of families (again) in the no man’s land between Fort Craig and Mesilla. There were no large populations there at this time and they could be accommodated further north above Fort Craig (Texans 213). On the 19th, Canby wrote to Donaldson in Santa Fé that the mutineers were still at large. An officer of the 2nd Regiment had failed to capture them and the two companies sent by Lt. Col. J. Francisco Cháves were hunting them. He stated that he had sent two cavalry companies of regulars out also and that they would be caught if the mutineers stayed in a bunch (Canby to Donaldson 1/19/62, Texans 214). That same day a New Mexican named Juan C. Armijo, a private citizen, wrote to Canby, “There is a great sensation among the people, caused by the delay of funds from the States to pay the expenses of the government, especially the volunteers” (Armijo 1/20/62, Texans).
Also on the 20th Captain Santiago Hubbell wrote a letter similar to Chacon’s in which he described the problems that the mounted volunteers in general were experiencing. “The volunteers do all the escorting with these horses untill [sic] by escorting and having no forage they have lost allmost [sic] all or have disabled them and it is a general expressed opion [sic] that a volunteers horse dos [sic] not want more than half-feed to do all the work” (SF Archives, Legacy 139). But Col. Canby was worried about more than just horses. At this point he and other Regular officers were very much afraid that the revolt would spread throughout the volunteer command and might even spread among the civilian population. Things may have looked as if Confederate Col. Baylor might get his wish and the natives would desert the Union altogether. Canby wrote to Donaldsen in Santa Fé, “There is a good deal of excitement in the reputable Mexican population of this part of the country, growing out of the hearing of a pronunciamento [proclamation] on the part of the militia and volunteers.” But Canby indicated that as long as the Regulars were close by they would not openly revolt and he wrote that he had peppered the volunteers with Anglos which would also help against outright mutiny (Canby to Donaldson 1/20/62, Texans 215). If the Hispanos had truly decided to revolt Canby would need a lot more ‘pepper’ than that and he seems to have forgotten that horses also were part of the problem. No doubt remembering that the volunteers had defied him before, yet keeping a cool head, Canby described the situation to Headquarters in Washington DC.
SIR: In my report of the 13th I stated that the news rumored from the East by the last mail would be likely to produce an unfortunate effect upon the volunteers in this country. The news by that mail was communicated to the Mexican population and volunteers with almost telegraphic rapidity, and the first result was a revolt in one of the companies of volunteers (militia) at Fort Union, and in two companies of the Second Regiment Volunteers at Camp Connelly, posts 200 miles distant, but occurring within very short periods of each other, and from the same alleged cause--the failing to pay and clothe them as they had been promised.
The first of these was suppressed by the prompt and energetic action and the excitement allayed by the prudent and judicious conduct of Colonel Paul. The second was not so easily managed, and about 30 of the mutineers made their escape and fled to the mountains. Measures were immediately taken to pursue and apprehend this party, and I do not think they can escape. (Canby to Washington DC 1/20/62, OR)
Captain Aragon of the 3rd Militia Division reported that Captain Espinosa and Lt. Montoya of the First Volunteer Regiment had passed through Fort Fauntleroy on the trail of the mutineers. Aragon had taken over command of the Fort from Captain A. W. Evans of the 6th US Cavalry on the previous 17th.
…On the 20th, of January a detachment of the 1st Rgt. N.M.Vols. [Espinosa and Montoya] arrived here in pursuit of deserters. They left this place the night of the same date for Savolleta [Cebolleta] accompanied by Lieut. [José María?] Sanchez & 20 men of Company B, 2nd Regt. N.M. Vols. and one piece of artillery… (Aragon 2/1/62, Texans 221)
Still on the 20th Col. Canby received an urgent request from Governor Connelly asking again for protection for civilians against the ferocious Indian attacks. Canby wrote back, noting that several regiments of Texans were on the march to the north. Then he stated that the Indian attacks were less critical since they only attacked in small groups while the Texan force was very large, approximately 4,000 men. It would be unwise to spread out the Union troops to guard against the marauding savages. Then he said he will do something for the citizens as soon as Connelly raised a force of his own for that purpose. Canby would not be able to arm or clothe that force (neither could Connelly and Canby knew that). But he could give some ammunition and rations, “and it must be distinctly understood by all who engage in this service that the campaigns against the Indians must be conducted in accordance with the laws of the United States and the policy and instructions of the War Department, and the campaign is to be made for the purpose of punishing the Indians, and not for the sake of plunder or captives” (Canby to Connelly 1/21/62, OR). The incident with Manuel Cháves and his brother Román Baca was still very much in his mind. Meanwhile Col. Roberts at Fort Craig sent Canby an express to inform him that two companies of Texans were seen by the Alcalde (mayor) at Canada Alamosa and he believed them to be the advanced guard for the Texan Army. Apparently not all of the citizens had evacuated yet. The Alcalde also reported that the Texans all wore white scarves on their left arms indicating they intended to fight at night. Then Roberts requested that all of the regulars be sent to Fort Craig immediately because “I have lost confidence in the volunteers since you were here” (Roberts to Canby 1/21/61, Texans 217).
Meanwhile, Kit Carson and other volunteer officers were anxious that with problems in the ranks, Indian attacks, and approaching Texans, they needed all the leadership they could get. A request signed by many officers as well as Kit Carson himself was sent to Colonel Canby asking him to release Lt. Colonel Cháves from house arrest, for which charges had still not been preferred.
The undersigned officers of the Volunteers and Militia of New Mexico would respectfully call your attention to the case of Lt. Col. Manuel Cháves, 2nd Regt. N. M. Vols., who has for two months been under arrest on unknown charges. For years past Lt. Col. Manuel Cháves has been well-known as a loyal citizen, an honorable man, and he has repeatedly proved himself a brave and efficient officer. In our opinion the cause in which we are all so deeply interested is every day losing the services of a man who is one of its strongest and ablest supporters (Simmons 173).
Because of this request, Canby wrote a special order on the 21st of January releasing Cháves to serve with his regiment. Things were hot. The volunteers were bristling with dissatisfaction and rumors of dissatisfaction, the citizens were very angry, and the Territorial Council was fuming. They passed a resolution to muster more men including Pueblo Indians to campaign against the hostile natives. Canby wrote to Donaldson, “I have learned by this evening’s mail that the Legislature is greatly exercised at the Indians depredations & is talking loudly about the sacrifices the people of new Mexico are making to sustain the government of the United States and fight an “imaginary evil” when the real evil is at their doors” &c &c.” Despite Canby’s ranting the Council did have a point. For seven months now, the Texans had seemed dormant. And even if they were massing troops to invade northern New Mexico, the hostile Native Americans had been raiding constantly with very little interference from the Army. To Canby, the Indian attacks were of lesser importance but to the citizens a whole lot of little attacks added up to a big one. To them Canby was concentrating on Texans that had not arrived yet while the Indians were definitely there. Continuing his letter, Canby also noted that, “Roberts is a good deal concerned about some apprehended trouble with his volunteers, but I do not think it will amount to anything” (Canby to Donaldson 1/21/62, Texans 217). The Regular Army officers were on edge everywhere - so were the volunteers and the populace as well. The best thing that could happen to get everyone’s mind off their other problems would have been a Texan invasion, but that wouldn’t occur for almost another month.
Meanwhile, Captain Juan Barrientos, Company A, 5th Volunteer Regiment, asked Col. Canby for lances for his company. This must have been a refreshing change from the topic of the day. Lances had been the traditional main weapon for mounted troops in New Mexico since the earliest days and the older volunteers would have been familiar with their use. Canby had seen Mexican lancers during the Mexican War and he thought it was a good idea (Canby to Donaldson 1/22/62, Texans 217). Soon enough, lances would be in action but oddly enough, they would be Texan lances. Finally, Canby had had enough griping about the Indian attacks. Perhaps admitting that he had indeed committed some negligence he immediately wrote another letter to Donaldson stating that, “As soon as the present emergency has passed, I will turn all the available force into the Navajo Country, and in the mean time will do all that I can without disseminating our force to a dangerous extent” (Canby to Donaldson 1/22/62, Texans 218). It seems at this point that he really did want to address the Indian problem but he felt that he couldn’t.
Amidst the general hysteria a humorous incident occurred in which Captain Raphael Chacon arrested his commanding officer, Colonel Kit Carson. Captain Chacon was Officer of the Day (OD) in Albuquerque. The Officer of the Day was in charge of the post, the guard, and the guard music for a 24 hour period. Then another officer would take over as OD at the changing of the guard. At this time, the men on guard were particularly nervous and alert since the Texans, or even collaborators and spies, were expected anywhere at anytime. Chacon had received orders that day to arrest anyone out of their quarters after Tattoo. Tattoo is the evening signal for all soldiers to be in their quarters. Suddenly, Chacon heard shots from the direction of Barelas which he calls the new plaza of Albuquerque. He formed his company and marched them towards the disturbance and found nothing except another crowd of soldiers who were also coming to investigate the shots. He arrested them all including Kit who was in the crowd. Kit protested that the commanding officer could not be arrested, but the Regular officers agreed that as OD Chacon had the authority. Chacon told them they were all under arrest but could remain in their quarters. He wrote in his memoirs, “Very early in the morning, Colonel Carson ordered his adjutant [Lt. Eben Everett] to call me in order to know if I was going to file charges. I went and told him, ‘no’ owing to the extraordinary circumstances of expecting the enemy at any moment. I later sent word to the lieutenant of the guard that the other officers were free, along with their men” (Legacy 140). Imagine, Kit was saved by the Texans.
Finally, Col. Canby was sure the Texan force would come from the south. He had received intelligence on the disposition of the Texans massing for the invasion and on the 25th of January he sent to Washington a detailed description which he had obtained from spies.
General Sibley and staff arrived in El Paso about a month ago; staff officers A.M. Jackson, I. Ochiltree., Captain Dwyer, and Judge Crosby, assistant quartermaster and receiver of property to be confiscated in New Mexico. The first and second regiments are now between Robledo and Santa Barbara, and are not fortifying themselves. They have taken only four additional pieces of artillery besides those belonging to Colonel Baylor's command (two 32-pounders). General Sibley and staff were to leave Mesilla for Fort Thorn on yesterday, the 16th instant.
The second regiment is expected next week. The troops are badly provisioned and armed; have had about 200 horses stolen since they passed here. Their only hope is to march into New Mexico in quick time, or engage in a war with Mexico (El Paso) to procure provisions. They have no money, and their paper is only taken by the merchants, not by the Mexicans. The Mexican population of (El Paso, Mexico) are much opposed to them, also at Mesilla and Doña Aña. Irisana and Ambugo goods at Mesilla have been confiscated, and that is the order of the day. S. Hart has done more to aid and assist them than the balance of the capitalists have, and has gone so far as to give a list of the principal capitalists in New Mexico, to confiscate their property, and that is their aim. January 17, 1862 (Canby to Washington 1/25/62, OR)
In response to this information Canby issued orders to collect as many Regulars, and Volunteers at Fort Craig as possible without leaving the rest of the Territory entirely defenseless. Elements of the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Volunteer Regiments marched south in three columns – the two companies of Robert’s Fifth Regiment are assumed to have been already there. In addition, part of the First and all of the Second Militia Divisions would be sent there also. On the 23rd of January, Col. Carson heading the Third Column started for the assembly point with four companies of the 1st Regiment; B, C, I, & K. At Las Lunas they were joined by Lt. Col. Cháves with Companies A & D. On the 24th the Column arrived at Belen (NA 23). The remaining companies of the regiment, companies E, F, G, and H under Major Morrison, were ordered to leave their post at Fort Union and also march to Fort Craig. Carson and his men rested at Belen for two days. While there, it was discovered that Navajos had killed a group of Penitentes (a religious group). Three companies of the First including Chacon’s were ordered to hunt them down. They brought along a couple of guns which were used quite effectively. The natives were caught on the aptly named Ladrone’s Hill. A short battle ensued, a few natives were killed and the rest fled with the New Mexicans in pursuit. During the chase, the artillery set up on the hill and fired shots over Chacon’s head, killing more natives at long range (Legacy 141). Meanwhile Espinosa and Montoya were still hunting for the mutineers and Captain Francisco Aragon reported that they had caught three of the deserters and passed through Fort Fauntleroy on the 25th of the month and were headed for Albuquerque. From there they would turn south to follow their regiment to Fort Craig. Captain José D. Sena with his Company B of the 2nd Regiment also left Fauntleroy that same day on his way to Fort Craig (Aragon 2/1/62, Texans 221). It’s likely that Espinosa, Montoya, and Sena caught up with the Third Column sometime during the march.
Meanwhile, late in January Col. Canby wrote a reply to a request that urged him to move upon the Texan threat to the south. Even though troops already were on the move he wrote back a little peevishly, “…I wish it to be said distinctly that I will move when I get ready to move; and that will be when I know that the country behind me is secured from a revolutionary movement” (Canby to Donaldson, 1/25(?)/62, OR). Contrary to his coolness otherwise, this letter indicates that he actually was in apprehension of an outright revolt. In his mind he feared that the Volunteers, Militia, and the general populace of New Mexico would rise up and rebel. Mentally, this put him in a very precarious state.
The Second Militia Division was finally activated on the 25th of January by order of Militia Major General O. P. Hovey. Canby had requested the activation of the remaining militia units and Connelly responded by putting Hovey into action. In his diary Major Charles Wesche reports that he was to act as commander of the 2nd Division in place of Col. Nicholas Pino for the time being. Wesche ordered the Captains to collect their companies and march to the capital city. Meanwhile, the first Columns marching south reached Fort Craig about the last week of the month and set up a tent encampment for Volunteers and Militia east of the fort near the river. It was called Camp Carson, presumably because Kit would be its commander. Col. Carson and the Third Column left Belen on the 26th, resuming their march south.
Still in Santa Fé on the 29th, Major Wesche began a collection of arms, horses, mules, and horse furniture. He also made requisitions for clothing and commissary supplies. They were denied clothing and almost everything else. The Territory still had no money and Governor Connelly had to order the militia officers to purchase at their own expense “Forage, Fuel, Clothing, Camp and Garrison Equipage” (Wesche). It was already understood that the militiamen would provide their own clothing, horses, mules and wagons but even this was a great hardship for many. Major Wesche incurred considerable personal expense by equipping his own Division, for which he was never recompensed. The 2nd Division mustered ten small companies but one was incorporated into two others. Records are sketchy but the Division seems to have had about 300 men and about 130 of them (two companies) were infantry. Meanwhile Dodd’s company of Colorado Volunteers reached Fort Craig on the 31st of January. Private Alonzo Ickis wrote in his diary:
Reach Camp by two [in the afternoon]. This is Camp Carson (Kit). It is situated between Fort Craig and the Rio Grande. It is a pretty camp. Besides our command Kit is here with his regiment of greasers….and two companies of Pino’s regiment of cerahoes [stupid ones]. (Mumey)
Even though the Coloradans had just arrived in the Territory, it seems that the reputation of the 2nd Volunteer Regiment had already been engrained in their minds. This indicates that most of the Regulars had already pegged the 2nd NM Regiment for failure and the Coloradans had heard about it from them. Col. Canby also arrived at the fort on the 31st. Meanwhile in California, Colonel James H. Carleton received orders from his superior, Brigadier General Wright, commander of the California Military District, to begin preparations to march to the relief of New Mexico (Wright to Carleton 1/31/62, OR). James Carleton was a native of Eastport, Maine. He joined the army and was made a 2nd Lt. of the 1st Dragoons in 1839. Just before the Mexican War he was promoted to 1st Lt. Then he was promoted to Captain during the War and quickly brevetted to Major for meritorious conduct at the Battle of Buena Vista. Carleton became a full Major early in 1861 and then became a Colonel of the 1st California Volunteers on August 7th. His command was preparing to march to the relief of New Mexico.
Col. Carson and the Third Column arrived at Fort Craig on the 1st day of February and settled in at Camp Carson (NA 23). While Carson’s battalion was on its march south the company commanders had heard a rumor that the Army intended to cut out the unfit horses of the regiment without supplying replacements and without paying for the use of the horses as promised. This was a matter of deep concern to the Captains whose companies were mounted: Gonzales (A), Espinosa (D), Deus (I), and Chacon (K). On the 5th of February these four Captains wrote a letter to the Regimental Adjutant, Lt. Eben Everett, stating that it was Canby’s intention to keep the best horses in service at the agreed upon evaluation upon enlistment. Unfortunately for most of the men, that evaluation was only about half of what they had actually paid for their mounts. In addition, the unsuitable horses would be given no more forage for subsistence; nor would any compensation be given for their use - and half the horses had already been rejected by this time. Upon enlistment the men had been promised $12 per month for the use of their horses plus forage and most of the men expected to pay their debts from that stipend ($.40 per day for 30 days). The letter also noted that the volunteers had constantly been refused forage for their mounts even when it was amply available, as noted earlier by Captains Chacon and Hubbell. They wrote, “We would ask, is it just that our men should lose their horses when the fault has been a want of forage when there has been plenty in the country, and no fault of their own?” (Legacy 142). This action meant that captains who had financed horses for many of their men would become financially destitute. On another level, one has to understand how New Mexicans felt about their horses in order to comprehend the magnitude of the situation. Unable to dispose of them, were they supposed to shoot the horses that had served them for long hard months? Fearing desertions and great dissatisfaction, the Captains pleaded for assistance. Col. Carson wrote a letter seconding their plight. He was a little more direct, “This course will bring much dissatisfaction and I fear will result badly and I would respectfully but urgently ask the Department Commander that he will, if consistent with the interest of the service, change his present intention in this matter” (Legacy 143).
On the same day Captain Aragon of the 3rd Militia Division, still at Fort Fauntleroy, sent a letter which demonstrates the plight of the Militia. They were running out of clothing and equipment and had no means at all to re-supply, while a nearby sutler, Dr. Kavanaugh, sat on his wares and demanded payment. Well, no one ever accused a sutler of being patriotic.
Sir: Being unable to procure clothing at this post for the necessary use of my Company, I beg leave to ask of you whether my Company has any right in drawing clothing from the Government? Most of my men are entirely out of shoes and other necessary articles for life.
Should the owner of Private Store Kap [Kavanaugh] in this place would know the certain[ty] as to the pay of my Company as Militia, I have not the least doubt he would credit my Company, as most of the people of this Territory are under the impression that Militia men will not receive any pay for their services under no considerations (Aragon 2/1/62, Texans 222).
This was the same Francisco Aragon who had set the constables out to round up his company last summer. To be sure, morale could not have been good in his unit. Not only had some of them been pressed into service without even a promise of pay or an issue of clothing, but here they were in a frontier outpost in January without shoes or other much-needed items. It’s possible that some of the volunteer companies were in similar straits, and especially the ones that mutinied. Given the attitude of the Federal Regulars towards them it’s conceivable that the Second Regiment did not receive all the supplies it needed. Perhaps Col. Carson’s reputation benefited the First Regiment in that regard, and Canby also seemed to appreciate the Third Regiment to a degree; yet even aggressive mounted companies (notably Chacon’s and Hubbell’s) were being denied the forage they needed.
Two days later, on February 3rd, Major Wesche left Santa Fé with three companies: A, foot, with Captain Antonio Sena, B, foot, commanded by Captain José E. Duran, and C, mounted, under Captain Ramon Sena y Rivera. Wesche was joined on the way by two more companies, Company D commanded by Captain Velasquez, and Company E led by José Merced Sanchez. Ahead of them, Governor Connelly, in the company of other Militia troops, probably of the First Division, arrived at Fort Craig on the 4th. On February 5th Major Morrison’s battalion of the First Volunteer Regiment also arrived at the fort (NA 23). The First Regiment was now completely assembled. On February 7th the Confederate forces finally began to move north with Col. Green’s Fifth Regiment and Teal’s artillery in the vanguard. That same day the rejected horses of the First Regiment were removed from the men and the acceptable mounts were allocated among two companies leaving the two other companies dismounted. Deus’ and Chacon’s were to remain mounted and Gonzales’ and Espinosa’s became foot companies. Eleven of Espinosa’s men deserted and “Many years later Captain Espinosa’s grandson still spoke of the terrible financial drubbing his grandfather had experienced as a reward for his patriotism to his new government” (Legacy 143). As the remaining mounted companies, Chacon and Deus found themselves to be constantly on patrol, and with the Texans known to be advancing, nerves were very jittery. A humorous incident occurred that night when Chacon camped in the small abandoned village of Paraje, seven miles below Fort Craig on the east bank. Cats left behind by the inhabitants scared his guards and they instinctively fired into the wailing, promptly ending a supposed surprise attack (Legacy 144). The next day, on the 8th, Carson’s First Regiment passed in review at Fort Craig and Alonzo Ickis noted as much in his diary. The maneuvers of the New Mexicans must have met a measure of approval because later he would grudgingly write, “If these greasers will only fight we are all OK” (Ickis).
Paddy’s Graydon’s first company had already mustered out in early February and on the 9th he began recruiting a new company of about 85 men. These men may have also been from the Lemitar area. On the 12th, Chacon and Deus were sent on patrol again; Chacon on the west side of the river and Deus on the east. Chacon went as far as the small village of Padercillas which was a mile or so below Paraje, Deus’ destination. Deus, who was first to return to the fort, reported that Chacon and his company had been captured, which of course was not true. Chacon had divided his company into two platoons and was reuniting them, not meeting up with Texans, as Deus thought he had seen in the moonlight (Legacy 144). They did not know it at the time but the Texan advance group was only about twenty miles south of the fort. Throughout this period the weather was reported as unseasonably cold with sporadic snow and hail and one can only imagine the suffering of both Texan and Union men alike due to the elements.
The next day, on the 13th, a patrol led by Major Wingate with a company of the 5th US and Captain Dodd’s Coloradans met with a Texan probe a few hours south of the fort (Taylor 22). At last, Col. Canby knew for sure that Sibley’s force was in the area and advancing, and he had a very good appraisal as to their strength of about 2,600 men. He admitted again that he still had “no confidence in the militia and but little in the volunteers” (Canby 3/1/62, OR). Nevertheless, he mustered his men, ineffectual as he thought some of them were, and marched out to meet the threat. But nothing came of it. It was just a patrol and the Confederate body of troops wasn’t there. Canby didn’t know exactly where they were. Perhaps due to a lack of confidence he was hesitant and indecisive and he gave the enemy ample time to consolidate their forces. In contrast to Canby’s pessimism Governor Connelly wrote to William Seward the US Secretary of State, “I have no fears as to the results here.” His sentiments echoed those of Col. Carson earlier. “We will conquer the Texan forces, if not in the first battle, it will be done in the second or subsequent battles. We will overcome them” (Connelly to Seward 2/6/62 OR). Like Carson it appears he had no qualms regarding the capabilities of the New Mexicans “to second us [the Regulars] in this matter.”
Despite Canby’s feelings about the New Mexicans, it was a fact that two thirds of his men at Fort Craig and more than three quarters of his overall force was New Mexican; and except for a few small contingents of Regulars, New Mexicans were the only ones watching the rest of the Territory. Outlying patrols from the remaining portion of the Third Volunteer Regiment were still maintained at Fort Union, stations on the northeastern plains, and at Abo Pass. The bulk of the Fourth Volunteer Regiment and portions of the First Militia Division and all of the Third Militia were also providing garrisons at the various forts and depots as well as patrols and escorts in the central and northern parts of the Territory. If Col. Canby had not had the support of the New Mexicans all of this would not have been possible. The mutiny of the 30 men and the recalcitrant company in the 1st Militia did not speak for the bulk of the Volunteers and although many took it as proof of their general unreliability, it was not true. There is a difference between being unhappy and being disloyal. Some Americans had rebelled for less. To name of few, there was a mutiny in the 69th NY Militia which was a thirty-day unit. Two companies rebelled because they hadn’t been paid before their 30 days were up. Another early war mutiny developed in the 13th, 21st, and 79th NY Regiments because they didn’t like their conditions. At least they had clothes, not to mention the fact that they had been paid as well. When seen in this light, the New Mexicans were amazing. Their endurance under hardship and their ability to continue their duties under that hardship was remarkable. In addition to Carson and Connelly there were other American born people in New Mexico who did not feel at all the way Canby and many of the Regulars did. On February 12th James L. Collins the editor of the “Santa Fé Weekly Gazette” wrote a letter to William Dole, the US Commissioner of Indian Affairs, “The Mexicans have turned out with a spirit that is truly commendable, the best and most influential Mexicans [in] the territory are here and will take part in the battle” (Taylor 14 & 148, note 14).
Meanwhile, Captain Santiago Valdez of Company H, First Volunteer Regiment, had been having health problems and had tendered his resignation earlier in the month. He could not aptly perform his duties and he had decided to resign. His resignation was confirmed on the 15th (NA 25). He was replaced by Edward Bergman who was the 1st Lt. of that company. Also by the 15th, Major Wesche had four companies of the 2nd Militia Division at Fort Craig, companies A, B, C, & E. Company D had been incorporated into C & E by Governor Connelly the day before. The 2nd Division infantry companies were ordered to camp in the post corral while the mounted companies were placed at Camp Carson (Wesche). There must have been some reason for this, since one would think the horses should be in the corral and the infantry in the camp. Canby’s force had nearly reached full strength although a few more militia companies would continue to trickle in.
Edward Bergman, Captain Co. H, 1st NMVI
On the 16th of February Fort Donelson in Tennessee, with a Confederate garrison of 12,000 men, fell to General U. S. Grant’s forces. It was an unconditional surrender. He had already taken Fort Henry on the 6th and was moving into the heart of the South, using a combination of land troops supported by river gunboats. Donelson was a spectacular victory that threw Gen. Grant into the limelight and gave some hope to the North. Further east things had not gone that well. But although Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee would dispute the fact for some time, Gen. Grant had proven that the Confederates were not invincible. That same day in New Mexico Gen. Sibley’s force, completely assembled now, was spotted crossing the river to the west bank south of Fort Craig. At about one o’clock in the afternoon the Confederates drew up in line of battle still south of the fort, hoping to draw the Federals out of the formidable looking fortifications. Col. Canby aligned his force in front of the fort to meet them but stayed well under cover of the fort’s cannons. The Rebels did not advance, except for two companies of Confederates who were seen to be moving to occupy a hill west of the fort, but Chacon and Graydon got there first. Other than that, Canby didn’t move either. Instead, Chacon, Grayden, and Deus were ordered to ride along the enemy line in an attempt to provoke a battle, but except for firing a few shots, the Rebels did not take the bait. They did not want to advance into the range of the fort’s cannon, some of which were actually ‘quakers’ (fakes – logs painted black). Captain Chacon states that his men fired three shots each and a man was killed and another wounded from Deus’ company. He believed these were the first shots fired in the Valverde Campaign. After the rebels withdrew Chacon found fresh graves at that site indicating they had killed six Texans (Legacy 163).
The Union men chafed under Canby’s restraint as they watched the Texans withdraw. Using the volunteers as an excuse for inaction, Canby reported that he spent the next several days operating so the volunteers would not be required to “maneuver in the presence of or under the fire of the enemy” (Canby 3/1/62, OR). He was already using them as a crutch. In reality, for the next two days both sides were paralyzed by a severe sandstorm, not inept volunteers. On the 19th the storm cleared and Gen. Sibley moved his army back to the east side of the river. Many of Canby’s men could not understand why he did nothing and let them cross “in full view of every Union soldier at the fort who cared about witnessing the crossing, and no one attempted to prevent them. Why this was so, no one, either a regular or a volunteer, could discover” (Cháves). Several more mounted companies of the 2nd Militia Division arrived on the 19th and the last one on the 20th. Col. Canby ordered Col. Nicholas Pino to command the infantry portion of the Division and Major Wesche was appointed to take charge of the mounted portion (Wesche) – an obvious slant on Canby’s part. On that day Gen. Sibley, still remaining on the east side of the river, moved his column north opposite Fort Craig. This area was composed of a series of basaltic ravines oriented north/south which provided cover for his column. Col. Canby wrote:
On the 20th the main force of the enemy moved up one of these ravines, and at 4 o’clock in the afternoon had reached a position in which it was possible to attack him, although the ground in his front was exceedingly difficult for the operations of cavalry or artillery. For the purpose of attacking him while on the march the main body of our force had already been thrown across the river and advanced in to the neighborhood of the ravine up which he was moving. Preparations for the attack were made, and skirmishers thrown forward for the purpose of drawing the fire of his batteries and developing his position. This was accomplished, but one of the volunteer regiments (Pino’s) was thrown into such utter confusion by a few harmless cannon-shots that it was impossible to restore them to any kind of order. This and the near approach of night rendered it inexpedient to continue the attack. To mask our intentions and keep the enemy in his position as long as possible a demonstration upon his right flank was made by Colonel Roberts with all the cavalry force, under cover of which the troops were with drawn, the infantry posted so as to prevent his effecting a lodgment during the night on the point opposite the post, and the artillery and cavalry crossed the river to the fort. (Canby 3/1/62, OR)
What we have here is an explanation by Col. Canby that he would have attacked the Confederates in the ravine but the inadequacy of the 2nd Volunteer Regiment prevented him from executing his plan. Clearly, Col. Miguel Pino’s Regiment was already his scapegoat. Not everyone agreed with Canby’s assessments regarding the confusion of the volunteers. Captain Raphael Chacon reported that his company in a force of about 600 Union cavalry (Col. Roberts’ “demonstration”) took possession of the some heights in order to keep the Confederates from setting their cannons there. It was believed that they might have been able to shell Fort Craig from that location. The Texans fired artillery at their position but only a few men were wounded by flying rocks. Chacon does not mention any volunteer confusion (Legacy 166). Major Wesche who was with the same group stated, “The rebels fired some seventy-odd cannon shots, most of them went over our heads, none did harm us” (Wesche). He doesn’t mention any confusion either, and presumably they could see a lot from that hill. Lt. Colonel J. Francisco Cháves of the 1st Volunteer Regiment states unequivocally that the “utter confusion” of the 2nd Regiment never occurred at all.
When our troops were within range of the enemy’s guns they began firing upon us, and there was no confusion among the New Mexico Volunteers to amount to anything. One private of the 3d United States Cavalry had his jaw broken by the gravel thrown up by the ricochet of a six pounder shot and Gen. Canby’s horse was wounded in the hock of one of the hind legs. The union troops were constantly advancing, except when ordered to halt, and they never fired a single shot at the enemy. For some inexplicable cause all the regulars were withdrawn from the field that evening, and ordered to Fort Craig, and the 1st and 2nd New Mexico Volunteers were ordered back to the edge of the mesa, near the river, where they passed the night. (Cháves)
It would seem that Col. Canby’s judgment was not just biased or prejudiced, but rather completely skewed. He appears to have been more interested in watching the 2nd NM fail than in actually attacking the Confederates. A man like Paddy Graydon would have simply shot any skedaddlers and slammed right into the enemy’s flank or rear. A man like Kit Carson would have watched their approach very carefully and executed a few ambushes on their columns as well as raids on their wagon train and livestock to weaken them. Then he would have been at the basaltic ridge before they were. With almost anyone else in charge the Confederates would not have gone this far unmolested.
Speaking of Graydon, it was on this night that he is said to have made his famous ‘mule bomb’ attack. He supposedly tied dynamite to two mules, lit the fuses and sent them off towards the Confederate camp. However, as the story goes, the mules turned around and Graydon was forced to run for his life. The resulting explosion caused the Texan mule and cattle herd to stampede and the New Mexicans rounded them up This hilarious story is very much in keeping with Paddy’s reputation but Lt. Col. J. Francisco Cháves reports that there was no such explosion that night.
It was during that night that the cattle herd and a lot of mules and horses of the confederates strayed off to the river. They were not stampeded at all by any of our men, but they came to the river of their own accord, and our outlying pickets drove them into the fort. (Cháves)
Sources for the mule bomb story are sketchy so we’ll probably never know for sure if two US mules sacrificed their lives for their country on that night. What is sure is that a number of livestock defected to the Union Cause; actually they were just thirsty. And if Graydon actually did try the attack, well good for him. At least someone was doing something.
Sources:
Source 1 (Taylor): Bloody Valverde, A Civil War Battle on the Rio Grande, February 21, 1862; by John Taylor, University of New Mexico Press, 1995.
Source 2 (Meketa): Heroes or Cowards? A New Look at the Role of Native New Mexicans at the Battle of Valverde, an article published in the New Mexico Historical Review, January, 1987; by Jacqueline and Charles Meketa.
Source 3 (Legacy): Legacy of Honor. The Life of Rafael Chacon, a Nineteenth Century New Mexican; edited by Jacqueline Dorgan Meketa, University of New Mexico Press, 1986.
Source 4 (Texans): When the Texans Came; by John P. Wilson, University of New Mexico Press, 2001.
Source 5 (Twitchell): Leading facts of New Mexican History, Ralph Emerson Twitchell, Esq. The Torch Press, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1912.
Source 6 (Josephy): The Civil War in the American West, Alvin M. Josephy, Jr. Vintage Books, 1991.
Source 7 (Felsenthal): Louis Felsenthal, Citizen-Soldier of Territorial New Mexico, by Jacqueline Dorgan Meketa, University of New Mexico Press, 1982.
Source 8: (Union): Fort Union and the Winning of the Southwest, Chris Emmett, University of Oklahoma, 1965.
Source 9: (Soldier) Soldier/Sailor online database
Source 10: (Fort) an online book on Fort Union by the National Park Service; www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books
Source 11: (Tiger) Desert Tiger, and the Civil War in the far Southwest, Jerry D. Thompson, University of Texas at El Paso, 1992
Source 12: (NA 23) United States National Archives, Compiled Service Records, E522 U5 Roll 23.
Source 13: (NA 25) United States National Archives, Compiled Service Records, E522 U5 Roll 25
Special thanks to Tony Campisi for his help at the UNM microfiche records.
Source 14: (OR): Official Records of the War of the Rebellion
Source 15: (Ickis) – Nolie Mumey, Bloody Trails Along the Rio Grande, Old West Publishing Company, Denver, 1958